Filed: Oct. 29, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2249-pr Watts v. Griffin UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
Summary: 14-2249-pr Watts v. Griffin UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A ..
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14‐2249‐pr
Watts v. Griffin
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL
EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand fifteen.
4
5 PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
7 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
10 KEVIN E. WATTS,
11
12 Petitioner‐Appellant,
13 v. 14‐2249
14
15 SUPERINTENDENT P. GRIFFIN,
16
17 Respondent‐Appellee.
18 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
19 FOR PETITIONER‐APPELLANT: Kevin E. Watts, pro se,
20 Napanoch, NY
21
22 FOR RESPONDENT‐APPELLEE: Leonard Joblove, Camille O’Hara
1
1 Gillespie, Gamaliel Marrero,
2 Assistant District Attorneys, for
3 Kenneth P. Thompson, District
4 Attorney, Kings County,
5 Brooklyn, NY
6
7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
8 District of New York (Allyne R. Ross, Judge).
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
10 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is
11 AFFIRMED.
12 Appellant Kevin Watts, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
13 Court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We assume the
14 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on
15 appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
16 “A State’s procedural rules serve vital purposes at trial, on appeal, and on
17 state collateral attack” and “channel[], to the extent possible, the resolution of
18 various types of questions to the stage of the judicial process at which they can be
19 resolved most fairly and efficiently.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749
20 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[f]ederal courts considering
21 habeas corpus petitions are generally barred from reviewing the decisions of state
2
1 courts insofar as those decisions are predicated on adequate and independent
2 state procedural grounds.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 Federal habeas review is not available if the State court “clearly and expressly”
4 holds that its judgment rests upon a State procedural bar, even if it “addresses the
5 merits in reaching an alternative holding.” Whitley v. Ercole, 642 F.3d 278, 286 &
6 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
7 Here, the State court reviewing Watts’s motion to vacate his conviction
8 under Section 440.10 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law ruled that Watts
9 failed to properly raise his claims on direct appeal and, in the alternative, held
10 that his claims lacked merit. The District Court properly concluded that the State
11 court had ruled on an independent and adequate state ground and that it was
12 barred from reaching the merits of Watts’s claims. See Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d
13 382, 393 (2d Cir. 2008); Murden v. Artuz, 497 F.3d 178, 191‐92 (2d Cir. 2007).
14 We have considered all of Watts’s remaining arguments and conclude that
15 they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
16 Court is AFFIRMED.
17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
3