Filed: Dec. 11, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 13-981-L Turkmen v. Hasty 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 5 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 6 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 7 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 8 on the 11th day of December, two thousand fifteen. 9 10 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 11 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 12 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 13 REENA RAGGI, 14 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 15 PETER W. HALL, 16 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 17 GERARD E. LYNCH, 18
Summary: 13-981-L Turkmen v. Hasty 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4 5 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 6 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 7 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 8 on the 11th day of December, two thousand fifteen. 9 10 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 11 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 12 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 13 REENA RAGGI, 14 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 15 PETER W. HALL, 16 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 17 GERARD E. LYNCH, 18 ..
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13-981-L
Turkmen v. Hasty
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2
3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
4
5 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
6 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
7 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
8 on the 11th day of December, two thousand fifteen.
9
10 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
11 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
12 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
13 REENA RAGGI,
14 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
15 PETER W. HALL,
16 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
17 GERARD E. LYNCH,
18 DENNY CHIN,
19 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
20 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
21 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
22 Circuit Judges.1
23
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
25
26 IBRAHIM TURKMEN, AKHIL SACHDEVA, AHMER
27 IQBAL ABBASI, ANSER MEHMOOD, BENAMAR
28 BENATTA, AHMED KHALIFA, SAEED HAMMOUDA,
29 PURNA BAJRACHARYA, on behalf of
30 themselves and all others similarly
31 situated,
32
33 Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross- 13-981 (L)
34 Appellants, 13-999 (Con)
35 13-1002 (Con)
36 - v.- 13-1003 (Con)
37 13-1662 (XAP)
1
Robert A. Katzmann, Chief Judge, took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
1 DENNIS HASTY, former Warden of the
2 Metropolitan Detention Center, MICHAEL ZENK,
3 former Warden of the Metropolitan Detention
4 Center, JAMES SHERMAN, former Metropolitan
5 Detention Center Associate Warden for
6 Custody,
7
8 Defendants-Appellants,
9
10 JOHN ASHCROFT, former Attorney
11 General of the United States, ROBERT
12 MUELLER, former Director, Federal
13 Bureau of Investigation, JAMES W.
14 ZIGLAR, former Commissioner,
15 Immigration and Naturalization
16 Service,
17
18 Defendants-Cross-Appellees,
19
20 SALVATORE LOPRESTI, former Metropolitan
21 Detention Center Captain, JOSEPH CUCITI,
22 former Metropolitan Detention Center
23 Lieutenant,
24
25 Defendants.
26
27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
28
29 ORDER
30 Following disposition of this appeal, an active judge
31 of the Court requested a poll on whether to rehear the case
32 en banc. A poll having been conducted and there being no
33 majority favoring en banc review, rehearing en banc is
34 hereby DENIED.
35 Rosemary S. Pooler and Richard C. Wesley, Circuit
36 Judges, concur by opinion in the denial of rehearing en
37 banc.
2
1 Dennis Jacobs, José A. Cabranes, Reena Raggi, Peter W.
2 Hall, Debra Ann Livingston, and Christopher F. Droney,
3 Circuit Judges, dissent by opinion from the denial of
4 rehearing en banc.
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
7
8
9
3
ROSEMARY S. POOLER and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc:
Our dissenting colleagues lament that the majority opinion in this matter
presents the first circuit decision in the country allowing a Bivens claim for an
“executive policy” enacted in response to a national emergency. We disagree.
The majority opinion acknowledges that Iqbal confirmed that it was
constitutionally permissible for the Attorney General to subject detainees with
suspected ties to terrorism to restrictive conditions of confinement. The majority
opinion is unanimous in concluding that plaintiffs have no claim in that regard.
Our differences arise from the significance of what we conclude is a
plausibly pled allegation that the Attorney General ratified the rogue acts of a
number of field agents in carrying out his lawful policy. The Attorney General is
alleged to have endorsed the restrictive detention of a number of men who were
Arabs or Muslims or both—or those who appeared to fit those categories—that
resulted from the fear and frenzy in greater New York following the 9/11 attacks
in which suspicion was founded merely upon one’s faith, one’s appearance, or
one’s native tongue.
Moreover, the dissenters fail to note that two of the defendants in this case
ran the Metropolitan Detention Center and are alleged to have filed false
1
documents with regard to the risk assessments of detainees and to have
encouraged a dangerous environment for those detainees at the facility. As
alleged in the complaint and documented by the Inspector General’s report and
national media, this included assaults, daily strip searches, and numerous other
degrading acts. All of these actions, were they to have occurred in a regular
prison environment and been employed against an inmate not suspected of
posing any security risk, would have been considered unlawfully punitive. See
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (holding that particular conditions or restrictions
of pretrial detention must be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective); see also, e.g., Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 705 F.3d 560, 574 (6th
Cir. 2013) (“‘[A] strip search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion
upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.’”
(quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996)). This view accords not
only with Iqbal, but also with both our own prior precedent and the views
expressed by several of our sister circuits in the wake of Iqbal. See, e.g., Walker v.
Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199
(10th Cir. 2010); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).
2
This case has drawn this Court’s attention now for over thirteen years.
The majority opinion and dissent have analyzed many arguments (including
Judge Raggi’s Bivens concerns, which were not even advanced by the
government) and hundreds of cases. The length of our efforts now fills many
pages. In our view, it is time to move the case forward.
3
DENNIS JACOBS, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, REENA RAGGI, PETER W. HALL, DEBRA ANN
LIVINGSTON, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc:
In this case, a sharply divided panel makes our court the first in the nation to
imply a Bivens damages action1 against senior Executive Branch officials—including
the former Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI—for
actions taken to safeguard our country in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
attacks. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2015); id. at 265 (Raggi, J.,
dissenting in part). The question of whether to rehear this case en banc has now
evenly divided the active judges of the court (6‐6), which means defendants’
petitions for rehearing will be denied. We six judges who voted for rehearing
respectfully dissent from that denial.2
1
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
2
Our court’s historic reluctance to revisit panel opinions en banc has been
questioned both in cases where we are the outlier in a circuit split, see 2002 Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit, Remarks by Justice Ginsburg, 221 F.R.D. 38, 223
(2002) (suggesting Second Circuit might be “a bit too resistant to en banc
rehearing”), and in cases where we have deemed the issues so important as to make
Supreme Court review likely, cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008)
(Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“If issues are important
enough to warrant Supreme Court review, they are important enough for our full
Court to consider and decide on the merits.”).
1
The panel decision raises questions of exceptional importance meriting further
review. These concern our court’s faithful adherence to controlling Supreme Court
precedent respecting (1) the narrow scope of Bivens actions, (2) the broad shield of
qualified immunity, and (3) the pleading standard for plausible claims. Judge Raggi
discusses each of these points in detail in her panel dissent. See id. at 265–302. We
incorporate that opinion here, which allows us to avoid repeating its analysis in
summarizing our reasons for seeking en banc review.
* * *
In June 2001, the Supreme Court observed that the threat of “terrorism” might
demand “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security,” including “forms of preventive detention”
for illegal aliens. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). Less than three
months later, the deadliest terrorist attack in the history of this nation—committed
by aliens operating under foreign direction—presented federal officials with what
even the panel majority acknowledges were “unprecedented challenges” in
protecting our homeland from further harm. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d at 226.3
3
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (describing “vast” federal
investigation “to identify the assailants and prevent them from attacking anew”); see
also Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d at 277 n.19 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (discussing
2
Astoundingly, given these circumstances, this court now implies a Bivens damages
action—a practice that is generally “disfavored,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009), and usually “unjustified,” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)—to
expose the former Attorney General, FBI Director, and other federal officials to
potentially unlimited personal liability for their efforts to provide such protection.4
We are the first court to use Bivens to this effect. Four Courts of Appeals—for
the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—have declined to extend Bivens to
suits against executive branch officials for national security actions taken after the
9/11 attacks. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Doe v.
Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975 (9th
Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Meshal v.
Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The panel decision puts this
court at odds not only with these sister circuits, but also with controlling Supreme
various events in five months following 9/11 that fueled fear of further imminent
terrorist attacks).
4
It was the President of the United States who, by written instructions,
assigned responsibility for homeland security after 9/11 to the Attorney General and
FBI Director, as well as to the CIA Director. See id. at 273 n.9 (Raggi, J., dissenting
in part).
3
Court precedent in the following three areas of law.
1. The Proper Scope of Bivens Actions
After implying damages actions against federal officials on three occasions in
the decade between 1971 and 1980, the Supreme Court has never done so again.5
Rather, it has consistently emphasized that Bivens actions are limited to a few
established contexts, and that those contexts cannot be generalized to extend Bivens
further. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 549–50. Only by redefining the few
established Bivens contexts at an impermissibly “high level of generality” has the
panel majority here been able to avoid its obligation to consider whether a judicially
implied damages action is “the best way” to implement constitutional guarantees
in the unprecedented legal and factual circumstances of this case. Id. at 500, 561–62
(requiring such judgment to extend Bivens, and recognizing that Congress is usually
in “far better position” than courts to evaluate impact of new species of litigation
against those who act in public’s behalf).6
5
See id. at 267 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (tracing history of Bivens actions
in Supreme Court).
6
See id. at 268–69 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (explaining why generalization
of Bivens contexts elides requirement for considered judgment about “best way” to
implement constitutional guarantees in particular legal and factual circumstances).
4
The majority thereby further avoids consideration of various factors strongly
counseling hesitation in extending Bivens here. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378
(1983). These factors include the following:
(a) plaintiffs here challenge an executive policy, rather than individual
rogue action, the typical Bivens scenario7;
(b) the challenged policy implicates the executive’s immigration authority8;
(c) the policy further implicates the executive’s responsibility for national
security, here exercised in a time of crisis9; and
7
See id. at 272–74 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (discussing why Bivens has
never been considered “‘proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy’” (quoting
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001))).
8
See id. at 274–75 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (referencing Supreme Court’s
recognition that “‘any policy toward aliens’” is so interwoven with foreign relations,
war powers, and other matters “‘so exclusively entrusted to the political branches
of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference’” absent
congressional authorization (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588–89 (1952))).
9
See id. at 275–78 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Supreme Court’s
observation that “‘[m]atters intimately related to . . . national security are rarely
proper subjects for judicial intervention’” in absence of congressional or
constitutional authorization, such as habeas corpus guarantee (quoting Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981), and citing Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
529–30 (1988))).
5
(d) Congress’s failure to provide a damages remedy despite longstanding
awareness of the concerns raised in this lawsuit.10
In opposing en banc review, the members of the panel majority attempt to
minimize the significance of their Bivens ruling by asserting that it does not extend
to executive policy challenges but applies only to the Attorney General’s alleged
ratification of “the rogue acts of a number of field agents in carrying out his lawful
policy.” Pooler and Wesley, JJ., Op. Concurring in Denial of Reh’g En Banc (“Pooler
and Wesley, JJ., Op.”), ante at [1]. The assertion is belied however both by (1)
plaintiffs’ complaint, which specifically sues the Attorney General and FBI Director
for the policies they allegedly developed and created in response to the 9/11 attacks,
see Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d at 227, 263 (quoting Compl. ¶¶ 39–49, 75); and
(2) the majority’s own opinion, which holds that plaintiffs can use a Bivens action
against the Attorney General, FBI Director, and others to challenge, not any rogue
actions by field agents, but the “MDC confinement policy” of holding 9/11 detainees
in “‘particularly restrictive’” conditions until cleared of terrorist connections, id. at
228 (emphasis added) (quoting Compl. ¶ 76); see id. at 239 (concluding that
pleadings plausibly allege that Attorney General “affirmatively supported”
restrictive conditions).
10
See id. at 278–80 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (tracing Congress’s
awareness).
6
Our concurring colleagues further confuse the issue by lumping together
certain challenged policy actions, e.g. daily strip searches, with rogue conduct not
authorized by any policy, e.g. assaults. See Pooler and Wesley, JJ., Op., ante at [2].
Plaintiffs’ ability to use a Bivens action against individual prison officers for such
rogue conduct is not at issue on this appeal.
Thus, to ensure this court’s adherence to controlling Supreme Court precedent
regarding the narrow scope of Bivens actions in the context of the restrictive
confinement policy challenge here at issue, we should rehear this case en banc.11
2. The Broad Shield of Qualified Immunity
Controlling Supreme Court precedent instructs that qualified immunity must
be afforded defendants in this case unless the constitutional rights asserted by
plaintiffs were so clearly established with respect to the “particular conduct”and the
11
This court’s duty to follow Supreme Court precedent regarding the narrow
scope of Bivens actions—a matter implicating the separation of powers critical to our
constitutional structure, see id. at 266 n.2, 267 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part)—exists
independently of any arguments made, or not made, by the government. See
generally Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing
court’s discretion to review unpreserved issue to remedy obvious misapplication of
law). Compare Pooler and Wesley, JJ., Op., ante at [3] (asserting that concerns raised
in panel dissent were not advanced by government on appeal), with Turkmen v.
Hasty, 789 F.3d at 268 n.4 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part) (observing that government
raised Bivens challenge in moving for dismissal but did not pursue after receiving
relief on other grounds).
7
“specific context” at issue that every reasonable official would have understood that
his conduct was unlawful. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
2080, 2083 (2011). The panel majority here maintains that plaintiffs, although
lawfully arrested and detained, had a right not to be restrictively confined in the
absence of an individualized suspicion of dangerousness. But it cites no case clearly
establishing such a right, let alone a case clearly establishing the unlawfulness of
defendants’ particular conduct in light of the specific context of this case. See
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. at 308. Instead, considerable precedent, including Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979), cited by our concurring colleagues, see Pooler
and Wesley, JJ., Op., ante at [2], suggests that restrictive confinement of lawfully
detained persons can be based on general, rather than individualized, suspicion of
dangerousness.12
12
See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d at 277, 290–93 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part)
(discussing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 316 (1986); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585–87
(1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979), and detailing experiences giving rise
to general suspicion in this case).
8
We should, therefore, review en banc the panel majority’s denial of qualified
immunity in the unprecedented circumstances of this case.13
3. The Iqbal Pleading Standard
In its earlier review of this very case (then bearing a different caption), the
Supreme Court made clear that to survive dismissal, plaintiffs had to plead a
plausible claim grounded in a factual basis. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court instructed that this standard could not be satisfied by pleading facts
“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” because that fell “short of the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As
Judge Raggi’s careful discussion of the pleadings and incorporated documents
demonstrates, the majority’s identification of viable claims, particularly policy‐
13
In opposing en banc review, our concurring colleagues assert that “it is time
to move the case forward.” Pooler and Wesley, JJ., Op., ante at [3]. But qualified
immunity dictates that damages actions not move forward unless the constitutional
right at issue was so clearly established in the particular context of the case as to be
beyond dispute. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014) (“Qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685
(explaining that “basic thrust of the qualified‐immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including avoidance of disruptive discovery”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we should not hesitate to take the time
for en banc review to ensure that the Attorney General, FBI Director, and other
officials are not subjected to further litigation based on rights not clearly established
by law.
9
challenging claims against the Attorney General and FBI Director, frequently relies
only on hypothesized possibilities,14 or on conclusory assumptions or insinuations
of discriminatory purpose that the Supreme Court has already rejected. See Pooler
and Wesley, JJ., Op., ante at [1] (repeating conclusory assumptions).15
The need to ensure faithful adherence to the Iqbal pleading standard,
pronounced by the Supreme Court in this very case, is thus a further reason for en
banc review.
* * *
To conclude, we observe that our court’s failure to adhere to controlling
Supreme Court precedent would raise a serious concern in any case. But here, that
14
See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d at 282–90 (Raggi, J., dissenting in part)
(explaining how majority’s hypotheses as to possible involvement of Attorney
General and FBI Director in challenged detentions are actually belied by record
facts).
15
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court stated that restrictive confinement
of 9/11 detainees until cleared of terrorist activities did not state a constitutional
claim absent plausible allegations that the restrictions were “due to” the detainees’
“race, religion, or national origin.” 556 U.S. at 683. Further, the Court held that the
disparate impact on Arab Muslims of the hold‐until‐cleared policy was not enough
to imply discriminatory intent given that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arab
Muslim members of an Islamic fundamentalist group comprised largely of Arab
Muslims. See id. at 682. Judge Raggi’s dissent explains why Iqbal’s reasoning
necessarily defeats plaintiffs’ amended pleadings. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d
at 295–300.
10
concern is compounded by the panel’s departure from precedent in three areas of
law. Further, this concern arises in a case requiring a former Attorney General and
FBI Director, among other federal officials, to defend against claims for money
damages based on a detention policy applied to illegal aliens in the immediate
aftermath of a terrorist attack on this country by aliens. Together, these
circumstances present important legal issues warranting full‐court review.16
Further, the Supreme Court has already once reviewed—and reversed—this court
for allowing plaintiffs to pursue deficient claims against the Attorney General and
FBI Director in this case. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. This litigation history,
when considered together with the sharp panel division, the even division (6‐6) of
active judges in the en banc poll, and our split from sister circuits, only reinforces
the propriety of our rehearing this case ourselves in advance of any possible further
consideration by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we dissent from the denial of defendants’ petitions for en banc
review.
16
While the focus of our concern in seeking en banc review is the panel
majority’s decision to allow plaintiffs to pursue damages against the Attorney
General and FBI Director, Judge Raggi’s dissent explains why plaintiffs’ policy‐
based claims against other officials should also be dismissed, obviating the need for
us to discuss them here. See id. at 293–95, 298–302.
11