REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs, black and Hispanic registered voters in Albany County, sue the County and the County Board of Elections (collectively "defendants") in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge) for enacting a redistricting plan for the Albany County Legislature ("Local Law C") in response to the 2010 United States census that allegedly dilutes black and Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, by failing to provide for five majority-minority districts ("MMDs"). Plaintiffs here appeal from the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction barring defendants from implementing Local Law C with respect to elections held in September and November of 2011. See Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 11-cv-736 (LEK)(DRH), 2011 WL 3651114 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011). For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the appeal is not moot, even though the challenged elections have taken place. Nevertheless, it is without merit because the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs failed, on the record presented in support of their preliminary injunction motion, to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the third factor of a vote dilution claim identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), i.e., bloc voting by the white majority sufficient to defeat minority voters' preferred candidate. At the same time, we identify a concern with the district court's apparent demand for more than a simple majority of minority group members of voting age within the proposed districts to satisfy the first Gingles factor. Because the district court will have to apply the Gingles analysis at trial in ultimately resolving this case, we clarify the law applicable to the first factor at the same time that we affirm the district court's denial of preliminary relief.
The Albany County Legislature consists of representatives elected every four years from 39 single-member districts. See Albany County Charter Art. 2, §§ 201, 206. After each decennial national census, the County legislature appoints a reapportionment commission charged with revising district lines to account for shifts in population. See id. § 207.
The County's past redistricting efforts have routinely triggered litigation. A challenge to the redistricting plan adopted after the 1990 census, which provided for only one district in which blacks would constitute a majority of the voting age population ("VAP"), resulted in the County entering into a consent judgment that prevented implementation of the plan and provided for the establishment of three MMDs in each of which blacks and Hispanics together constituted at least 63% of the VAP. See Consent J. & Decree, NAACP v. Albany Cnty., No. 91-cv-1288 (CGC) (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1991), ECF No. 2. When, following the 2000 census, the County enacted a redistricting plan that maintained three MMDs, the district court
After the 2010 census, the County enacted the redistricting plan challenged in this lawsuit, which maintains four MMDs. In doing so, the County followed the recommendation of its redistricting commission, which had retained a redistricting expert, John Merrill, to prepare a plan based on the new census information. The commission held public hearings, at which minority groups urged the creation of a fifth MMD. One such group, the Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corporation, submitted a proposed redistricting plan to that effect ("AHEJ Plan").
Merrill advised the Commission that, although he attempted to create a fifth MMD, the task was impossible because of the dispersion of the minority population, which he treated as including both blacks and Hispanics. See infra at 572 n. 5, 577 n. 11 (discussing issues presented by choice of minority group). Merrill deemed the AHEJ Plan unsatisfactory because, in his view, it violated a number of redistricting principles and constituted racial gerrymandering.
Plaintiffs filed this Section 2 challenge to Local Law C on June 29, 2011, and on July 15, 2011, they moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from "conducting the petition process, gathering signatures for elections, holding and conducting any further primary or general elections, or implementing or certifying elections in the districts under the current scheme implemented in 2004 or those created by Local Law C for any term of office commencing January 1, 2012." Notice of Mot. at 1-2, Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 11-cv-736, ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs maintained that they were likely to succeed on their claim of minority vote dilution whether the relevant minority population aggregated blacks and Hispanics or was limited to blacks alone. After evidentiary hearings and written submissions, the district court denied a preliminary injunction on August 18, 2011. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal and sought an expedited briefing schedule, which was granted, with
In the interim, primary and general elections for the County legislature on the basis of Local Law C were held on September 13, 2011, and November 8, 2011, respectively. On November 14, 2011, defendants moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. On November 30, 2011, plaintiffs moved in this court for a preliminary injunction pending appeal to prevent defendants from "conducting elections or related processes, or qualifying and/or certifying individuals elected in the November 8, 2011 elections for Albany County legislature to take office." Appellant Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Pending Appeal at 1, Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 11-3439-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2011), ECF No. 82. On December 28, 2011, this court summarily denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal.
Because the question implicates our jurisdiction, we first address defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal as moot in light of the fact that the very 2011 elections that plaintiffs sought preliminarily to enjoin have now been conducted. "The occurrence of the action sought to be enjoined normally moots the request for preliminary injunctive relief because this Court has no effective relief to offer once the action has occurred." Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir.2005) (Sotomayor, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle does not apply, however, when "we do not lack the ability to offer effective relief" because we "can feasibly restore the status quo." Id. at 509-10 (emphasis in original). This conclusion is a "natural, if not inevitable, extension of the well established principle that where a defendant with notice in an injunction proceeding completes the acts sought to be enjoined the court may by mandatory injunction restore the status quo." Id. at 510 n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, defendants unquestionably had notice that plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin the 2011 elections. Indeed, the parties were engaged in an appeal from the denial of such relief when defendants proceeded with the 2011 elections. See id. (rejecting mootness challenge where district court denied preliminary injunction that sought to prevent plaintiff's termination and plaintiff was then terminated before appeal was heard). We do not fault defendants' actions in this respect; no court order barred them from proceeding with the elections. We note only that defendants were on notice that plaintiffs were still pursuing preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, we will not dismiss the case as moot if we are satisfied that, should plaintiffs succeed on this appeal, it would be possible to restore the status quo.
In considering that question, we are mindful of precedent recognizing that "[i]t is within the scope of [a federal court's] equity powers to order a governmental body to hold special elections to redress violations of the VRA." Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 357 F.3d at 262. Implicit in the power to order special elections is the authority to void elections conducted in violation of the VRA. It was not necessary to authorize such relief in Arbor Hill because the district court had enjoined elections under the challenged plan before we ordered special elections. See id. Nevertheless, Arbor Hill cites a case from a sister circuit holding that the equity power to order special elections applies even when the original election has already taken place. See Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.1967) (holding that district
Courts may understandably hesitate to void elections that have already been conducted as a form of preliminary equitable relief, preferring to take such action only upon a final determination that plaintiffs are entitled to permanent relief. That, however, is an argument for consolidating preliminary injunction proceedings with a trial on the merits where possible, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2), or for denying a preliminary injunction as a matter of equitable discretion, see Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). It does not render the preliminary injunction motion, or the appeal from a denial of such a motion, moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (recognizing distinction between court's power to order effective relief and court's discretion to do so). Accordingly, we deny defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, and we proceed to discuss the merits.
Where, as here, a party seeks a preliminary injunction against government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory scheme, a moving party must demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying claim, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, and (3) the public interest weighs in favor of granting the injunction. See Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir.2011).
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, states in relevant part as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 1973; see also id. § 1973b(f)(2) (extending protection to language minority groups).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a redistricting scheme may violate Section 2 by impermissibly diluting the minority vote. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Gingles instructs that a viable Section 2 claim of vote dilution depends on plaintiffs' preliminary showing of three factors: (1) that the relevant minority is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (2) that the relevant minority is "politically cohesive," and (3) that the majority "votes sufficiently in a bloc to enable it ... in the absence of special circumstances ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Although the Court in Gingles applied these factors to a challenged at-large multimember districting plan, it has since applied the same factors to claims of vote dilution under single-member districting plans, such as the one at issue in this case. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006).
If a plaintiff satisfies the three preliminary Gingles factors, he must then satisfy the ultimate Section 2 inquiry by showing from the "totality of the circumstances," that members of the identified racial group "have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate" to elect a candidate of their choice. Id. at 425-26, 126 S.Ct. 2594.
In denying a preliminary injunction of the application of Local Law C, the district court found that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate likely success on all three preliminary Gingles factors. Insofar as plaintiffs had attempted to carry their burden by defining the relevant minority community to include blacks and Hispanics, the district court found the record evidence insufficient to establish the political cohesiveness of these two groups, the second Gingles factor.
We identify legal error in the district court's demand for plaintiffs to show more than a simple majority of the relevant minority group at the first step of Gingles analysis. At the same time, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs a preliminary injunction based on their failure to establish majority bloc voting.
Before the district court, defendants did not dispute the minority VAP percentages shown in the five MMDs proposed in the AHEJ plan and plaintiffs' Illustrative Plan 3. Rather, defendants argued that the bare majority DOJ Non-Hispanic Black VAPs reflected in the two plans failed to satisfy the "sufficiently large" requirement of the first Gingles factor. In support, they relied on the cross-examination testimony of plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Baodong Liu, a professor of political science at the University of Utah, who testified that in the "academic world," a "dominant black district" is defined as one in which blacks constitute at least 55% of the VAP. Liu Test., Hr'g Tr. at 103.
The district court agreed that "a barebones 50.44 percent" DOJ Non-Hispanic Black VAP, as indicated for proposed MMD 4 under the AHEJ plan, was insufficient to satisfy the first Gingles factor, "particularly where Plaintiff[s'] own expert... testified that a 55 percent minority population is required" for a district to be considered "`dominant.'" Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 2011 WL 3651114, at *3. While the district court acknowledged that the plurality opinion in Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009), signaled that a bare majority could satisfy the first Gingles factor, see id. at 18, 129 S.Ct. 1231, the district court concluded that the opinion was non-binding and, in any event, irrelevant, as it pertained to "crossover districts," which were not at issue in this case, Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 2011 WL 3651114, at *3. We disagree and here clarify that no super-majority is necessary for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Gingles factor.
In so ruling, we note that the first Gingles factor is only the initial step in a larger inquiry that ultimately asks (1) whether the totality of the circumstances evidences "an inequality in the opportunities" enjoyed by minority voters that prevents them from "elect[ing] their preferred candidates," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, and, if so, (2) how to "devis[e] a sound remedy" for that inequality, Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1008, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). The relative size of a minority group's majority in a district may well be among the totality of circumstances that can inform the ultimate determination of vote dilution and the appropriate remedy. But it is simply the fact, not the size, of a minority group's majority presence in a proposed district that permits a plaintiff to satisfy the first of Gingles's preliminary requirements.
Defendants nevertheless maintain that the district court permissibly demanded a super-majority showing to satisfy the first Gingles factor because a minority group that constitutes only a simple majority of the VAP may not realistically have the potential to elect representatives of its choice, particularly where minority voter registration rates and turnout are low. Such concerns may well warrant careful consideration when a court reviews the totality of the circumstances in deciding the ultimate Gingles inquiry. See id. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (holding that list of typical factors relevant to assessing totality of circumstances is not comprehensive and that such inquiry requires "searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality" (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir.1995); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1012, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (stating that district court should analyze totality of circumstances "without isolating any ... arguably relevant facts from the act of judgment"). The concerns may also inform the appropriate remedy for a Section 2 violation. See Dickinson v. Ind. State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th Cir.1991) (observing that determination that super-majority is not necessary at "liability stage" is distinct from court's ability to "consider, at the remedial stage, what type of remedy is possible based on ... minority voter registration and turn-out rates" (emphasis in original)); accord Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir.2006); see also Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413 (7th Cir.1984) (identifying error in district court's failure at remedial stage to provide for super-majority in light of minority group's lower registration and turnout rates).
In urging us to conclude otherwise, defendants emphasize that the Supreme Court has described the first Gingles factor as requiring "a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidates of its choice." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1008, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (emphasis added); accord LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. at 430, 126 S.Ct. 2594. We are not persuaded that the highlighted language transforms the first Gingles factor as defendants urge. We understand Supreme Court references to a "sufficiently large minority" to be reiterating, not departing from, Gingles's observation that a minority group is "sufficiently large" when it "constitute[s] a majority." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752. We do not understand these cases, or any other precedent, to require plaintiffs to show a super-majority to satisfy the first Gingles factor. Indeed, the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173, even if not controlling, persuades us that it would be inappropriate to recognize such a requirement here.
In Bartlett, the Supreme Court considered whether Section 2 required the creation of a district in which the identified minority group, though not a majority, was sufficiently large that, when coupled with reliable white "crossover" votes, it would be capable of electing the representatives of its choice. The plurality opinion — authored by Justice Kennedy, who also wrote those parts of the LULAC decision commanding a majority — espoused a "majority-minority" rule that required the minority to show that it was at least 50% of the VAP in the proposed district. In explaining its reasoning, the plurality provides one of the fullest discussions of the purpose of the first Gingles factor and, in the process, indicates that the factor demands no more than a simple majority to proceed with further Section 2 analysis:
Id. at 18-19, 129 S.Ct. 1231.
Those of our sister circuits to have considered the question have agreed that nothing more than a simple majority is necessary to satisfy the first Gingles factor. See Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d at 1019 [(8th Cir.)] (rejecting need to show "super-majority status"); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1117 (5th Cir.1991) (concluding that 52.8% VAP is sufficient); Dickinson v. Ind. State Election Bd., 933 F.2d at 503 [(7th Cir.)] (concluding that 50.27% VAP is sufficient, and rejecting need for super-majority at threshold stage).
Both the AHEJ Plan and Illustrative Plan 3 show DOJ Non-Hispanic Blacks to constitute a majority in five proposed districts for representatives to the County legislature. See supra at 573 n. 7.
To satisfy the third Gingles factor, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the white majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed — usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752; accord LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. at 425, 126 S.Ct. 2594. In reviewing the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of this factor to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, we apply de novo review to its identification and application of law, but we review factual determinations only for clear error. NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1008. Here the latter review predominates because the law, which the district court correctly identified, recognizes the need for some flexibility. As the Supreme Court has observed, "no simple doctrinal test" applies to the third Gingles factor because racial bloc voting can "vary according to a variety of factual circumstances." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The factual circumstance that here prompted the district court to conclude that plaintiffs failed to carry their preliminary injunction burden was unexplained omissions from the electoral data provided to their expert witness, Dr. Liu.
In reaching his conclusion that Albany County exhibited racial polarization in biracial elections from 2004 to 2010, Dr. Liu analyzed fourteen elections from that seven-year time frame: twelve single-member elections and two multi-member elections. Operating on the assumption that an election was racially polarized if a majority of black voters, but only a minority of non-black voters, supported the black candidate,
Defendants did not employ competing expert testimony to challenge Dr. Liu's opinion. Rather, they pointed to his failure to consider a number of biracial County elections won by black candidates in the 2004-2010 period.
On this record, the district court found that it was not persuaded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the Gingles bloc voting factor because Dr. Liu formed his racial polarization opinion without considering several countywide and citywide elections that he acknowledged provided relevant data. The court considered the omissions significant because it found that "[w]hile the Arbor Hill decision correctly concluded that whites [in Albany County had] voted as a bloc before and during 2003, there has clearly been a change in the voting patterns of white residents of the County in the last eight years." Pope
In challenging the district court's determination that they failed to demonstrate likely success on the third Gingles factor, plaintiffs essentially fault the court for not according more weight to their expert's opinion. The question of what weight to accord expert opinion is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the factfinder, and we will not second guess that decision on appeal absent a basis in the record to think that discretion has been abused, which is not this case. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 126 (2d Cir.2003) (reviewing weight that district court assigned to expert testimony for abuse of discretion). A factfinder may certainly consider the bases for an expert's opinion and may accord the opinion less, or even no, weight if the record suggests that the bases are defective, incomplete, or questionable. See NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1020 (concluding that district court was entitled to find plaintiffs' expert unpersuasive because her analysis covered only portion of relevant timeframe and she relied heavily on interviews with plaintiffs). To the extent plaintiffs suggest that defendants bore the burden to offer contradictory expert testimony, we disagree. It is plaintiffs' burden to establish the Gingles factors, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, and plaintiffs failed to satisfy that burden here, where the district court justifiably declined to rely on their expert, see NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1020.
To be sure, in the context of election challenges, the law does not require that expert opinions be supported by an exhaustive analysis of elections within the relevant period. "The number of elections that must be studied in order to determine whether voting is polarized will vary according to pertinent circumstances." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 n. 25, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Indeed, flexibility is particularly warranted when comprehensive data are not available. See id. ("[T]he fact that statistics from only one or a few elections are available for examination does not foreclose a vote dilution claim."). Further, even when omitted data are available, a court may properly consider whether they pertain to exogenous elections or the ones specifically at issue. See Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 497 (2d Cir.1999) (concluding that exogenous elections "are less probative than elections involving the specific office that is the subject of the litigation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nevertheless, a factfinder's ability to excuse omitted data in considering an expert opinion does not mean that it is compelled to credit the opinion or to find that it demonstrates the sufficient likelihood of success on the third Gingles factor to support a preliminary injunction. In making
We do not predict what Dr. Liu's opinion would be if he were to include the omitted data in his analysis. Much less do we predict whether plaintiffs will be able to prove bloc voting or the other elements of a Section 2 claim when they make a full evidentiary presentation to the district court on final, rather than preliminary, presentation of their case. Evidence of black candidates' electoral successes may be probative of "a general willingness of white voters to vote for black candidates." Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 93, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). But such evidence does "not necessarily negate" a finding of bloc voting, particularly if "elections are shown usually to be polarized" or the success of minority candidates in particular elections can be explained by "special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent [or] incumbency." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Further, where, as here, a Section 2 challenge is to a single-member redistricting plan, a court considering exogenous elections does so mindful that the ultimate "inquiry into the existence of vote dilution caused by submergence ... is district specific." Id. at 59 n. 28, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (faulting district court for aggregating racial polarization numbers across several independently challenged multimember districts). These matters, however, warrant no further discussion here; they are for the district court to consider in any subsequent proceedings.
We here conclude only that the district court acted within its discretion in finding, based on the record then before it, that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden as to the third Gingles factor because of questions raised by omitted data as to their expert's bloc voting analysis.
To summarize, we conclude as follows:
1. Because it would be possible to restore the parties to the status quo if plaintiffs were to prevail on this appeal, the appeal is not moot.
2. Because the first factor for a Section 2 claim identified in Thornburg v. Gingles does not require plaintiffs to show that the minority group is a super-majority in a proposed MMD, plaintiffs satisfied that factor by showing that the DOJ Non-Hispanic Black VAP in five proposed MMDs exceeded 50%.
3. Nevertheless, because the district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate likely success on the third Gingles factor, white bloc voting, it acted within its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction of the 2011 election for the Albany County Legislature.
Defendants' motion to dismiss the case as moot is DENIED, and the judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. The parties shall bear their own costs.
In finding plaintiffs not to have demonstrated the political cohesiveness of blacks and Hispanics in Albany County, the district court did not, as plaintiffs argue, hold that, as a matter of law, the burden needed to be satisfied through statistical evidence. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 n. 25, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (stating that where applicable election data is not available, "courts must rely on other factors" to determine whether Section 2 claim has been proved); see also Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that "statistical evidence is not a sine qua non to establishing cohesion"). Rather, the court found that the particular socioeconomic data and anecdotal evidence advanced by plaintiffs to demonstrate the aggregated group's political cohesiveness were not factually convincing. We express no view on this factual determination because plaintiffs' injunction motion fails, in any event, at the third step of Gingles analysis, majority bloc voting. See infra at II.B.3.b.
VAP Any Part VAP DOJ Non-Hispanic VAP DOJ Non-Hispanic
MMD Black Black Black & Hispanic
1 55.41% 52.17% 62.69%
2 55.16% 52.66% 60.46%
AHEJ Plan 3 56.22% 52.67% 61.57%
4 54.06% 50.44% 61.97%
6 55.35% 51.56% 61.12%
1 55.39% 51.16% 62.80%
2 55.84% 52.75% 60.05%
Illustrative 3 65.78% 62.54% 72.43%
Plan 3 4 54.62% 51.21% 61.50%
6 55.06% 51.62% 62.13%
Non-Black
Year Position Scope Type Black Candidate Support Black Support
2005 Mayoral City Primary Goodbee 21% 74%
2005 Common Council City Primary Cobb 11% 78%
2009 Mayoral City Primary Ellis 38% 75%
2009 City Treasurer City Primary Barnette 28% 76%
2010 County Surrogate Judge County Primary Heath-Roland 25% 80%
2010 County Surrogate Judge County General Heath-Roland 8% 59%
2004 Legislature District 1 Primary Stokes-Holmes 21% 53%
2004 Legislature District 4 Primary Dewitt 35% 95%
2007 Legislature District 4 Primary Dixon and Jones 17% 82%
Non-Black
Year Position Scope Type Black Candidate Support Black Support
2005 Mayoral City General Green 7% 1%
2005 Legislature District 7 Primary McLain 73% 40%
2005 Legislature District 8 Primary Delavallade 64% 46%
Year Position Scope Type Black Candidate 2004 City Court Judge City Primary Heath-Roland 2004 City Court Judge City General Heath-Roland 2009 Common Council City Primary McLaughlin 2004 District Attorney County Primary Soares 2004 District Attorney County General Soares 2005 State Committee County N/A Barnett 2008 District Attorney County General Soares
Year Candidate Black Precincts Non-Hispanic White Precincts Jenkins-Cox (black) 22% 14% McLaughlin (black) 22% 15% 2005 Cohen 20% 16% Morris 17% 13% Doesschate 11% 18% Gaffuri 8% 23% Green (black) 35% 16% Walston (black) 30% 15% 2010 Leet 11% 18% Morris 10% 16% Streznewski 8% 24% Lembo 5% 11%
