Filed: May 31, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: 11-3335-ag Drejaj v. Holder BIA LaForest, IJ A095 837 777 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH T
Summary: 11-3335-ag Drejaj v. Holder BIA LaForest, IJ A095 837 777 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH TH..
More
11-3335-ag
Drejaj v. Holder
BIA
LaForest, IJ
A095 837 777
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 31st day of May, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
PETER W. HALL,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________
PRANVERE DREJAJ,
Petitioner,
v. 11-3335-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director;
Theodore C. Hirt, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Pranvere Drejaj, a native and citizen of
Albania, seeks review of a July 18, 2011 order of the BIA
affirming the July 24, 2008 and April 14, 2003 decisions of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Brigitte LaForest denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
Pranvere Drejaj, No. A095 837 777 (B.I.A. July 18, 2011)
aff’g No. A095 837 777 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 24, 2008)
modifying No. A095 837 777 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 14,
2003). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We have reviewed the IJ’s modified decision as
supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin
Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Because
Drejaj filed her asylum application in August 2002, this
case is not governed by the REAL ID Act. We thus review the
agency’s credibility determination to see if it was based on
2
“specific, cogent” reasons bearing a “legitimate nexus” to
the finding. See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307
(2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the IJ reasonably found that Drejaj’s
testimony about her July 2001 detention was inconsistent
with her written statement because when asked by her
attorney about her detention she did not mention her sexual
assault or threats made against her. Contrary to Drejaj’s
argument, the IJ did not err in relying on these omissions
because they were not minor details, but core facts about
her detention which went “to the heart” of her asylum claim.
Id. at 309. Moreover, the IJ gave Drejaj an opportunity to
explain why her testimony about her detention differed from
her written statement, and was not required to accept her
explanation that she was confused about what her attorney
was asking. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d
Cir. 2005).1
Drejaj’s testimony describing her October 2000
interrogation, in which she stated that she was asked
1
Drejaj for the first time argues that she did not
testify about the sexual assault because her attorney was
a man and she had experienced sexual trauma. However,
she did not raise this explanation in front of the agency
and her attorney’s unsworn statements do not constitute
evidence. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6
(1984).
3
questions about the Democratic Party but did not identify
specific questions, also undermined her credibility. The IJ
reasonably concluded that it was implausible that the
authorities who allegedly interrogated Drejaj would not have
asked her any questions more specific than “what the
Democratic Party planned for the future.” Certified
Administrative Record (“C.A.R.”) 175. Thus, the IJ did not
err in finding that her sparse testimony about the
interrogation suggested that it was fabricated. See Jin
Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2003),
overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice,
494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (providing
that, after probing for specific details, an IJ may “fairly
wonder whether [] testimony is fabricated” when an applicant
“gives very spare testimony,” lacking in details).
Moreover, the IJ also reasonably concluded that
Drejaj’s limited explanations about the Democratic Party’s
plans -- asserting that it supports “rights” without any
details, see C.A.R. 176 -- and inability to identify the
party’s 2001 candidate undermined her credibility because
she lacked knowledge one would reasonably expect of a
political activist who worked for the party in the 2001
election. Cf. Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90-91 (2d
4
Cir. 2006) (cautioning that the agency may only rely on an
asylum applicant’s ignorance of a religion to find that his
testimony is not credible where his other testimony “would
render his lack of a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge
suspect”).
Having questioned Drejaj’s credibility in light of the
above findings, the IJ did not err in concluding that her
credibility was further undermined by her failure to provide
corroborating evidence from her brother or mother. See
Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2009).
Contrary to Drejaj’s argument, because the IJ made her
corroboration finding in the context of an adverse
credibility determination, the IJ was not required to first
identify the particular pieces of missing relevant evidence,
before finding that Drejaj failed to provide corroboration.
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 341
(2d Cir. 2006). Because there was no evidence to the
contrary, we defer to the IJ’s conclusion that Drejaj’s
mother and brother -- who both lived in New York City --
were reasonably available to testify at her New York City
hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse
a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the
availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the
5
court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is
compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is
unavailable.”).
In sum, the agency’s adverse credibility determination
was supported by substantial evidence because the IJ
identified “specific, cogent” reasons for doubting Drejaj’s
credibility. See Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 307 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the agency did not
err in denying relief because Drejaj’s claims for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief arose from the same
factual background, her claim that she was persecuted as a
political activist. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 157
(2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
