Filed: Jul. 17, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2469 Dong v. Lynch BIA Vomacka, IJ A200 733 668 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 14-2469 Dong v. Lynch BIA Vomacka, IJ A200 733 668 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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14-2469
Dong v. Lynch
BIA
Vomacka, IJ
A200 733 668
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 17th day of July, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 XIAN QUAN DONG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 14-2469
17 NAC
18
19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Lewis G. Hu, New York, New York.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux,
1 Assistant Branch Director; Matthew
2 A. Connelly, Trial Attorney, Office
3 of Immigration Litigation, U.S.
4 Department of Justice, Washington,
5 D.C.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
10 DENIED.
11 Petitioner Xian Quan Dong, a native and citizen of the
12 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 23, 2014,
13 decision of the BIA affirming the April 1, 2013, decision of
14 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying Dong’s application for
15 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
16 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xian Quan Dong, No. A200 733
17 668 (B.I.A. June 23, 2014), aff’g No. A200 733 668 (Immig. Ct.
18 N.Y. City Apr. 1, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity
19 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
21 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
22 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
23 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
2
1 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
2 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency may,
3 “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a
4 credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the
5 plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
6 statements and other record evidence “without regard to
7 whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
9 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
10 Dong was not credible.
11 The agency reasonably relied on Dong’s implausible and
12 inconsistent statements regarding whether he had attended
13 multiple church gatherings and discussed baptism with a pastor
14 in December 2009 (within days of entering the United States),
15 or whether he first attended church in January 2010. See Siewe
16 v. Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that
17 an implausibility finding that is based on “speculation that
18 inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made
19 available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single
20 fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary
3
1 experience.”); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 164-67. The
2 agency also reasonably found a discrepancy in Dong’s evidence
3 regarding whether his father gave public security officials
4 money or gifts as a bribe to secure Dong’s release from
5 detention. See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (“[a]n
6 inconsistency and an omission are . . . functionally
7 equivalent.”). Dong’s unresponsive explanations were not
8 compelling. See Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80-81 & n.1
9 (2d Cir. 2005). Dong also made inconsistent statements related
10 to whether he reported to Chinese officials weekly as they had
11 required as a condition of his release. See Xiu Xia Lin,
534
12 F.3d at 164-67.
13 Having questioned Dong’s credibility, the agency
14 reasonably relied further on his failure to provide evidence
15 corroborating his religious practice in the United States. See
16 Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). As
17 the agency observed, Dong failed to corroborate his attendance
18 at church (for the two years prior to his merits hearing) with
19 a statement from his church, fellow practitioners, or uncle.
4
1 Given the inconsistency, implausibility, and
2 corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility
3 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See
4 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding is dispositive of
5 Dong’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
6 insofar as they are based on his claim of past persecution and
7 fear of future harm on account of his current religious
8 practice. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
9 2006).
10 The agency also did not err in denying relief based on its
11 determination that, even if credible as to his assertion that
12 he would practice Christianity if removed to China, Dong did
13 not demonstrate that his fear was well-founded. See 8 C.F.R.
14 § 1208.13(b)(2); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft,
357 F.3d
15 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). As the agency noted, the
2009 U.S.
16 Department of State International Religious Freedom Report
17 provides that the treatment of unregistered Christians varies
18 by locality in China and did not indicate that such individuals
19 face harm in Dong’s home province. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS,
20
421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a fear is not
5
1 objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record
2 and is merely “speculative at best”).
3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
4 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
5 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
6 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
7 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
8 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
9 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
10 34.1(b).
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
