Filed: Feb. 21, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-1100-ag Tjandra v. Holder BIA A098 690 641 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
Summary: 10-1100-ag Tjandra v. Holder BIA A098 690 641 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “..
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10-1100-ag
Tjandra v. Holder
BIA
A098 690 641
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 21st day of February, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
ROGER J. MINER,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
LINDAWATI TJANDRA,
Petitioner,
v. 10-1100-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, Madeo & Fasano,
New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant
Director; Ann Carroll Varnon, Office
of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Lindawati Tjandra, a native and citizen of
Indonesia, seeks review of a February 26, 2010, order of the
BIA denying her application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Lindawati Tjandra, No. A098 690 641 (B.I.A.
Feb. 26, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the BIA’s
decision alone. See Belortaja v. Gonzales,
484 F.3d 619, 623
(2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards of review are
well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jian Hui Shao
v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2008); Salimatou Bah
v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
Tjandra argues that the BIA erred in finding that she did
not establish a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic
Chinese Christians in Indonesia. She argues that the BIA
failed to give reasoned consideration to her evidence and
deprived her of due process by ignoring her arguments and
supporting evidence. These arguments are unavailing.
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The BIA explicitly addressed Tjandra’s argument that she
established a pattern or practice of persecution because the
country conditions evidence she submitted supported a
conclusion different from that reached by the BIA in In re
A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741–42 (B.I.A. 2005) (finding no
pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians in
Indonesia). Because the BIA explicitly addressed Tjandra’s
evidence, the record does not compel the conclusion that the
BIA failed to consider the full record. See Xiao Ji Chen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006)
(presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the
evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests
otherwise”).
The only material difference between the conditions
demonstrated in Tjandra’s case and those in In re A-M- was the
occurrence of the 2005 Bali bombings. The agency reasonably
concluded that this one additional incident did not establish
a “systemic, pervasive or organized” threat of harm, and thus
did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution. See
In re A-M-, 23 I. & N Dec. at 741 (finding that threat of harm
must be systemic or pervasive to amount to pattern or practice
of persecution). Accordingly, the agency reasonably concluded
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that sporadic incidents of violence in Indonesia did not give
Tjandra a well-founded fear of future persecution establishing
her eligibility for asylum. See Santoso v. Holder,
580 F.3d
110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming agency’s conclusion that
petitioner’s country conditions evidence did not establish
pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians in
Indonesia).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in
this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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