SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner Terry Smith appeals from the District Court's May 11, 2012 judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

On May 24, 1997, Smith was pursued by police officers after stealing a car from a dealership. The chase ended when Smith crashed into a utility pole. As police officers and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) rendered aid, Smith attempted to drive away; this led to another crash, which injured one of the EMTs. On June 23, 1997, Smith was charged in New York County Court, Suffolk County, with possession of stolen property. Later, he was also charged with assault against the injured EMT. On November 15, 1998, Smith accepted a plea offer, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to possessing stolen property—with a sentence of three-and-a-half to seven years' imprisonment—and to assault—with a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences for both charges were to be served concurrently; therefore, the maximum term of imprisonment Smith could have received was seven years. That same day, Smith pled guilty to both charges. See App'x 42-83.

At his sentencing hearing approximately seven weeks later, Smith informed the state trial court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea to assault. The prosecutor and the court informed Smith that the plea offer he had agreed to was contingent on his pleading guilty to both charges. In a subsequent colloquy with the court, Smith insisted that he wanted to go to trial. See App'x 101. The court, accordingly, withdrew Smith's guilty plea as to both charges, see App'x 111 ("Plea is withdrawn on both."), and set a trial date. Smith was convicted at trial of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and was sentenced as a persistent felony offender to seventeen-and-a-half years to life in prison. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

Relevant here, the District Court, through Judge Weinstein, denied Smith's amended petition for habeas relief on April 17, 2012. Smith's sole claim on appeal is that the state trial court violated his double jeopardy rights by requiring him to stand trial for an offense to which he had already pled guilty. We review the District Court's denial of habeas corpus de novo. See Hines v. Miller, 318 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2003).

Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly rejected Smith's double jeopardy claim. Smith failed to exhaust his state remedies by not fairly presenting his double jeopardy claim to the state courts. See Carvajal v. Artus, 633 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). Because "were he to return to the state courts with his unexhausted claim, those courts would find the claim barred by the application of a state procedural rule, we must deem the claim procedurally defaulted." Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Under these circumstances, Smith "may escape dismissal on the merits . . . only by demonstrating `cause for the default and prejudice' or by showing that he is `actually innocent.'" Carvajal, 633 F.3d at 104 (quoting Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2001)). Smith does not make such a showing, and his petition based on this claim was therefore properly dismissed.

We have considered all of the arguments raised by petitioner on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the May 11, 2012 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.