Plaintiff William Sanchez, a former utility representative of defendant Connecticut Natural Gas Company ("CNG"), appeals from a final judgment entered on March 1, 2010, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, granting CNG's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Sanchez's complaint in its entirety. Sanchez filed suit after he was terminated asserting claims for (1) unlawful discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, and age pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 et seq.; and (2) First Amendment retaliation pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and "will uphold the judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is entered, demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the judgment was warranted as a matter of law." Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 595 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). For summary judgment purposes, a "genuine issue" exists where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-moving party's favor. Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000). "Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Shannon v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, Sanchez's discrimination claims are governed by the three-step burden shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Assuming arguendo that Sanchez could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we agree with the district court that Sanchez failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge offered by CNG—i.e., given the company's progressive discipline policy and Sanchez's earlier written warning, his discharge was warranted when his later payment arrangements for a fellow employee as well as one of his tenants violated multiple company policies—was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) ("[A] reason cannot be proved to be `a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." (emphasis removed)). Since Sanchez cannot point to any evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that the adverse employment action was more likely than not motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus based on his protected status, CNG was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his discrimination claims. See Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997).
Second, Sanchez appears to argue that CNG retaliated against him in response to his complaints, which he asserts are protected by the First Amendment, that the company had unlawfully discriminated against him in its hiring practices.
We have considered all of Sanchez's other contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is