Filed: Sep. 04, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: 10-2221 Stony v. Holder BIA Balasquide, IJ A097 698 389 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 10-2221 Stony v. Holder BIA Balasquide, IJ A097 698 389 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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10-2221
Stony v. Holder
BIA
Balasquide, IJ
A097 698 389
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 4th day of September, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
8 ROBERT D. SACK,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MANGIRING-JOHN STONY,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 10-2221
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONERS: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, New
24 York.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
27 General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
28 Assistant Director; Sheri R. Glaser,
29 Trial Attorney; Andrea Shuford,
1 Legal Intern, Office of Immigration
2 Litigation, United States Department
3 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
4
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Mangiring-John Stony, a native and citizen
10 of Indonesia, seeks review of a May 11, 2010, decision of
11 the BIA affirming the August 27, 2008, decision of
12 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Javier Balasquide, which denied his
13 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
14 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
15 Mangiring-John Stony, No. A097 698 389 (B.I.A. May 11,
16 2010), aff’g No. A097 698 389 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 27,
17 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
18 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
19 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
20 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d
21 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-
22 established. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513
23 (2d Cir. 2009). Because Stony does not challenge the
24 agency’s denial of CAT relief, we address only his asylum
25 and withholding of removal claims.
2
1 I. Past Persecution
2 Stony first contends that the IJ ignored evidence that,
3 when considered with the other evidence in this case,
4 established that he suffered past persecution as an Ambonese
5 Christian. But the IJ explicitly addressed every incident to
6 which Stony testified, including: (1) the religious violence
7 during the riots in 1998-2001; (2) Stony’s visit to the
8 island of Ambon during which a resident warned him that the
9 Laskar Jihad controlled Ambon and targeted Christians; and
10 (3) Stony’s escape from a bus stopped by Laskar Jihad
11 protesters seeking to harm Ambonese Christians. The IJ also
12 expressly addressed Stony’s claim that he was unable to
13 practice his religion while in Indonesia, stating that Stony
14 failed to provide corroborating evidence.
15 The IJ did not, however, specifically address Stony’s
16 assertions in his asylum application that: (1) a jihadist
17 stopped his taxi in search of Christians, but released him;
18 (2) the bombing near a church shook his taxi; and (3) his
19 uncle was killed during the 1998 riots. Nevertheless, an IJ
20 does not err by failing to discuss explicitly every piece of
21 evidence. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d
22 315, 338 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume that an IJ has
3
1 taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless
2 the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).
3 Furthermore, the IJ reasonably concluded that Stony
4 failed to demonstrate past persecution. Stony stated that
5 he was not physically harmed except for some back pain he
6 suffered when he jumped from a bus that the Laskar Jihad had
7 stopped. Beyond this, Stony testified only to experiencing
8 the threat of being harmed if the Laskar Jihad became aware
9 that he was an Ambonese Christian. Although Stony asserted
10 that his uncle was killed during the 1998 riots, harm to
11 relatives is not, alone, a basis for finding that Stony
12 suffered past persecution. See Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500
13 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007). Because Stony was not
14 targeted individually or harmed physically, the IJ
15 reasonably found that the threats of violence that Stony
16 alleged did not rise to the level of persecution even when
17 considered cumulatively. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of
18 Justice,
433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that harm
19 must be sufficiently severe, rising above mere harassment,
20 to constitute persecution); See Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Attorney
21 Gen.,
449 F.3d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts
22 have “rejected [persecution] claims involving ‘unfulfilled’
23 threats’”).
4
1 II. Pattern or Practice of Persecution
2 Stony also argues that he demonstrated a pattern or
3 practice of persecution of Christians in Indonesia. To
4 demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
5 pattern or practice of persecution against a particular
6 group, a petitioner must demonstrate that the harm to that
7 group constitutes persecution, is perpetrated or tolerated
8 by state actors, and is “so systemic or pervasive as to
9 amount to a pattern or practice of persecution.” In re
10 A–M–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see also Mufied
11 v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88,92-93 (2d Cir. 2007) (accepting the
12 BIA’s standard as a reasonable one).
13 Here, Stony submitted a 2007 State Department Religious
14 Freedom Report, which acknowledged that extremist Muslim
15 groups worked to close small churches. However, the report
16 also stated that the Indonesian government respected the
17 constitutionally protected right to freedom of religion,
18 prosecuting terrorists who targeted Christians, and that
19 Maluku, the province in which Ambon is located, “remained
20 calm and leaders of both the Muslim and Christian
21 communities and the Maluku provincial government
22 demonstrated a strong commitment to ease religious tension
23 and rebuild.” Both the 2007 report and a 2006 State
5
1 Department report also noted that local and national
2 Indonesian police promptly sought and prosecuted terrorists
3 who targeted Christians. As the State Department reports
4 were the most recent of Stony’s background materials, the IJ
5 reasonably relied on them in finding that Muslim-Christian
6 relations in Indonesia were improving. See Tu Lin v.
7 Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006).
8 The IJ also reasonably found that the lack of evidence
9 that Stony’s wife or three children, who live in Indonesia
10 and practice Christianity, have been harmed or targeted
11 diminished Stony’s fear of future persecution. See Melgar
12 de Torres v. Reno,
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999). Based
13 on the improved relations between Muslims and Christians
14 indicated by the State Department reports and the lack of
15 evidence that Muslims targeted Stony or his family, the IJ
16 reasonably found that Stony failed to establish a well-
17 founded fear of persecution because he is Christian. See
18 Santoso v. Holder,
580 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2009)
19 (upholding agency’s rejection of pattern or practice claim
20 when background materials noted only sporadic religious
21 violence).
22 Because Stony was unable to show the objective
23 likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum
6
1 claim, he was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard
2 required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal.
3 See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 665 (2d Cir. 1991).
4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
5 DENIED.
6
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
