SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Roncallo appeals from an October 22, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J.) granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Sikorsky Aircraft ("Sikorsky") on Roncallo's Title VII claims and dismissing Roncallo's state law claims. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate "only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the first time on appeal, Roncallo argues that the district court ought to have analyzed his discrimination claim under the framework set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).1 "Although we may exercise discretion to consider waived arguments where necessary to avoid a manifest injustice," In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), we conclude that the circumstances of this case, including that Roncallo offers no explanation for his failure to raise this argument below, do not warrant such an exercise of discretion.

The district court analyzed Roncallo's claims under the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), concluding that, assuming arguendo that he had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, Sikorsky's proffered reason for not filling Job Requisition No. 68047 was legitimate and non-discriminatory and that Roncallo had failed to show that the reason was pretexual.

At step one of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff must establish "a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: `1) he belonged to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.'" Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003)). "[A]fter a prima facie instance of discrimination has been identified, the burden shifts to the employer `to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [action].'" Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, 627 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). "If the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff `is given an opportunity to adduce admissible evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the employer's proffered reason is pretext for an impermissible motivation.'" Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000)). The plaintiff should show "both that the [proffered] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason" for the adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in original). "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We agree with the district court that, as Roncallo concedes, Sikorsky has satisfied its burden at the second step of the analysis. The record supports Sikorsky's explanation that Job Requisition No. 68047, an "L4" management position, was closed without being filled because Roncallo's section was already over its allotment of L4s and Sikorsky was trying to reduce the number of these positions. We conclude that Roncallo has failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that this explanation was a pretext.

Roncallo also contends that the district court erred in concluding that he had failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. A retaliation prima facie case requires Roncallo to "show (1) that []he participated in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that [his] participation was known to [his] employer, (3) that [his] employer thereafter subjected [him] to a materially adverse employment action, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 552 (2d Cir. 2010). The determination of whether an employment action is "materially adverse" is an objective one; such an action is one that "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id. at 555 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that, contrary to Roncallo's argument, a temporary move from an office to a cubicle, consistent with Sikorsky's office allocation policy with respect to L5s and L4s, does not constitute a materially adverse employment action.

We have considered Roncallo's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.