SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the District Court's April 3, 2012 judgment is AFFIRMED.

As we have stated, this "litigation stem[s] from a loan agreement initially entered into between [Trafalgar Power, Inc. and Aetna Life Insurance Co.], and Aetna's subsequent sale of the debt instruments that agreement created"an `A' and a `B' note"to [Algonquin Power Fund, Inc.; Algonquin Power Corporation, Inc.; and Algonquin Power Income Fund, Inc.]." Christine Falls Corp. v. Algonquin Power Fund, Inc., 401 F. App'x 584, 586 (2d Cir. 2010). Although this litigation involves several consolidated actions and has spanned more than a decade, plaintiffs-appellants Trafalgar Power, Inc.; Marina Development, Inc.; and Christine Falls of New York, Inc. (jointly, "Trafalgar"), only ask us to determine whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on counterclaims brought by Algonquin Power Corporation, Inc.; Algonquin Power Income Fund; and Algonquin Power Fund (Canada), Inc. (jointly, "Algonquin"). In particular, Algonquin's counterclaims "seek a declaratory judgment that Trafalgar defaulted with respect to both the A and B Notes and, accordingly, that Algonquin was entitled to accelerate the balances due." Id. at 589.1

Previously, the District Court had denied summary judgment on and dismissed Algonquin's counterclaims, see Trafalgar Power Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 396 B.R. 584, 596-97 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), but we vacated that judgment and directed the District Court to determine "whether (1) an event of default occurred within the meaning of the parties' various agreements, and (2) if so, whether Algonquin properly exercised its rights as the Note holder pursuant to those agreements," Christine Falls Corp., 401 F. App'x at 589. On remand, the District Court answered both of these questions affirmatively and concluded that Algonquin was entitled to the declaratory relief it sought. Trafalgar Power Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Nos. 5:99-CV-1238, 5:00-CV-1246, 2012 WL 1119533, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2012).

We assume the parties' familiarity with the background of this case and the issues on appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment and "resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[ ] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009)).

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Trafalgar's arguments are without merit. Although we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its careful and comprehensive Memorandum Decision and Order dated April 3, 2012, we note briefly the three principal conclusions underlying our decision.

First, a close reading of the various contractual documents reveals that Trafalgar's failure to pay some of its corporate income taxes constituted an event of default.2 Second, the record demonstrates that Trafalgar knew about the event of default, received actual and timely notice of the acceleration, and was not prejudiced in any way.3 See Joint App'x 508-09, 5069-71; see also Twenty-Four Merrill St. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Murray, 902 A.2d 24, 29 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that under Connecticut law (which applies to the relevant agreements), "[t]he modern approach to notice-giving attaches primary importance to actual notice and treats technical compliance with notice procedures as a secondary consideration"). Third, we agree with the District Court that Algonquin is entitled to the relief it seeks"namely, recourse to Trafalgar's stock"because Algonquin has recourse to the "Indenture Estate," which includes Trafalgar's stock. See Joint App'x 417, 915, 4923-25, 4935.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Trafalgar's arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court's April 3, 2012 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Algonquin on its counterclaims.