WINTER, Circuit Judge:

Several individual investors appeal from Judge Crotty's dismissal of their complaint alleging securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b). We dispose of this appeal by both summary order and opinion. In the summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part with regard to most appellees. In this opinion, we affirm the dismissal of the federal claim and vacate and remand on the state law claim with regard to one group of appellees, principally Isaac R. Dweck.1

BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of a fraudulent scheme engaged in by a now-defunct broker-dealer, A.R. Baron ("Baron"). Over the course of four years beginning in 1992, Baron defrauded customers of millions of dollars. As a result, Baron's former officers, directors, and key employees have been convicted of various crimes.

As pertinent here, and based on the complaint, the allegations of which we assume to be true, Baron's scheme used high-pressure sales campaigns involving "cold calls" to potential customers. The goal of the scheme was to induce the customers to purchase securities in initial public offerings of small, unknown companies with negligible profits. The salespeople would falsely represent that the stocks were the subject of an active, rising market, and the purchasers were led to believe that the prices they paid were set by trading in that arms-length market. In fact, the market was principally a series of artificial trades orchestrated by Baron designed to create a false appearance of volume and increasing price. Baron's scheme was a paradigmatic "pump and dump" scheme.

The scheme was in part furthered by "parking" stock with trusted Baron investors, including Dweck. "Parking" would involve placing stock in the investor's account while Baron retained the risk of loss by promising to buy back shares, if necessary, at a price that afforded the insider a guaranteed profit. Based on Baron's salespeople's false representations of trading volume and increasing stock prices inducing customers to buy, Baron and its co-conspirators would sell their holdings at a profit before the stock crashed.

Appellants do not allege a liquid, efficient market in the securities. Rather, they allege that the only market for them was based on artificial trading by Baron and others. See Pls.' First Am. Compl. at 9 ¶ 17 ("[T]here was no real market for [the manipulated securities] outside of Baron, and its customers, and other brokers with whom it conspired. Because of the limited public information available ... (few, if any, were followed by other brokerage firm analysts)[,] Baron brokers were able to `box' the stock.").2 Appellants alleged that Baron and Bear Stearns, see infra note 4, falsely represented the securities were trading in "an active, liquid, bona fide market," see Pls.' First Am. Compl. at 10 ¶ 21, 16 ¶¶ 40-41, and that appellants believed the price at which the securities were offered was that established by that public market rather than an artificial price established by Baron. The deception on which appellants relied, therefore, were statements by Baron's salespeople that the customers were buying at a price set by public market activity.

The complaint alleged that Dweck was one of Baron's principal investors, provided Baron with short-term cash infusions and financing for specific deals, and allowed Baron to park certain securities on particular occasions in his accounts at other broker-dealers. Dweck was rewarded with ownership in companies on a preferential basis and a guaranteed return on his parking arrangements as well. These acts undoubtedly facilitated Baron's frauds. The impact of Dweck's involvement is alleged to have been twofold. Parking by Dweck and others "creat[ed] a false impression in the minds of Baron customers of the value and liquidity of the `parked' securities and induced Baron customers... to make investments based on Baron's illusion of trading activity," id. at 44 ¶ 131, while Dweck's provision of funds to Baron prolonged the firm's frauds. See id. at 18 ¶ 46 (noting the importance of collective action for the fraud to succeed); see also id. at 81 ¶ 251.

However, appellants' claims for damages do not contain discrete claims related to the prices paid for the particular securities parked by Dweck at times they were trading. Rather, they seek to recover damages for all losses caused by Baron. While the complaint contains voluminous records of trades involving securities of various firms over extended periods of time, no attempt is made to connect particular trades in particular securities to Dweck's parking.

DISCUSSION

As noted with regard to Dweck, the only legal claims in the complaint argued on this appeal are that: (i) his conduct involved market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; and (ii) he aided and abetted, and conspired to commit, fraud under New York law. Also, appellants make no claim for recovery from Dweck for damages caused by parking particular securities but seek, like our dissenting colleague, to impose liability on Dweck for all of Baron's deceptive activities.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2009). "In conducting this review, we assume all `well-pleaded factual allegations' to be true, and `determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). A complaint alleging securities fraud in a private action for damages is subject to heightened pleadings standards. First, it must satisfy Rule 9(b), which requires that "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Second, under the pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), the allegations of the state of mind required for a Section 10(b) violation — scienter or recklessness, Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 168-69 (2d Cir.2000) — must state "facts [either] (1) showing that the defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit the fraud or (2) constituting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir.2007).

Valid securities-manipulation claims under Section 10(b) must allege: "(1) manipulative acts; (2) damage; (3) caused by reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation; (4) scienter; (5) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (6) furthered by the defendant's use of the mails or any facility of a national securities exchange." Id. at 101. These elements — save for the requirement of manipulative acts and a misplaced belief in the price of the security as being set by arms-length, bona fide trading3 — are, of course, identical to Section 10(b) claims generally. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 156-57, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (noting that the typical § 10(b) claim must make the same allegations).

There is no doubt that appellants have alleged a valid Section 10(b) claim against Baron based on false representations that the price Baron charged customers for securities was established in a market independent of artificial trading by Baron itself. They have also adequately alleged their reliance upon Baron's misrepresentations.

Our difficulty with regard to Dweck's liability under Section 10(b) arises from the lack of an allegation that Dweck was involved in any communication with any of the appellants. Dweck is alleged to have been one of a group that engaged in phony trading activity that created an "impression" of "value and liquidity" in securities being pedaled by Baron. There is no allegation that any appellant was told of Dweck's artificial trading, or purchased such securities in specific reliance on such trading. See Pls.' First Am. Compl. at 18 ¶ 46 (noting the importance of collective action for perpetrating the fraud); see also id. at 107 ¶ 332 (alleging reliance on defendants collectively and not individually). Baron and Bear Stearns4 are the sole sources alleged regarding the appellants' perceptions of prices at which trades were being made.

Dweck is sufficiently alleged to have had particular knowledge of some artificial trades, to have participated in them, and to have actively facilitated Baron's fraudulent business generally by loans and other investments. The issue is whether, as appellants argue and our dissenting colleague agrees, these allegations sufficiently support a Section 10(b) claim for damages by all the appellants for all the fraudulent sales of securities to them by Baron.

In pursuing a claim against Dweck for all damages caused by Baron, appellants make no claim of Dweck's liability under respondeat superior or other common law theory of vicarious liability. They have also abandoned any claim on appeal that Dweck is liable under Section 20(a) as a "controlling person" — any "person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under [the '34 Act]" is "liable jointly and severally" for the violation, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) — with regard to Baron's fraud. And, they have dropped all claims based on Section 9 of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (prohibiting "any transaction" effected for "the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any security ... or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market for any such security").5

Therefore, because there is no aiding and abetting liability in private actions under Section 10(b), Dweck may be liable in this matter only as a primary violator. Cent. Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180, 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that to prove a primary violation of Section 10(b), in such a private action, a plaintiff must allege that the specific defendant was identified as making the pertinent misrepresentation(s). Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158-59, 128 S.Ct. 761. Otherwise, the plaintiff's complaint would fail to allege reliance upon a misrepresentation made by that defendant, an element of a valid Section 10(b) claim for damages caused by a primary violator of that section. In short, an allegation of acts facilitating or even indispensable to a fraud is not sufficient to state a claim if those acts were not the particular misrepresentations that deceived the investor. See, e.g., id. at 157-59, 128 S.Ct. 761.

For example, in Stoneridge, the defendant, Scientific-Atlanta, had knowingly structured a sale of cable boxes to Charter at an artificially high price. Id. at 154, 128 S.Ct. 761. At the end of the year, Scientific-Atlanta returned the excess portion of the price by purchasing advertising from Charter at above-market prices. Id. at 154-55, 128 S.Ct. 761. This was alleged to have been a phony transaction designed only to allow Charter to report the returned excess as a purchase of advertising by Scientific-Atlanta, thus inflating Charter's revenue, and then to capitalize the inflated costs of the cable boxes, thereby decreasing Charter's apparent operating costs. Id. Although the complaint in Stoneridge alleged that the transactions had no economic substance and were specifically intended by Scientific-Atlanta to deceive investors (and Charter's auditor) — precisely as appellants have alleged with regard to Dweck's acts — the Supreme Court held that Scientific-Atlanta could not be liable in a civil action for damages under Section 10(b). Id. at 154-55, 166-67, 128 S.Ct. 761. The ground for this holding was that only Charter, and not Scientific-Atlanta, had made the fraudulent statements to the public through its financial statements. Id. at 155, 166-67, 128 S.Ct. 761.

The Supreme Court further elaborated this test in Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011). In Janus, the Court held that a corporation serving as the investment advisor and administrator — the manager — of a mutual fund could not be liable under Section 10(b) for false statements made in the mutual fund's prospectuses. Id. at 2299, 2305. The Court held that the advisor/administrator was insulated from Section 10(b) civil liability because the false statements to the public were made only in the name of the mutual fund, a separate corporate entity. Id. at 2305. Given that the advisor/administrator, as the Fund's manager, had surely prepared the prospectuses, Dweck's more limited involvement in Baron's frauds, although serious, is foreclosed by Janus (and Stoneridge as well).

Applying these principles to the present claims, appellants were required to allege acts by Dweck that amounted to more than knowingly participating in, or facilitating, Baron's fraud to state a claim under Section 10(b). To reiterate, under ATSI, manipulation violates Section 10(b) when an artificial or phony price of a security is communicated to persons who, in reliance upon a misrepresentation that the price was set by market forces, purchase the securities. 493 F.3d at 101-02. Under Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159-60, 166-67, 128 S.Ct. 761, and Janus, 131 S.Ct. at 2305, only the person who communicates the misrepresentation is liable in private actions under Section 10(b). The present complaint alleges only that Baron and Bear Stearns communicated the artificial price information to the would-be buyers. Therefore, allegations of financing Baron's operations and parking some securities fail to state a Section 10(b) private claim for damages against Dweck.

To summarize, appellants have sufficiently pleaded with particularity that Dweck provided knowing and substantial assistance in financing and facilitating the Baron fraud. While such allegations would easily be sufficient in an SEC civil action, see 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e), or a federal criminal action because this knowing and substantial assistance constitutes, at the least, aiding and abetting, see 18 U.S.C. § 2, they do not meet the standards for private damage actions under Section 10(b).

Nevertheless, with regard to appellants' state law claims — civil conspiracy to defraud and aiding and abetting fraud — the complaint alleges sufficient involvement by Dweck in the scheme to survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore, we vacate the dismissal and remand appellants' state law claims against Dweck for further proceedings.6

CONCLUSION

We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants' federal securities claims against Dweck and vacate and remand the state law claims.

LOHIER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Although I agree with the majority's resolution of the state-law fraud claims against Isaac Dweck ("Dweck"), I respectfully dissent from the majority's disposition of the federal securities claim of market manipulation against Dweck. In my view, the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded such a claim by alleging that (1) Dweck participated in a manipulative scheme in which he conveyed to the investing public, through a series of securities transactions, false signals that he controlled securities that were in fact controlled by a boiler room, A.R. Baron ("Baron"), (2) these false signals distorted the market for the relevant securities, and (3) they relied on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation in buying the relevant securities.

The majority opinion takes at least three wrong turns as it navigates the complaint and the relevant legal landscape. First, it ignores the fact that Dweck is alleged to be an insider of Baron who has primary liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, for engaging in a manipulative scheme. Instead, it interprets the complaint to state a claim only for aiding and abetting securities fraud. Second, it conflates market manipulation claims and pure misrepresentation claims. Third, it misreads Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011), and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008), to require a direct communication of false information to the plaintiffs in the context of a claim of market manipulation.

As the Supreme Court explained in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,

511 U.S. 164, 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (emphasis added). The Court in Central Bank also highlighted the distinction between "those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice," and those "who aid and abet the violation." Id. at 167, 114 S.Ct. 1439. "[A]iding and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." Id. at 176, 114 S.Ct. 1439. In other words, secondary actors who do more than aid and abet a securities fraud can be liable as primary violators. Neither the Supreme Court nor our precedents have modified the principle that an individual who "commi[tted] a manipulative act" and thereby "participated in a fraudulent scheme" is a primary violator. SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir.1998).

Here, the plaintiffs claim that Dweck was a primary violator because he engaged directly in market manipulation. The Supreme Court has described market manipulation as a "term of art" in connection with securities markets that generally refers "to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977). As I describe in greater detail below, the first amended complaint alleges that Dweck engaged in at least some of these manipulative practices directly.

The majority opinion itself aptly describes the purpose of the scheme involving Dweck and others as follows: "[T]he market was principally a series of artificial trades orchestrated by Baron designed to create a false appearance of volume and of increasing price" so that "Baron and its co-conspirators [c]ould sell their holdings at a profit before the stock crashed." Majority Op. at 21. It required at least two bad actors to create the "false appearance" to the market described in the majority opinion, and Dweck is adequately alleged to be one of those actors engaged in the securities transactions at issue. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161, 128 S.Ct. 761. Indeed, Dweck is specifically alleged to have "authorized," "engaged in" and "agreed to" the scheme, and one can plausibly conclude that, far from being a mere third-party agent or an enabler providing aid from the sidelines, he was central to the manipulation itself. See, e.g., J.A. at 320 ("As one of the founding investors and principal owners of A.R. Baron, Dweck played an important role in Baron's operations. He provided substantial needed bridge financing for many of the Baron investments....").

To the extent that the majority opinion superimposes the elements of a misrepresentation claim on a market manipulation claim and suggests that misrepresentation and market manipulation claims should be analyzed identically in this case, I respectfully disagree. Although both claims fall within the scope of conduct generally prohibited by Section 10(b), the pleading requirements for a claim of market manipulation differ from the pleading requirements for a misrepresentation claim. "Market manipulation requires a plaintiff to allege (1) manipulative acts; (2) damage; (3) caused by reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation; (4) scienter; (5) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (6) furthered by the defendant's use of the mails or any facility of a national securities exchange." ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir.2011). A misrepresentation claim, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to allege "(1) a material representation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157, 128 S.Ct. 761; Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.2010).

The most relevant difference between the two claims relates to pleading reliance. A market manipulation claim permits the plaintiff to plead that it relied on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation, whereas a misrepresentation claim requires the plaintiff to allege reliance upon a misrepresentation or omission. Compare ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101, with Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157, 128 S.Ct. 761. In addition, "a claim of manipulation ... can involve facts solely within the defendant's knowledge; therefore, ... the plaintiff need not plead manipulation to the same degree of specificity as a plain misrepresentation claim." ATSI, 493 F.3d at 102.

These differences, among others, between claims based on market manipulation and those based on misrepresentation are essential to understanding why the Supreme Court's analysis in Stoneridge and Janus regarding reliance does not control the outcome in this case, and why the majority opinion is wrong to conclude that these cases foreclose the market manipulation claim against Dweck.

Our Court has recognized that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine "creates a presumption that (1) misrepresentations by an issuer affect the market price of securities traded in an open market, and (2) investors rely on the market price of securities as an accurate measure of their intrinsic value." In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir.2008) (emphasis in original). In a Section 10(b) misrepresentation claim premised on the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is the misrepresentation that affects the market price of securities. Id. In comparison, participants in market manipulation schemes engage in fraudulent transactions in the public market for securities. The market manipulators' "own deceptive conduct," Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160, 128 S.Ct. 761, affects the market price of securities traded in the market,1 ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101 (market manipulation requires "market activity" that "create[s] a false impression of how market participants value a security"). For this reason, in a market manipulation claim based on a fraud-on-the-market theory, the complaint must allege that the manipulative acts of each principal participant in the scheme communicate false pricing signals to the market, which in turn transmits the false pricing information to investors. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988) (describing theory of reliance based on fraud-on-the-market theory and explaining that "[w]ith the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form of market price"). The relevant analysis, therefore, is whether a defendant has engaged in a manipulative "transaction [that] sends a false pricing signal to the market," ATSI, 493 F.3d at 100, or "convey[s] a misleading impression" to the investing public, United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.2008). If so, we presume that the market acts as the intermediary in communicating that false signal or conveying that false impression to investors.

With these principles in mind, I conclude that permitting the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim against Dweck by pleading reliance based on these false communications to the market is entirely consistent with the holdings in Stoneridge and Janus, neither of which disavows a theory of reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159, 128 S.Ct. 761 ("[U]nder the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, reliance is presumed when the statements at issue become public. The public information is reflected in the market price of the security. Then it can be assumed that an investor who buys or sells stock at the market price relies upon the statement." (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 247, 108 S.Ct. 978)); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 481. In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a claim alleging a fraudulent scheme because the defendants' "deceptive acts were not communicated to the public. No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of [defendants'] deceptive acts during the relevant times." 552 U.S. at 159, 128 S.Ct. 761. Moreover, the scheme in Stoneridge involved potentially fraudulent transactions "in the marketplace for goods and services, not," as with Dweck's alleged market manipulation, "in the investment sphere." Id. at 166, 128 S.Ct. 761. Janus, too, involved discrete misrepresentations relating to the defendants' business operations, rather than a market manipulation scheme such as the one alleged here. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Janus alleged that certain mutual fund prospectuses included fraudulent misrepresentations indicating that the funds "were not suitable for market timing" and would avoid that practice. 131 S.Ct. at 2300.

According to the majority opinion, Stoneridge held that "a plaintiff must allege that the specific defendant was identified as making the pertinent misrepresentation(s)." Majority Op. at 24 (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158-59, 128 S.Ct. 761). Stoneridge, of course, did no such thing. Ultimately, the claims in both Stoneridge and Janus failed because the defendants in each case did not communicate any false statement or misrepresentation directly to the investing public, and the "deceptive acts" of the defendants in Stoneridge were "too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance." Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161, 128 S.Ct. 761. Stock manipulation, however, necessarily and directly communicates false information through the market and goes beyond a false statement. See ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101 (market manipulation requires "market activity" that "create[s] a false impression of how market participants value a security"); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir.2001) (identifying manipulative conduct as transactions that "inject[] false inaccurate information into the marketplace or create[] a false impression of supply and demand").

I have not been able to find a single federal case that has applied Stoneridge or Janus to foreclose a claim against an actor alleged to have engaged directly in market manipulation of securities. Yet, relying on Stoneridge and Janus, the majority opinion does so by mistakenly focusing on who actually communicated the false price to the plaintiffs and viewing the answer to that question as dispositive. See Majority Op. at 25 ("The present complaint alleges only that Baron and Bear Stearns communicated the artificial price information to the would-be buyers"). In doing so, however, the majority opinion ignores the fraud-on-the-market doctrine-a doctrine that, as I have explained, clearly remains a viable method for establishing reliance after Stoneridge and Janus-and wrongly suggests that Stoneridge and Janus require a direct communication of either a false statement or deceptive conduct to specific plaintiffs in every case in order for those plaintiffs to state a claim under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Cf. U.S. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F.Supp.2d 148, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (concluding that Janus does not require dismissal of a complaint that "plausibly alleges that [the defendant] violated Rule 10b-5 beyond the making of a statement" by participating in a manipulative scheme).

The plaintiffs have pleaded a market manipulation claim against Dweck based on a theory of reliance that both Stoneridge and Janus appear to embrace. In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that Dweck effectively was a founder, principal, and owner of Baron, which was indisputably an archetypal boiler room.2 They also allege that Dweck was a key participant in the manipulative scheme who actively engaged in several prearranged, riskless trades, among other things, that resulted in his purchase of securities (warrants) pursuant to an agreement with Baron. There is no question that the prearranged securities trades were illegal. Moreover, as alleged, they were designed to deceive by directly giving the public the false impression that Dweck, not Baron, controlled the relevant manipulated securities.

The first amended complaint also explains the impact that the Baron/Dweck manipulative scheme had on the market and on the plaintiffs:

J.A. at 241, 243, 247, 281, 331, 340 (emphasis added).

I agree that the plaintiffs could have done a better job of drafting the complaint. But that is neither the standard of review nor the standard for a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs have adequately and plausibly alleged that Dweck personally engaged in a stock manipulation scheme that affected the prices of the relevant manipulated securities. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (describing requirement of "facial plausibility"). As alleged, Dweck's conduct constitutes more than "aid" or "facilitation"; under any fair reading of the complaint, Dweck was up to his eyeballs in the fraud at its inception. The plaintiffs have also adequately and plausibly alleged that they acted in reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation when they purchased the securities at artificially inflated prices. In the context of a claim for market manipulation, and at this stage in the proceedings, these allegations are enough. See ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101 (an allegation that the plaintiffs' injuries were "caused by reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation" will suffice to establish causation).

Notwithstanding the availability of criminal penalties and civil enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission, see Majority Op. at 25, I fear that every market manipulator — the remaining Dwecks of the world — will be cheered by the extra shelter for stock manipulation under the federal securities laws that the majority opinion unnecessarily provides them. If I thought that Stoneridge or Janus required that result, I would shrug, concur, and move on. Because I conclude that neither case forecloses the federal claim of market manipulation against Dweck, I respectfully dissent.