Filed: May 29, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: 11-3749 Ang v. Holder BIA Bukszpan, IJ A089 009 168/169 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 11-3749 Ang v. Holder BIA Bukszpan, IJ A089 009 168/169 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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11-3749
Ang v. Holder
BIA
Bukszpan, IJ
A089 009 168/169
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 29th day of May, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 REENA RAGGI,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 LIAN LING ANG, ALWIS ROTHER,
14 Petitioners,
15
16 v. 11-3749
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONERS: David J. Rodkin, New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart Delery, Acting Assistant
26 Attorney General; Thomas B.
27 Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel;
28 Kathryn M. McKinney, Attorney,
29 United States Department of Justice,
30 Office of Immigration Litigation,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Lian Ling Ang and her husband Alwis Rother, natives and
6 citizens of Indonesia, seek review of an August 24, 2011,
7 order of the BIA affirming the March 15, 2010, decision of
8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Joanna M. Bukszpan, which denied
9 their application for asylum and withholding of removal. In
10 re Lian Ling Ang, Alwis Rother, Nos. A089 009 168/169
11 (B.I.A. Aug. 24, 2011), aff’g Nos. A089 009 168/169 (Immig.
12 Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 15, 2010). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
17 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
18 applicable standards of review are well established. See
19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d
20 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 The only issue before us is Petitioners’ eligibility
22 for asylum and withholding of removal on the asserted ground
23 that they suffered past persecution based on ethnicity and
2
1 religion, giving rise to a presumptive well-founded fear of
2 future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Paul v.
3 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA has
4 defined persecution as a “threat to the life or freedom of,
5 or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who
6 differ in a way regarded as offensive.” Matter of Acosta,
7 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on
8 other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421
9 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433
10 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). The harm must be sufficiently
11 severe to rise above “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili,
433
12 F.3d at 341. Here, the agency reasonably found that the
13 mistreatment Ang endured did not rise to the level of
14 persecution.
15 Petitioners argue that the IJ failed to consider Ang’s
16 experiences in the aggregate in concluding that she did not
17 suffer past persecution. However, the BIA explicitly noted
18 that the “cumulative effect” of Ang’s experiences did not
19 rise to the level of persecution. Moreover, the record
20 supports the agency’s conclusion that, in the aggregate, Ang
21 was not harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high
22 threshold of “persecution,” but rather experienced “mere
3
1 harassment.” See id. The record shows that in 1995, Ang’s
2 house was robbed, while Ang and her family were in it, by
3 three ethnic Indonesian men who claimed to be police
4 officers; in 1996 Ang jumped out of a moving minibus to
5 avoid being mugged by an ethnic Indonesian; in 2002, she was
6 mugged by three Indonesian men; and in 2003, her husband was
7 attacked and hit by a group of ethnic Indonesians. However,
8 neither Ang nor her husband were ever subjected to serious
9 physical or mental harm to the degree that their lives or
10 freedom were actively threatened, and, as a result, these
11 unfortunate experiences in Indonesia do not rise to the
12 level of past persecution. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
13 222; see also Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales,
435 F.3d 172, 182
14 (2d Cir. 2006). Although “non-life threatening violence and
15 physical abuse” may constitute persecution as well, Beskovic
16 v. Gonzales,
467 F.3d 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), the
17 agency did not err in determining that the sporadic
18 instances during which Ang or her husband endured physical
19 harm did not rise to the level of persecution when
20 considered in the aggregate. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder,
21
632 F.3d 820, 821 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that isolated
22 instance of physical violence followed by brief detention,
23 viewed in context, was not persecution).
4
1 Because Ang did not establish that she suffered past
2 persecution, the agency did not err in denying her
3 application for asylum and withholding of removal.
4 Moreover, because that finding is dispositive of
5 Petitioners’ claim, we do not reach Petitioners’ argument
6 that the harm was on account of a protected ground.
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
9 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
10 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
11 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
12 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
13 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
14 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
17
5
