SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the orders of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Movant-Appellant Joseph Silliman appeals from the August 16, 2012 and September 14, 2012 orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.), denying Silliman's request to be appointed lead plaintiff and motion to intervene. At issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in finding the three-year statute of repose applicable to claims brought under the Securities Act barred Silliman's requests and motions. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

On June 27, 2013, after Silliman had timely filed his notice of appeal and while it was pending before this panel, this Court decided Police and Fire Retirement Systems of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013). Our decision in that case forecloses Silliman's appeal here. In IndyMac, we explained first that tolling was not available under the statute of repose applicable to Silliman's claims. Id. at 109 ("[O]ur conclusion is straightforward: American Pipe's tolling rule, whether grounded in equitable authority or on Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], does not extend to the statute of repose in Section 13 [of the Securities Act]."). We further held that "the Rule 15(c) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] `relation back' doctrine does not permit members of a putative class, who are not named parties, to intervene in the class action as named parties in order to revive claims that were dismissed from the class complaint for want of jurisdiction." Id. at 110. We are not persuaded that Silliman's claims are so distinct from those in IndyMac that a different result is compelled here.1

We have considered the rest of Silliman's arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the orders of the district court hereby are AFFIRMED.