Filed: Jul. 19, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-3064-ag Chun v. Holder BIA A072 483 923 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SU
Summary: 10-3064-ag Chun v. Holder BIA A072 483 923 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUM..
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10-3064-ag
Chun v. Holder
BIA
A072 483 923
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 19th day of July, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
LIU CHUN,
Petitioner,
v. 10-3064-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_________________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Peter S. Gordon, Forest Hills, New
York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Edward C. Durant, Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Liu Chun, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of the July 14, 2010, decision
of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Liu Chun, No.
A072 483 923 (B.I.A. July 14, 2010). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of the case.
The BIA’s denial of Chun’s motion to reopen as untimely
was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA,
413 F.3d
232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (We review the BIA’s
denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider for abuse of
discretion, which may be found where the BIA’s decision
“provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from
established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains
only summary or conclusory statements; that is to say, where
the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”).
A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90
days after the date on which the final administrative decision
was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8
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U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is
no dispute that Chun’s 2009 motion was untimely and number-
barred, as the final administrative decision was issued in
1995, and it was his second motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the
time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen
if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the
country of nationality or in the country to which deportation
has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
available and could not have been discovered or presented at
the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Chun contends that his Falun
Gong activities in the United States constitute changed
circumstances. As the BIA noted, Chun’s Falun Gong
activities, which he commenced in the United States in 2008,
reflect a self-induced change in personal circumstances, and
therefore do not exempt his motion from the applicable bars.
See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.
2006); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008).
Chun also argued before the BIA that conditions for Falun
Gong practitioners in China had deteriorated. Chun now
asserts that the BIA abused its discretion by “overlooking the
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material evidence which details China’s worsened conditions in
2008.” However, the BIA referenced this evidence in its
decision, and its acknowledgment was sufficient. See Jian Hui
Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that
the BIA does not need to expressly parse or refute every piece
of evidence submitted by the petitioner); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“we
presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence
before him, unless the record compellingly suggests
otherwise.”). Moreover, the BIA’s determination that the
evidence failed to demonstrate changed country conditions is
supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui
Shao, 546
F.3d at 169 (when the BIA considers relevant evidence of
country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review
the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard). While the background materials submitted by Chun
show a general deterioration of human rights around the 2008
Beijing Olympics, and a continued repression of Falun Gong
practitioners, there is nothing to show a worsening of
conditions for Falun Gong practitioners in China in a way that
is material to Chun’s claim, particularly as the evidence is
not focused on Chun’s home province of Fujian, on the
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persecution of individuals who practiced Falun Gong in the
United States, or on the level of persecution subsequent to
the Olympics.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in
this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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