Filed: Jun. 17, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-3504-cv State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nutone, Inc. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N
Summary: 10-3504-cv State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nutone, Inc. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO..
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10-3504-cv
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nutone, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 RALPH K. WINTER,
9 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY,
14 a/s/o Kevin Curran and Elizabeth
15 Curran,
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 10-3504-cv
19
20 NUTONE, INC.,
21 Defendant-Appellee.
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
23
24 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Stuart D. Markowitz, Law Offices
25 of Stuart D. Markowitz, P.C.,
26 Jericho, New York.
27
28 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Marc Rowin, Lynch Rowin LLP, New
29 York, New York.
30
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
2 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wall, M.J.).
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
6 AFFIRMED.
7
8 Plaintiff-Appellant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company
9 (“State Farm”) appeals from an August 11, 2010 judgment
10 entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern
11 District of New York (Wall, M.J.) in favor of Defendant-
12 Appellee Nutone, Inc. (“Nutone”) dismissing State Farm’s
13 claims of design defect and negligent failure to warn. We
14 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
15 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
16
17 “In reviewing a district court’s decision in a bench
18 trial, we review the district court’s findings of fact for
19 clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” White v.
20 White Rose Food,
237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001). “Under
21 the clearly erroneous standard, there is a strong
22 presumption in favor of a trial court’s findings of fact if
23 supported by substantial evidence. We will not upset a
24 factual finding unless we are left with the definite and
25 firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Id.
26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
28 [1] To establish a prima facie case in a strict products
29 liability action predicated on a design defect, a “plaintiff
30 must show that the manufacturer breached its duty to market
31 safe products when it marketed a product designed so that it
32 was not reasonably safe and that the defective design was a
33 substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury.” Voss v.
34 Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
59 N.Y.2d 102, 107 (1983). “A
35 manufacturer who places a defective product on the market
36 that causes injury may be liable for the ensuing injuries.
37 A product may be defective when it contains a manufacturing
38 flaw, is defectively designed or is not accompanied by
39 adequate warnings for the use of the product.” Liriano v.
40 Hobart Corp.,
92 N.Y.2d 232, 237 (1998) (internal citations
41 omitted). “[A] manufacturer of a product may not be cast in
42 damages, either on a strict products liability or negligence
43 cause of action, where, after the product leaves the
44 possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a
45 subsequent modification which substantially alters the
46 product and is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”
2
1 Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49
2 N.Y.2d 471, 475 (1980).
3
4 State Farm contends that the magistrate judge erred by
5 placing the burden on State Farm to prove that: (1) the
6 ceiling fan did not contain a thermal cut-off (“TCO”) as
7 manufactured; and (2) the ceiling fan was not substantially
8 modified after leaving Nutone’s possession. We disagree.
9 The magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of
10 law make no mention of the burden of proof. Instead, the
11 magistrate judge relied on documentary evidence and expert
12 testimony in concluding that the ceiling fan was designed
13 and manufactured with a TCO and that the ceiling fan was
14 modified at some point after leaving Nutone. Although
15 neither party could identify who removed the TCO, the
16 magistrate judge credited testimony that, sometimes,
17 “workers do unexpected things in the field.” State Farm
18 Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nutone, Inc., No. CV 05-4817(WDW), 2010
19 WL 3154853, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2010). These findings
20 of fact are not clearly erroneous with respect to State
21 Farm’s design defect claim.
22
23 [2] To prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, a
24 plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a manufacturer has a
25 duty to warn (2) against dangers resulting from foreseeable
26 uses about which it knew or should have known, and (3) that
27 failure to do so was the proximate cause of the harm. See
28
Liriano, 92 N.Y.2d at 237. “A manufacturer has a duty to
29 warn against latent dangers resulting from foreseeable uses
30 of its product of which it knew or should have known.”
Id.
31
32 As the magistrate judge concluded, State Farm offered
33 no evidence showing that Nutone’s failure to warn was a
34 substantial factor in causing the fire. Nutone,
2010 WL
35 3154853, at *9. There was no evidence as to where a warning
36 should have been placed, what it should have said, and
37 whether it would have been heeded. Accordingly, the
38 magistrate judge’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
39
40 We have considered all of State Farm’s remaining
41 arguments and find them to be without merit. For the
42 foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
43 hereby AFFIRMED.
44 FOR THE COURT:
45 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
46
3