JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
The question presented is one of first impression
Franck Berlamont ("Berlamont"), a Swiss criminal complainant, seeks from appellants the production of documents relating to the examination of Rajiv Jaitly ("Jaitly Documents") to provide to a Swiss investigating magistrate overseeing a criminal inquiry related to a Bernard Madoff "feeder fund" in Switzerland. The Jaitly Documents were part of the discovery obtained in a case formerly pending before the United States District Court for
We hold, based on the plain reading of § 1782, as well the law's legislative history, that the statute applies to a foreign criminal investigation involving an investigating magistrate seeking documents in the United States.
Accordingly, we
This case arises out of the Bernard Madoff ("Madoff") Ponzi scheme. Franck Berlamont is the President and CEO of Geneva Partners, an investment firm in Switzerland that invested in a fund managed by Optimal Investment Services, S.A. ("OIS"), a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A. OIS, in turn, had invested significant funds with Madoff.
In June 2009, Berlamont commenced a criminal proceeding in Switzerland (the "Swiss proceeding") accusing OIS and its former Director General, Manuel Echeverría ("Echeverría"), of making misrepresentations concerning its investments with Madoff.
In support of the criminal proceeding in Switzerland, Berlamont seeks the production of certain documents relating to an examination of Rajiv Jaitly ("Jaitly"), a former Chief Risk Officer for OIS. The Jaitly Documents were a product of discovery in a case formerly pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Rembaum v. Banco Santander, S.A., No. 10 Civ. 4095, 2010 WL 3055314 (S.D.N.Y.2010).
The plaintiffs in the Rembaum case were a group of OIS's investors who brought civil claims in New York similar to those of Berlamont in the current Swiss criminal proceeding. Knowing that Jaitly held a management position at OIS from 2005 to 2007, the parties sought to examine him regarding OIS's conduct with respect to its Madoff investments. On May 3, 2012, the Rembaum Court issued a Letter Rogatory to the English High Court of Justice requesting that Jaitly's examination be ordered and conducted in London. The English High Court granted the application and ordered the examination of Jaitly. On July 16, 2012, Jaitly was examined in London and a transcript was produced. Thereafter, on August 10, 2012, the District
Berlamont is now seeking the Jaitly transcript and accompanying exhibits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a statute that permits federal courts to order document production "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation." On June 20, 2014, Judge Gardephe approved Berlamont's ex parte application and granted Berlamont leave to subpoena the documents from OIS's counsel in the United States, Hunton & Williams LLP ("H & W").
OIS and H & W moved on June 30, 2014 to vacate the ex parte order and quash the subpoena or, in the alternative, for a protective order. After oral argument on July 11, 2014, Berlamont submitted to the District Court a letter addressed to him from the Swiss magistrate investigating Mr. Echeverría, which stated that the Jaitly Documents would be "of great usefulness" to the Swiss proceeding.
On August 4, 2014, Judge Rakoff denied appellants' motions, holding that Berlamont's application satisfied the requirements of § 1782 because, among other things, "[a] complaining witness's presentation of evidence to an investigating magistrate satisfies the `for use' prong of § 1782." In re Application of Franck Berlamont for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No. 14 Misc. 190, 2014 WL 3893953, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2014).
On appeal, appellants challenge the lower court's decision on a variety of grounds. They contend that (1) Berlamont's claim does not meet the requirements of § 1782 because, according to appellants, a Swiss investigating magistrate is not a "foreign or international tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782, and that (2) the District Court should have denied Berlamont's application pursuant to the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (referred to in the District Court's memorandum order as the "Hague Convention"), international comity, and Swiss attorney-client privilege. In this opinion, we address appellants' § 1782 claim; finding no error, we affirm the District Court's order granting § 1782 discovery. We also affirm the District Court's order with regard to appellants' other challenges for substantially the reasons outlined in its well-reasoned memorandum order. See In re Application, 2014 WL 3893953, at *2.
Our review of a District Court decision granting § 1782 discovery involves two inquiries: whether "(1) as a matter of law, ... the District Court erred in its interpretation of the language of the statute; and (2) if not, whether the District Court's decision to grant discovery on the facts before it was in excess of its discretion." Brandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).
A district court is authorized to grant a § 1782 request where: (1) the person from whom discovery is sought resides (or is found) in the district of the district court to which the application is made, (2) the discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal, and (3) the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person. See Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2004). "Once the statutory requirements are met, a district court is free to grant discovery in its discretion." Id. at 83-84 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellants argue that Berlamont's discovery request does not meet the requirements of § 1782. They do not dispute that Berlamont's application satisfies the first and third requirements noted above, but they claim that the second — the "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" — requirement of § 1782 was not met here because, according to them, a Swiss investigating magistrate is not a "foreign or international tribunal."
The plain language and legislative history of § 1782 contradict appellants' argument. Section 1782 of Title 28 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (emphasis supplied).
The statute is the product of Congress's efforts, over the past 160 years, to provide judicial assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247, 124 S.Ct. 2466, 159 L.Ed.2d 355 (2004). The goals of the law are to provide "equitable and efficacious" discovery procedures in American courts "for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects" while "encourag[ing] foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts." Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The statute's precise scope — as well as its text — has evolved over time. Earlier versions of the statute authorized district courts to allow discovery in a "suit for the recovery of money or property depending in any court in any foreign country," then "in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country," and later "in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country." In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d at 1018 (Friendly, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (chronicling the changes made to the foreign discovery statute in 1863, 1948, and 1949, respectively).
In 1964, Congress modified the law's scope once more by replacing the words "in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country" with the phrase "in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 248-49, 124 S.Ct. 2466. The accompanying Senate Report makes clear that Congress used the word "tribunal" to expand the reach of the law beyond just providing assistance to "proceedings before conventional courts," but also to allow district courts to aid foreign "administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings." Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782). The Report specifically highlighted Congress's intention to
Congress's most recent textual change, in 1996, cemented the statute's applicability to foreign criminal investigations. The amended statute explicitly covered "criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation." National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 186.
The Swiss criminal investigation in the instant case is exactly the type of proceeding that the 1996 amendments to the statute were intended to reach. The criminal inquiry is a "proceeding" and an "investigation" being conducted by a Swiss magistrate.
Having concluded that the District Court did not err in its interpretation of the language of the statute, we also hold that appellants' remaining arguments are without merit substantially for the reasons given by the District Court.
To summarize: we hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 permits district courts to order the production of discovery for use in a foreign criminal investigation being conducted by an investigating magistrate.
For the reasons stated above, we
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
While we have analyzed § 1782's applicability to numerous different types of foreign proceedings, we have yet to rule squarely on the statute's applicability to a foreign criminal investigation conducted by a foreign investigating magistrate. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov't of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.1967) (holding § 1782 inapplicable to discovery requested by an Indian income-tax officer).