Lenroy McLean, pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to § 2241. See, e.g., Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2005). Our review of the written findings resulting in a disciplinary ruling leading to the loss of good time credits is limited to whether the ruling is supported by "some evidence." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). "This standard is extremely tolerant and is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that supports the disciplinary ruling." Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the disciplinary ruling is supported by some evidence. Contrary to Appellant `s argument that he was merely present when several Rastafarian inmates protested a ceremonial meal, the chaplain's report indicated that Appellant asked several questions during the confrontation, and refused to leave the chapel when told that the menu would not be changed. This case is not analogous to Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1992), in which the evidence placed the plaintiff among approximately 100 inmates in a mess hall during a disturbance, but did not indicate that the plaintiff participated in the disturbance. Here, the specific allegations about Appellant's conduct are sufficient to meet the "some evidence" standard. See Sira, 380 F.3d at 69.
To the extent Appellant asserts a First Amendment violation or that he was denied due process, he waived those issues by not raising them below. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 124 n.29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that where a party "advances arguments available but not pressed below, . . . waiver will bar raising the issue on appeal." (internal quotations omitted; ellipses in original)).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's June 28, 2012 judgment is hereby