Filed: Oct. 20, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-3669-ag Ci v. Holder BIA Abrams, IJ A094 800 768 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOT
Summary: 10-3669-ag Ci v. Holder BIA Abrams, IJ A094 800 768 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA..
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10-3669-ag
Ci v. Holder
BIA
Abrams, IJ
A094 800 768
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 20th day of October, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 ______________________________________
12
13 CHUN LAN CI,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 10-3669-ag
17 NAC
18 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondents.
22 ______________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Dehai Zhang, Flushing, New York.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENTS: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
27 General; Jennifer Paisner Williams,
28 Senior Litigation Counsel; Margaret
29 Kuehne Taylor, Attorney, Office of
1 Immigration Litigation, United
2 States Department of Justice,
3 Washington, D.C.
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Chun Lan Ci, a native and citizen of China, seeks
9 review of an August 24, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the
10 October 24, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
11 Steven R. Abrams, which denied Ci’s application for asylum,
12 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
13 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chun Lan Ci, No. A094 800
14 768 (B.I.A. Aug. 24, 2010), aff’g No. A094 800 768 (Immig.
15 Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 24, 2008). We assume the parties’
16 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
17 in this case.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have
19 considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
20 sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237
21 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are
22 well-established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also
23 Corovic v. Mukasey,
519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008);
24 Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
2
1 Contrary to Ci’s position, substantial evidence
2 supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
3 For asylum applications like Ci’s, governed by the REAL ID
4 Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the
5 circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum
6 applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, or
7 inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether
8 they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The agency reasonably relied on
10 inconsistencies in Ci’s testimony and between Ci’s testimony
11 and information she had previously provided. See Xiu Xia
12 Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). As the IJ
13 found, Ci testified that she wanted to have more children
14 and attempted to conceive, yet did not remove an
15 intrauterine device (“IUD”) she had inserted in 1995 until
16 2007. Additionally, as to the IUD, Ci testified that it was
17 inserted in 1995, but her written statement listed the date
18 as 2004. She also testified inconsistently as to the year
19 she divorced her first husband and the year she married her
20 second husband, first stating that the divorce and
21 remarriage occurred in 2005, but later changing her
22 testimony and stating she divorced in 1995. These
23 inconsistencies provide substantial evidence in support of
3
1 the adverse credibility finding. Moreover, contrary to Ci’s
2 argument, these inconsistencies were a sufficient basis for
3 the agency’s adverse credibility finding, even if they do
4 not go to the heart of her claim. 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 162 at 163.
6 Ci also argues that the IJ erred in concluding that
7 corroborating documents were needed for her to meet her
8 burden of demonstrating that she was eligible for relief.
9 This argument is unpersuasive. “While consistent, detailed,
10 and credible testimony may be sufficient to carry the
11 alien’s burden, evidence corroborating his story, or an
12 explanation for its absence, may be required where it would
13 reasonably be expected.” Diallo v. INS,
232 F.3d 279, 285
14 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 8 U.S.C. §§
15 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(C) (codifying the same
16 principle). The agency’s determination that a particular
17 piece of corroborating evidence is available to the
18 applicant is a finding of fact to which we defer under the
19 substantial evidence standard. See Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS,
20
445 F.3d 554, 563, 568 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the IJ
21 reasonably found that Ci could have provided supporting
22 documentation and that her failure to do so cast doubt on
23 her claim. Although Ci submitted pages from a household
4
1 registry booklet indicating that a young girl lived in that
2 household and claimed that the registry booklet was her
3 sister’s and the girl was Ci’s daughter, she failed to
4 submit copies of all of the pages of the booklet. Ci also
5 failed to submit statements from her husband or any friends
6 or family members in China corroborating her testimony. As
7 Ci had submitted a partial copy of the registry and had
8 received other documentation from family members or friends
9 in China, it was reasonable for the IJ to conclude that she
10 could have obtained additional corroboration. Furthermore,
11 Ci did not submit a contemporaneous certificate verifying
12 her 1994 abortion, instead submitting one she allegedly
13 obtained in 2008, or any documentation of her alleged 1989
14 stillbirth, her 1990 miscarriage, the birth of her daughter
15 in 1992, or her 1995 divorce. The IJ reasonably determined
16 that, given her poor credibility, the lack of corroboration
17 made it impossible for Ci to meet her burden, “because the
18 absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant
19 unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been
20 called into question.” See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d
21 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted); Chuilu
22
Liu, 575 F.3d at 198 n.5.
23
5
1 Ci further argues that the agency failed to consider a
2 letter from a doctor in the U.S. corroborating her statement
3 that she had three terminated pregnancies. Although the IJ
4 did not address the letter and stated erroneously that Ci
5 had never visited a doctor, the letter did not corroborate
6 Ci’s claim because it set forth only information Ci had told
7 the doctor. Because the IJ considered the relevant
8 information in the letter, that Ci eventually had her IUD
9 removed, there is no realistic possibility that this minor
10 error affected the IJ’s decision. See Alam v. Gonzales, 438
11 F.3d 184, 187-188 (2d Cir. 2006) (remand not required where
12 there is no realistic possibility that, absent the error,
13 the IJ or BIA would have reached a different conclusion).
14 Ci also argues that the IJ erred in failing to give
15 adequate weight to her abortion certificate. This argument
16 fails, as the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in
17 immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion
18 of the IJ. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471
19 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). In fact, the IJ discussed the
20 abortion certificate extensively, noting that despite having
21 been obtained fourteen years after Ci’s abortion, the
22 certificate did not indicate that it was based on records,
23 but instead, held itself out as a contemporaneous document,
6
1 stating Ci’s age at the time the document was obtained
2 rather than her age at the time of the abortion, and
3 advising her to rest for one month.
4 Because Ci’s claims were based on the same factual
5 predicate, the agency’s adverse credibility determination
6 was a proper basis for denial of her application for asylum
7 and withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d
8 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Ci does not challenge the agency’s
9 denial of CAT relief.
10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
11 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
12 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
13 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
14 this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for
15 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
16 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
17 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
18 FOR THE COURT:
19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
20
7
