Filed: Nov. 05, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 12-3611 Seyed Mohammed v. Holder BIA Nelson, IJ A089 253 296 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WIT
Summary: 12-3611 Seyed Mohammed v. Holder BIA Nelson, IJ A089 253 296 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH..
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12-3611
Seyed Mohammed v. Holder
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A089 253 296
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 5th day of November, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MOHAMED FIRTHOWZ SEYED MOHAMMED,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 12-3611
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
26 Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn,
27 Assistant Director; James A. Hurley,
28 Attorney, Office of Immigration
29 Litigation, United States Department
30 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Mohamed Firthowz Seyed Mohammed, a native and citizen
6 of Sri Lanka, seeks review of a September 7, 2012, decision
7 of the BIA affirming the March 14, 2011, decision of an
8 Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for
9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
10 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohamed Firthowz
11 Seyed Mohammed, No. A089 253 296 (B.I.A. Sept. 7, 2012),
12 aff’g No. A089 253 296 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 14, 2011).
13 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
14 and procedural history in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Zaman v. Mukasey,
17 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards
18 of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
562 F.3d
20 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of
22 removal, an applicant must show persecution, or fear of
23 persecution, on account of race, religion, nationality,
2
1 membership in a particular social group, or political
2 opinion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42); 1231(b)(3). The
3 agency did not err in finding that Seyed Mohammed did not
4 demonstrate persecution on account of a protected ground
5 because there was no evidence that he was harmed because of
6 either his family membership or his status as a wealthy
7 Muslim business owner, or that any protected ground was one
8 central reason for any harm he encountered. See 8 U.S.C.
9 §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d
10 141, 152 (2d Cir. 2010). Seyed Mohammed testified that he
11 saw LTTE members shoot and kill his father and great uncle
12 when he was a child, and later learned that his father had
13 refused to pay the LTTE members. He then discussed the
14 LTTE’s attempts to extort money from him in 2006, but gave
15 no indication that the threats, harassment, and harm the
16 LTTE visited upon him had anything to do with either his
17 family name or his religion. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey,
18
509 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2007) . Moreover, his two
19 sisters, a brother, and his mother all continue to live in
20 Sri Lanka without incident. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno,
21
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999). While Seyed Mohammed
22 stated in his asylum application that several days after
3
1 LTTE members assaulted him, the LTTE massacred a group of
2 Muslims in the region, he did not indicate that his
3 encounter with the LTTE was premised upon the fact that he
4 is Muslim. Accordingly, Seyed Mohammed did not demonstrate
5 that any harm he encountered was on account of any protected
6 ground. See Kone, 596 F.3d at 152.
7 Furthermore, the agency did not err in concluding that
8 the harm Seyed Mohammed experienced did not rise to the
9 level of persecution. The BIA has defined persecution as a
10 “threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of
11 suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded
12 as offensive.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222
13 (BIA 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, INS v.
14 Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v.
15 U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).
16 The harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere
17 harassment.”
Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341.
18 Considering the harm inflicted upon Seyed Mohammed in
19 the aggregate, the agency reasonably found that he was not
20 harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high threshold
21 of “persecution.” See
id. Although his experiences were
22 unfortunate, he was never subjected to serious physical harm
4
1 to the degree that his life or freedom was threatened. See
2 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222; see also Joaquin-Porras v.
3 Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2006). Although “non-
4 life threatening violence and physical abuse” may constitute
5 persecution as well, the one instance in which Seyed
6 Mohammed endured physical harm did not rise to the level of
7 persecution when considered in the aggregate. See Beskovic
8 v. Gonzales,
467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover,
9 although tragic, the murder of Seyed Mohammed’s father and
10 great uncle in front of him when he was a child does not
11 constitute persecution of Seyed Mohammed. See Tao Jiang v.
12 Gonzales,
500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007).
13 Finally, the agency did not err in denying CAT relief,
14 because Seyed Mohammed presented no particularized evidence
15 that he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the
16 Sri Lankan government. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
17 Justice,
432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005).
18 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
19 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
20 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
21 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
22 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
23 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
5
1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
2 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
6
6
