In appealing his conviction in the District Court, defendant Michael Thomas contends that the District Court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by excluding evidence he sought to introduce at trial.
On January 4, 2013, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Thomas, the former Chairman of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation ("MPTN" or "Tribe"), with one count of theft from an Indian tribal organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1163, and two counts of theft concerning an Indian tribal government receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).
In its opinion, the District Court held that, because intent to repay stolen funds is not a legal defense to charges of theft or embezzlement, evidence that Thomas previously reimbursed the Tribe for personal expenses was not relevant. The Court also held that evidence of charge card misuse by Shalida Jones—another MPTN tribal councilor who used her card for $36,511 in personal expenses, which she later reimbursed—was not relevant to Thomas's state of mind, because Thomas was unaware, when he committed the charged misconduct, that Jones had used her card to pay for personal expenses.
Thomas's sole claim on appeal is that the District Court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by excluding this evidence at trial. A defendant has "a fundamental due process right to present a defense." See United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). That right, however, is "not absolute, for a defendant `must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability.'" Id. (quoting Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 56 (2d Cir. 2001)). "Thus, a defendant does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is inadmissible under the rules of evidence." Id.
In light of the District Court's "superior position to assess relevancy and to weigh the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice," United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 131 (2d Cir. 2010), we will "not overturn the district court's decision to admit or reject evidence absent an abuse of discretion," United States v. Ramirez, 609 F.3d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 2010).
Thomas concedes that the intent to repay funds is no defense to charges of theft or embezzlement.
We find no error in the District Court's evidentiary rulings, much less an "abuse of discretion." See generally In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the term of art "abuse of discretion"); Joseph T. Sneed, Trial-Court Discretion: Its Exercise by Trial Courts and Its Review by Appellate Courts, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 201, 207-08 (2012) (commentary by the late Judge Sneed, a former Dean of the Duke Law School, on the several possible meanings of "abuse of discretion"). Even if the evidence at issue was sufficient to establish that the Tribe, in practice, permitted its officials to charge personal expenses to their cards with subsequent reimbursement, such evidence would only have been relevant at trial if Thomas's conduct comported with that practice. Here, it is undisputed that Thomas did not reimburse the Tribe for any of the over $100,000 in personal expenses that he charged to his card between October 2007 and September 2009—despite the fact that he was not indicted until January 2013. Any evidence purporting to show that the Tribe's "practical policy" permitted its officials to make personal charges with subsequent reimbursement, or that Thomas had sporadically reimbursed the Tribe for personal expenses prior to the period charged in the indictment, was therefore irrelevant to Thomas's case. Moreover, the probative value of admitting evidence of this "practical policy" to the jury—only to have the evidence show that Thomas did not comply with that policy either—was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury as to the true issues at stake. As the District Court aptly stated in its oral ruling before trial:
App'x 70-71 (emphases added).
Because we agree with the District Court that the evidence at issue was not relevant to any fact of consequence, and that the purported probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury, we decline to reverse the District Court's ruling that the evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403.
We have reviewed the record and the parties' arguments on appeal. For the reasons set out above, Thomas's conviction and sentence are