SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Dina Jaeger appeals from the April 26, 2013 Amended Judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granting Defendants' motions to dismiss all eight claims in her complaint. Jaeger's complaint alleged, inter alia, deprivation of her constitutional rights to: petition for redress of grievances; religious freedom; just compensation for the taking of her property for public use; protection of her property and liberty interests; and procedural and substantive due process. Additionally, Jaeger asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut state law. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo the district court's determinations of law with respect to the issues raised on appeal. Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (res judicata); Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003) (collateral estoppel); Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1994) (standing). In reviewing the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must at a minimum "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). With respect to a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the "party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in [her] favor" bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having conducted a de novo review of the record in light of the controlling substantive principles, we affirm the district court's dismissal of all eight claims in Jaeger's complaint for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court. Counts one, two, four, six, and eight asserting claims against the members of the Connecticut Siting Council ("CSC") in their official capacities, and counts two, four, six, and eight asserting claims against Cellco were either brought, or should have been brought, in Jaeger's first federal litigation. That lawsuit, which was ultimately dismissed, alleging, inter alia, that in rendering its decision, the Siting Council should have considered the putative effect of radio frequency on human health and on wildlife. These claims in this litigation are therefore barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Malcolm v. Board of Ed. of the Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent. Sch. Dist., 506 Fed. App'x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) "[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action"); Environmental Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The judicially-created doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars a party from relitigating in a subsequent proceeding an issue of fact or law that was clearly raised in a prior action where the party to be precluded, [. . .] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.").1 To the extent that claims one, two, four, and six were brought against the members of the CSC in their individual capacities, the district court properly rejected these claims on the ground of collateral estoppel.
Jaeger's remaining claims were properly dismissed as well. Jaeger's takings claim is not ripe because Connecticut's Constitution contains its own takings clause, and Jaeger does not allege, as she must, that she attempted to use procedures available to her under state law to obtain her requested compensation and was unsuccessful in that effort. See Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[a] takings claim is not ripe if a remedy potentially is available under the state constitution's provision"). Jaeger's seventh claim is barred by Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Jaeger lost her case in Connecticut state court when her appeal of the CSC decision was rejected for lack of standing because she was unable to persuade the court she was aggrieved as required under the Connecticut Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-166 et seq. This present action was filed six months after the last of her state-court appeals was decided adversely to her, and it alleges injuries that Jaeger suffered as a result of the state court's judgment. By challenging the dismissal of her Connecticut state-court appeal as a violation of her due process and equal protection rights, Jaeger "seek[s] federal-court review and rejection of the state-court judgment." Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. Accordingly, this claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 87.
With respect to Jaeger's remaining claim, we affirm that portion of the judgment which dismissed it based on lack of standing. As we held when this case was last before this court, "Jaeger lacks standing to sue for a declaratory judgment that the funding scheme of the Council [. . .] violates due process" because she fails to "allege any redressable injury that is `fairly traceable' to conduct by either defendant." Jaeger v. Cellco P'ship, 402 F. App'x 645 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
We have considered Jaeger's remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
