Filed: Jan. 30, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 11-1834-ag Shi v. Holder BIA A077 341 285 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUM
Summary: 11-1834-ag Shi v. Holder BIA A077 341 285 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMM..
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11-1834-ag
Shi v. Holder
BIA
A077 341 285
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 30th day of January, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 GUIDO CALABRESI,
8 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 SHI HAO SHI, AKA SHAOHUA LI,
14 AKA SHI HAO JIN,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 11-1834-ag
18 NAC
19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _______________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Zhao Wang, New York, New York.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
27 General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant
28 Director; Tracie N. Jones, Trial
29 Attorney, Office of Immigration
30 Litigation, United States Department
31 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
3 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for
4 review is DENIED.
5 Shi Hao Shi, a native and citizen of the People’s
6 Republic of China, seeks review of an April 25, 2011,
7 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Shi
8 Hao Shi, No. A077 341 285 (B.I.A. Apr. 25, 2011). We assume
9 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
10 procedural history of this case.
11 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
12 abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s
13 admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v.
14 Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v.
15 Doherty,
502 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1992)). Aliens seeking to
16 reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later
17 than 90 days after the date on which the final
18 administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is
20 undisputed that Shi’s November 2010 motion to reopen was
21 untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal
22 in 2003, and number-barred, because it is his second motion
2
1 to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(C)(i); see also
2 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number
3 limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if
4 the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising
5 in the country of nationality or the country to which
6 removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and
7 was not available and would not have been discovered or
8 presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C.
9 § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
10 In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion
11 in denying Shi’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-
12 barred. The agency reasonably relied on the IJ’s underlying
13 adverse credibility determination to decline to credit Shi’s
14 uncorroborated and unauthenticated evidence purporting to
15 establish changed country conditions. See Qin Wen Zheng v.
16 Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir. 2007).
17 Further, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
18 conclusion that the background materials do not demonstrate
19 a change in country conditions material to Shi’s claim that
20 he is eligible for relief. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
21
546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). The country conditions
22 materials provided by Shi did not support his contention
3
1 that he would be persecuted for practicing Christianity in
2 China because the change in Chinese regulations he relies on
3 pre-dates the information in the State Department reports
4 cited by the BIA by approximately four years. As the BIA
5 found, the 2009 State Department report reflects that, while
6 the government requires churches to register and restricts
7 participation in unregistered or house churches, “freedom to
8 participate in religious activities continued to increase in
9 many areas.” The Religious Freedom report reflects that the
10 Chinese government’s interference with unregistered churches
11 varied depending on the location, and that between 50 and 70
12 million people in China practiced Christianity without
13 government interference. Although both reports reflect that
14 church leaders and unregistered house churches face
15 occasional harassment, nothing in the background materials
16 supports Shi’s claim that he will be harassed or tortured on
17 the basis of his faith if he returns to China. Absent
18 “solid support” in the record that his fear is objectively
19 reasonable, Shi’s claim of future persecution is
20 “speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421
21 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005); see Jian Hui
Shao, 546 F.3d at
22 154, 163-66.
23
4
1 Finally, the agency properly concluded that Shi’s
2 conversion to Christianity in the United States constituted
3 a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not
4 merit an exception to the time and number limitations
5 applicable to motions to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
6 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the agency
7 did not abuse its discretion in denying Shi’s motion to
8 reopen.
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
11 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
12 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
13 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
14 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
15 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
16 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
19
20
5
