Filed: Dec. 16, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 13-4069-cr United States v. Spruill 1 2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 5 SUMMARY ORDER 6 7 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 8 SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 9 BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 10 WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 11 MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
Summary: 13-4069-cr United States v. Spruill 1 2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 5 SUMMARY ORDER 6 7 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 8 SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 9 BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 10 WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 11 MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH ..
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13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1
2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
4
5 SUMMARY ORDER
6
7 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
8 SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
9 BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
10 WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
11 MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
12 NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
13 OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
14
15 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
16 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
17 16th day of December, two thousand and fifteen.
18
19 Present:
20 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
21 RENNA RAGGI,
22 PETER W. HALL,
23 Circuit Judges.
24 ____________________________________________________
25
26 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
27
28 Appellee,
29
30 v. No. 13-4069-cr
31
32 JEFF SPRUILL,
33
34 Defendant-Appellant.
35 ____________________________________________________
36
37 For Defendant-Appellant: HARRY SANDICK (Andrew D. Cohen, on the brief), Patterson,
38 Belknap, Webb & Tyler L.L.P., New York, NY.
39
40 For Appellee: SARALA V. NAGALA, Assistant United States Attorney (Marc H.
41 Silverman, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for
42 Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for the District of
43 Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
44 ____________________________________________________
45
1
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
2 Connecticut (Chatigny, J.).
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
4 DECREED that, for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion addressing defendant’s
5 challenge to the dismissal of a juror and in this summary order, the judgment of the district court
6 is AFFIRMED.
7 Defendant-Appellant Jeff Spruill (“Spruill”) appeals from a July 2013 conviction entered
8 after a jury trial on three counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine
9 and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts One, Two, and Three), and one
10 count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
11 922(g) (Count Four). In October, 2013, Judge Chatigny sentenced Spruill principally to 120
12 months’ imprisonment. We address here Spruill’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
13 introduced at trial to prove him guilty of the crimes charged in Counts One, Two, and Four, and
14 the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. In a supplemental pro se brief Spruill also argues
15 that proof of a defendant’s knowledge of ‘drug type’ is a predicate element of the drug-related
16 offenses for which he was convicted.1 As noted above, we address in a separate opinion
17 accompanying this order Spruill’s argument that the district court improperly dismissed and
18 replaced one of the jurors before deliberations were completed. We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. For the reasons
20 stated below, we affirm.
1
On March 4, 2015, after this case was argued, Spruill’s appellate counsel moved for leave to
allow Spruill to file a supplemental pro se brief. This Court granted the motion and subsequently
received and has considered Spruill’s supplemental brief and the Government’s response.
2
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 Spruill contends that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
2 government, a reasonable juror could not find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Counts
3 One, Two, and Four. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction.
4 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2014). This Court exercises an “exceedingly
5 deferential standard of review” when reviewing sufficiency challenges to a jury verdict. United
6 States v. Hassan,
578 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). The defendant seeking to overturn a jury’s
7 finding bears a “heavy burden” because we must draw all reasonable inferences in the
8 Government’s favor and “uphold the conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the
9 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Aguilar,
585 F.3d
10 652, 656 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). “The ultimate question is not whether we
11 believe the evidence adduced at trial established defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
12 whether any rational trier of fact could so find.” United States v. Corbett,
750 F.3d 245, 250 (2d
13 Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Payton,
159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1998).
14 To overturn his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) Spruill must show that the
15 government failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
16 knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance with the specific intent to
17 distribute it. See United States v. Gore,
154 F.3d 34, 45 (2d Cir. 1998). Spruill argues that
18 because the confidential informants involved in the June and August 2012 controlled purchases
19 did not testify, the government failed to demonstrate that an exchange between Spruill and the
20 informants actually occurred, and thus no reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt
21 that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance. After reviewing the evidence, we conclude
22 that a rational trier of fact could find that Spruill had the intent to distribute and did distribute
23 cocaine and crack cocaine on the dates in question. The detectives who engineered both
3
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 controlled purchases testified at trial in detail about the confidential informants, the logistics of
2 the sting operation, and the cocaine that was purchased from Spruill. Although the confidential
3 informants’ testimony would have contributed to the weight of evidence, the testimony was not
4 necessary for a reasonable juror to find that Spruill intended to distribute and actually distributed
5 cocaine when engaging in the June and August 2012 purchases.
6 To overturn his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Spruill must show that the
7 government failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
8 either actually or constructively possessed a firearm. United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 300
9 (2d Cir. 2002). Constructive possession “exists when a person has the power and intention to
10 exercise dominion and control over an object, [which] may be shown by direct or circumstantial
11 evidence.”
Id. (alternation in original) (quoting
Payton, 159 F.3d at 56). “[U]nder constructive
12 possession, an individual can possess a gun . . . without ever physically handling the firearm . . . .
13 [and] possession need not be exclusive.”
Id. Spruill argues there was insufficient evidence to
14 prove that he constructively possessed the firearms that were found in the attic of 18 Glover
15 Place. We disagree. The Government produced evidence that Spruill regularly stored his
16 belongings in the attic; that additional garbage bags were found in the attic containing Spruill’s
17 clothing; and that nearby garbage bags were found in the attic containing a bulletproof vest, three
18 handguns, and four boxes of ammunition. The jury also heard testimony that the firearms did not
19 belong to the building’s tenant—Spruill’s girlfriend. This evidence provided a sufficient basis for
20 a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Spruill had the “power and intention
21 to exercise dominion and control over” the firearms found in the attic.
Id. (quoting Payton, 159
22 F.3d at 56).
4
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 Spruill contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court
2 erred in calculating his Guidelines sentencing range when it failed to consider the applicability of
3 our decision in United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959 (2d Cir. 2008). A procedural error in
4 sentencing occurs when a district court “(1) fails to calculate the Guidelines range; (2) is
5 mistaken in the Guidelines calculation; (3) treats the Guidelines as mandatory: (4) does not give
6 proper consideration to the statutory sentencing factors; (5) makes clearly erroneous factual
7 findings; (6) does not adequately explain the sentence imposed; or (7) deviates from the
8 Guidelines range without explanation.” United States v. Watkins,
667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir.
9 2012) (internal quotation omitted). When an alleged error has not been raised below, this Court
10 reviews the district court’s sentencing determination for plain error. See United States v. Olano,
11
507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993); United States v. Zillgitt,
286 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2002)
12 In Savage we applied the two-step modified categorical approach to determine that an
13 Alford plea to a violation of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-277(b) did not qualify as a conviction of a
14 controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) such that it could be considered when
15 imposing an enhanced sentence.
Savage, 542 F.3d at 964. We held that CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-
16 277(b) was not categorically a controlled substance offense under the guidelines and that the
17 Alford plea could not support a finding that the defendant necessarily committed the underlying
18 acts that constituted a predicate offense.
Id. at 964–65. Spruill previously pled guilty to the sale
19 of narcotics and the possession of narcotics with the intent to sell in violation of CONN. GEN.
20 STAT. § 21a-277(a). Although these offenses are not categorically controlled substance offenses
21 under the Guidelines, the district court’s decision to consider these convictions as predicate
22 offenses for a career offender enhancement was not procedurally unreasonable if Spruill’s plea
5
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 “necessarily rested on a fact identifying the conviction as a predicate offense.” Id. at 964
2 (internal quotation omitted).
3 Based on the record before us, the district court properly calculated Spruill’s Guidelines
4 range because the plea colloquy in Spruill’s prior state proceedings demonstrated that his guilty
5 plea “rested on a fact identifying the conviction as a predicate offense.”
Id. The transcript from
6 Spruill’s September 11, 2003 state court proceeding describes in sufficient detail that his
7 convictions were based upon actual possession and sale of crack cocaine and thus went beyond a
8 “mere offer to sell.”
Id. at 965. Spruill admitted as much, and at no point during the state
9 proceeding did Spruill voice an objection to the prosecutor’s recitation of the facts supporting the
10 two convictions. In the district court, the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) referenced and relied
11 upon the state court transcript. During sentencing Spruill’s counsel did not object to the accuracy
12 of the PSR, and Spruill agreed and did not contest that he qualified as a career offender under the
13 Guidelines. We hold, therefore, that the district court did not commit procedural error when
14 calculating Spruill’s sentence because the court properly classified Spruill’s prior state
15 convictions as predicate offenses for a career offender enhancement consistent with our guidance
16 in Savage.
17 Finally, Spruill argues in a supplemental post-argument pro se brief that because neither a
18 grand jury nor petit jury made a finding as to the identification of the controlled substance he
19 possessed, his drug-related convictions should be overturned. This argument is meritless. To the
20 extent Spruill argues that the grand jury and petit jury did not determine that the controlled
21 substances involved were cocaine and crack-cocaine, that argument is belied by the specific
22 charges in the indictment and by the notations on the jury verdict form. To the extent he argues
23 the government was required to charge and prove that he had knowledge of the specific drug
6
13-4069-cr
United States v. Spruill
1 type he possessed and distributed in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, this is not the law. See United
2 States v. Andino, 627 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2010). Spruill’s argument fails on both the facts and
3 the law.
4 We have considered Spruill’s remaining arguments and find that they are without merit.2
5 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
2
We decline to decide Spruill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. “When faced with a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we may [] decline to hear the claim,
permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. Morgan, 386 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir.
2004) (internal quotation omitted). We are “generally disinclined to resolve ineffective assistance
claims on direct review.” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 467 (2d Cir. 2004).
7
