SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Bob W. Gibbs, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"),1 finding that the Commissioner's determination that Gibbs's Supplemental Security Income benefits were correctly reduced was supported by substantial evidence. Gibbs seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

When reviewing determinations made by the Commissioner, we conduct a "plenary review of the administrative record." Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the focus of review is the administrative ruling, not the district court's decision). We may set aside the Commissioner's decision only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if incorrect legal standards were applied. See Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127; Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Having conducted a plenary review of the administrative record, we affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. See Gibbs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-cv-1439 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). We have considered all of Gibbs's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. Further, Gibbs' motion to "withdraw with or without prejudice," [ECF No. 44], is DENIED as moot.