Filed: Sep. 10, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-1993-cv Salmon v. Blesser In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit _ August Term, 2014 (Submitted: June 15, 2015 Decided: September 10, 2015) Docket No. 14-1993-cv _ OLIVER SALMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, —v.— THOMAS BLESSER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN ALBANY, NEW YORK POLICE OFFICER, ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK, Defendants-Appellees, JOHN DOE, 1 AND 2, THE NAME BEING FICTITIOUS BUT INTENDED TO REPRESENT ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES OF THE
Summary: 14-1993-cv Salmon v. Blesser In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit _ August Term, 2014 (Submitted: June 15, 2015 Decided: September 10, 2015) Docket No. 14-1993-cv _ OLIVER SALMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, —v.— THOMAS BLESSER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN ALBANY, NEW YORK POLICE OFFICER, ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK, Defendants-Appellees, JOHN DOE, 1 AND 2, THE NAME BEING FICTITIOUS BUT INTENDED TO REPRESENT ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES OF THE ..
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14‐1993‐cv
Salmon v. Blesser
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________________
August Term, 2014
(Submitted: June 15, 2015 Decided: September 10, 2015)
Docket No. 14‐1993‐cv
________________
OLIVER SALMON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
—v.—
THOMAS BLESSER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN ALBANY, NEW
YORK POLICE OFFICER, ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ALBANY, NEW YORK,
Defendants‐Appellees,
JOHN DOE, 1 AND 2, THE NAME BEING FICTITIOUS BUT INTENDED TO REPRESENT ONE
OR MORE EMPLOYEES OF THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
________________
Before:
JACOBS, RAGGI, AND LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
________________
1
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered in the Northern District of
New York (D’Agostino, J.), plaintiff argues that his complaint alleging forcible
ejection from the Albany City Court states plausible claims for relief under the
First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as under New York
law prohibiting the intentional infliction of emotional distress. While an order to
depart a public area does not, by itself, effect a “seizure” of the person so
ordered, see Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994), where, as here, a
plaintiff alleges that an officer used physical force to restrain and control the
plaintiff’s movements, that allegation does plausibly plead a seizure subject to
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Accordingly, we vacate
the dismissal of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against defendant Blesser,
but affirm the judgment in all other respects.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
________________
KEITH FRANK SCHOCKMEL, ESQ., Albany, New York, for Plaintiff‐
Appellant.
ERIC SUGAR, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Albany, New York, for
John J. Reilly, Corporation Counsel, Albany, New York, for
Defendants‐Appellees.
________________
2
REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Oliver Salmon sued the City of Albany, the Albany Police
Department, Police Officer Thomas Blesser, and two “John Doe” employees of
the Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law for
alleged constitutional and tort injuries resulting from the use of physical force to
eject him from the Albany City Court. Salmon now appeals from a judgment
entered on May 29, 2014, in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge) dismissing his complaint in all
respects. See Salmon v. Blesser, No. 1:13‐cv‐1037(MAD/RFT), 2014 WL 1883552
(N.D.N.Y. May 12, 2014). Specifically, Salmon appeals from the dismissal of his
claims against Officer Blesser, in his individual capacity, under the First and
Fourth Amendments as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and under
state law prohibiting intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).1
1 Because Salmon fails to appeal the dismissal of his equal protection claim
against Blesser or the dismissal of all claims against the other defendants or
against Blesser in his official capacity, we deem those claims abandoned, and we
do not discuss them further in this opinion. See, e.g., Grogan v. Blooming Grove
Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 263 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014).
3
On de novo review, see, e.g., Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d
25, 26 (2d Cir. 2015), we affirm the challenged dismissal of Salmon’s First
Amendment and emotional distress claims, but we vacate dismissal of his Fourth
Amendment claim. To the extent the district court relied on Sheppard v.
Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994), to conclude that removals from courthouses
do not constitute “seizures” subject to the Fourth Amendment, we explain herein
that Sheppard states a general rule that a police order to leave an area, without
more, does not effect a seizure of the person so ordered. Nevertheless, where, as
here, an official uses physical force to effect the ejection, so that for a time,
however brief, he intentionally restrains the person and controls his movements,
a plaintiff can plausibly plead a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part,
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. Background
A. Salmon’s Removal from the Courthouse
The following facts are drawn from Salmon’s complaint and are presumed
to be true for purposes of this appeal. See Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88, 91 (2d
Cir. 2008).
4
On September 1, 2010, Salmon accompanied his attorney to the Albany
City Court to examine a court file. Because only lawyers were permitted into the
clerk’s office where the file was kept, Salmon waited in a public area outside the
office while his attorney went inside. As Salmon waited, Officer Blesser
approached and ordered persons to leave the area. Salmon explained that he
was waiting for his attorney and offered to summon counsel to confirm that fact.
According to Salmon, Blesser “became enraged . . . , and without warning,
grabbed [Salmon] by the collar and violently twisted his arm up behind his back
and began shoving [him] toward the door.” Compl. ¶ 23. When Salmon
complained that Blesser was hurting him, Blesser twisted Salmon’s arm further.
Blesser then “physically threw [Salmon] out the door and threatened [him] with
arrest” if he reentered the building. Id. ¶ 28. Salmon asserts that these actions
caused him permanent physical injury.
B. Procedural History
On August 23, 2013, Salmon filed this federal action. Defendants moved to
dismiss, which motion the district court granted on May 12, 2014. See Salmon v.
Blesser, 2014 WL 1883552. As to the Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable
seizure, the district court concluded that Salmon failed plausibly to plead a
seizure of his person in light of Sheppard v. Beerman, wherein this court held
5
that a fired law clerk was not seized when court officers ordered him to leave his
formerly employing judge’s chambers and escorted him out of the courthouse.
See id. at *6–7. Sheppard explained that no seizure occurred because the clerk
remained “free to go anywhere else that he desired, with the exception of [the
judge’s] chambers and the court house.” Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d at 153
(internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent Salmon also complained of
excessive force, the district court held that such a claim was not cognizable
absent a seizure. See Salmon v. Blesser, 2014 WL 1883552, at *7.
The district court afforded Salmon 14 days to amend his complaint. Rather
than amend, however, Salmon let the deadline pass, whereupon he filed notice of
this appeal.2
II. Discussion
A. Fourth Amendment Claim
Salmon’s appeal from the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claim
against Blesser presents us with a single question: Did he allege facts sufficient
to plead a plausible “seizure” of his person? See County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
2 A dismissal with leave to amend is ordinarily a non‐appealable order, see
Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2006), but an appeal may
be pursued where the plaintiff disclaims any intention to amend or where, as
here, the district court sets a deadline for amending and the plaintiff does not
amend within the deadline, see id. at 224 & n.7.
6
523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (noting that “Fourth Amendment covers only ‘searches
and seizures’”). We conclude that he did.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that a person
is seized “when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, . . .
in some way restrain[s] the liberty of a citizen.” Id. at 19 n.16. Determining
when “physical force” effects such restraint has normally been straightforward.
See, e.g., id. at 7 (describing seizure in which officer “grabbed . . . Terry, spun
him around . . . , and patted down the outside of his clothing”); United States v.
Freeman, 735 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that suspect was seized when
officer “grabb[ed him] around the waist . . . placing him in a ‘bear hug’”). To
explain when a sufficient “show of authority” effects restraint, the Supreme
Court has relied on a totality‐of‐the‐circumstances test, asking whether a
reasonable person would believe that he was “not free to leave.” INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007); United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105
(2d Cir. 2009). Indeed, we referenced this “free to leave” test in Sheppard v.
Beerman, identifying no seizure where a fired law clerk “was free to go
anywhere else that he desired with the exception of [the judge’s] chambers and
7
the court house.” 18 F.3d at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing
that if authorities had retained Sheppard’s car keys or wallet, he arguably would
have been seized because that would have prevented him from being free to
leave).
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the “free to leave” test may not be
the best measure of a seizure where a person has no desire to leave the location
of a challenged police encounter. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–36
(1991) (observing, in context of bus sweep, that “when the person is seated on a
bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would
feel he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the
encounter”). Thus, Bostick framed the seizure inquiry as “whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.” Id. at 436.3 The “request” at issue in the Bostick encounter was for a
seated passenger to answer questions and allow his luggage to be searched. See
id. at 431–32. Noting that such requests, by themselves, would not effect a
3 This hardly renders the free‐to‐leave inquiry obsolete because, in many
circumstances, “departure is the most obvious way to ‘otherwise terminate the
encounter.’” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 9.4(c), at 609 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. at
436).
8
seizure if posed in a terminal lobby to passengers who could walk away, the
Supreme Court remanded for consideration of whether any different conclusion
obtained when the “free to decline/terminate” standard was applied to the bus
sweep at issue. See id. at 434–35, 437.
The circumstances in this case are not analogous to either Bostick or
Delgado. Blesser was not looking to question or search Salmon at a site where he
wished to remain. Nor was he seeking to prevent Salmon from leaving the
courthouse. To the contrary, Blesser actively sought Salmon’s departure from
the courthouse. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 9.4(c), at 619 (5th ed. 2012) (noting distinction between
police conduct conveying “not that the person was ‘not free to leave,’ but rather
that he was ‘not free to stay’” (emphasis in original)).
Police officers frequently order persons to leave public areas: crime scenes,
accident sites, dangerous construction venues, anticipated flood or fire paths,
parade routes, areas of public disorder, etc. A person may feel obliged to obey
such an order. Indeed, police may take a person by the elbow or employ
comparable guiding force short of actual restraint to ensure obedience with a
departure order. Our precedent does not view such police conduct, without
9
more, as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment as long as the person is
otherwise free to go where he wishes. That is the crux of Sheppard v. Beerman,
which concluded that a person who is ordered to leave a judge’s chambers and
then escorted out of the courthouse has not been seized because the person
remains free to go anywhere else that he wishes. See 18 F.3d at 153; see generally
Stephen E. Henderson, “Move on Orders” as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 2008
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 45 (2008) (arguing that “move on” orders are generally not
Fourth Amendment seizures). Thus, if Blesser had merely ordered or escorted
Salmon out of the courthouse, or even if Blesser had barred Salmon’s reentry to
the courthouse, the district court could well have relied on Sheppard v. Beerman
to conclude that no “seizure” had occurred. See Maxwell v. City of New York,
102 F.3d 664, 668 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Sheppard for proposition that refusing
entry does not constitute seizure).4
4 Only one of our sister circuits has concluded otherwise. See Bennett v. City of
Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that “person is seized not
only when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with
police, but also when a reasonable person would not feel free to remain
somewhere, by virtue of some official action” (emphasis in original)). The
circumstances of Bennett—an order for black bicyclists to leave the majority‐
white suburb of Eastpointe and return to Detroit—suggest equal protection
concerns. While Salmon initially pleaded an equal protection claim, he has
abandoned it on appeal, and, thus, we do not address it. See supra note 1.
10
Here, however, Blesser’s method for removing Salmon was not simply to
order or escort him from the courthouse, or to use guiding force to direct him as
needed. It was physically to grab him without encountering reprisal or
resistance, and to use painful force to control Salmon’s movements. That
distinguishes this case from Sheppard, in which no use of physical force was
alleged. See Compl. ¶ 22, Sheppard v. Beerman, No. CV 91‐1349 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 1991) (alleging, in case brought only against judge, that on morning at issue,
before judge entered chambers, principal court officer “directed” plaintiff to
leave courthouse immediately, whereupon two other officers “escorted” plaintiff
out of building). Whatever other actions might effect a Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court tangentially addressed departure orders in City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), when it struck down Chicago’s Gang
Congregation Ordinance as unconstitutionally vague. Three of the six justices
forming the majority were prepared to identify “an individual’s decision to
remain in a public place of his choice” as part of the “liberty” afforded by due
process. Id. at 53–54 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
An equal number of dissenting justices, however, disavowed such a liberty
interest. See id. at 102–06 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
Scalia, J.) (tracing history of anti‐loitering laws). Thus, the due process issue
remains unsettled. See also id. at 84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
discriminatory application of challenged law could implicate equal protection).
In any event, nowhere in Morales, nor in any other case, has the Supreme Court
suggested that police orders directing persons to move from particular public
areas while leaving them free to go anywhere else they wish effect Fourth
Amendment seizures of the persons.
11
seizure of a person ordered to depart a public area, the intentional use of
physical force to restrain the person and control the movements of a compliant
person certainly does. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)
(stating that “word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement”); see also Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 2057 (1986) (defining “seize” as, inter alia, “to
possess or take by force” and “to take hold of”); 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary
of the English Language (8th ed. 1799) (defining “to seize” as, inter alia, “[t]o take
hold of; to grip[]; to grasp” and “to take possession of by force”). Thus, at the
point Blesser allegedly used such force, it no longer mattered whether his
ultimate purpose was to secure Salmon’s departure from the courthouse or to
prevent it. For such time as Blesser held Salmon by the collar and twisted his
arm behind his back, Blesser was intentionally restraining and controlling
Salmon’s movements, thereby transforming their encounter, even if only briefly,
into a detention, which qualifies as a seizure of Salmon’s person. See Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. at 255 (recognizing that seizure can occur even where
“‘resulting detention [is] quite brief’” (quoting Delaware v. Proust, 440 U.S. 648,
653 (1979))); United States v. Sugrim, 732 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A detention
12
no matter how momentary is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”); see
generally Henderson, “Move On” Orders as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 2008
B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 16 (suggesting that use of force could transform “move on”
order into seizure if interaction thereby became, “even momentarily, a
detention”). Whether such a detention or seizure is reasonable is of course
another question.5
To be clear, we do not here hold that any physical contact will transform
an order to depart a public place into a Fourth Amendment seizure. But where
such an order is accompanied by the use of sufficient force intentionally to
restrain a person and gain control of his movements—as the collar grab and arm
twisting allegedly did here—we conclude that a Fourth Amendment seizure is
plausibly alleged. See generally id. (suggesting that move‐on order “emphasized
by a physical shove would presumably not work a seizure,” whereas order
accompanied by menacing “grabbing by the collar . . . might constitute a
5 While brevity does not preclude seizure, the duration of the seizure may be
relevant to assessing reasonableness. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1969 (2013) (observing that, although cheek swab to obtain DNA sample
constituted search, intrusion was “negligible,” a fact “of central relevance to
determining reasonableness”); see also id. at 1977–79 (holding that cheek swab
was reasonable because, in part, intrusion was “minimal”); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. at 28–30 (finding a brief external pat‐down reasonable).
13
momentary detention” amounting to seizure). Accordingly, we vacate so much
of the district court’s judgment as dismisses Salmon’s Fourth Amendment claim
against Blesser for failure to plead the requisite “seizure.”
B. First Amendment Claim
To state a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege facts admitting a
plausible inference that the defendant’s actions restricted, or were retaliation
against, speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (stating that First Amendment protects “symbolic
or expressive conduct” as well as “actual speech”); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 97
(2d Cir. 2005) (requiring that plaintiff’s actions be “protected by First
Amendment” to support First Amendment retaliation claim). Salmon asserts
that Blesser violated his First Amendment right to access judicial records by
forcing him out of the courthouse when he “was at the City Court Clerk’s office
to examine a file.” Appellant’s Br. 13; see Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380
F.3d 83, 90–96 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing qualified First Amendment right of
access to public documents, including judicial records).
Even assuming that a seizure interfering with the right of access to court
records is actionable under the First Amendment, we conclude that Salmon fails
to plead such a claim for relief. Salmon does not allege that, at the time of his
14
removal, he was himself attempting to access court records. Rather, he asserts
that he was waiting for his attorney, who was attempting to access records on
Salmon’s behalf. Salmon points to no authority, nor are we aware of any,
indicating that being required to wait for one’s attorney outside the courthouse,
when one wished to wait for him inside, interferes with the ability to access
judicial records. Thus, Salmon fails to state a claim that Blesser’s actions violated
his First Amendment rights.
In urging otherwise, Salmon contends that the First Amendment affords a
right to be “in a public place for a lawful purpose.” Appellant’s Br. 14. In
support, he cites to that part of the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that criminal trials must be open to
the public), which states that people “may ‘assemble for any lawful purpose,’”
id. at 578 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring, joined by Reed, J.)).
But as more recent decisions have clarified, the First Amendment protects
conduct only if it has an expressive purpose, see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non‐Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984); accord Church of Am. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Doe v. City of
15
Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating that plaintiff’s
prohibition from park triggers First Amendment scrutiny only if conduct “was
infused with an expressive element”); cf. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,
25 (1989) (rejecting right of “social association” independent of expressive
purpose).6
Salmon does not allege or argue that he was engaged in any expressive
conduct by waiting for his attorney inside the courthouse. Thus, the district
court correctly dismissed his First Amendment claim against Blesser for failure to
state a claim.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Salmon asserts that Blesser’s alleged conduct (unprovoked grabbing of the
person and twisting of the arm) was sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” to
state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law.
Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (1993). The
argument fails because, under New York law, an intentional infliction tort may
6 As we have already explained supra note 4, three justices in City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 53–54 (plurality opinion), identified a person’s decision to
remain in a chosen public place even without expressive purpose as part of the
“liberty” protected by due process, but that view has not commanded a Supreme
Court majority. Further, even those justices rejected First Amendment protection
for such non‐expressive activity. See id. at 52–53.
16
“be invoked only as a last resort,” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140,
158 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), “to provide relief in those
circumstances where traditional theories of recovery do not,” Sheila C. v. Povich,
11 A.D.3d 120, 130, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342, 351 (1st Dep’t 2004). Thus, the New York
Court of Appeals has questioned whether an intentional infliction claim can ever
be brought where the challenged conduct “falls well within the ambit of other
traditional tort liability.” Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557–58, 402
N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (1978). All four Appellate Division courts have answered the
question and held that it cannot. See Doin v. Dame, 82 A.D.3d 1338, 1340, 918
N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (3d Dep’t 2011); Leonard v. Reinhardt, 20 A.D.3d 510, 510, 799
N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (2d Dep’t 2005); Di Orio v. Utica City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
305 A.D.2d 1114, 1115, 758 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (4th Dep’t 2003); Hirschfeld v. Daily
News, L.P., 269 A.D.2d 248, 249, 703 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (1st Dep’t 2000).
Blesser’s alleged conduct would have been actionable under state law as a
battery. See Bower v. City of Lockport, 115 A.D.3d 1201, 1204, 982 N.Y.S.2d 621,
625 (4th Dep’t 2014) (listing elements of battery as “bodily contact, made with
intent, and offensive in nature” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cotter v.
Summit Sec. Servs., Inc., 14 A.D.3d 475, 475, 788 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (2d Dep’t 2005)
17
(same); Zgraggen v. Wilsey, 200 A.D.2d 818, 819, 606 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (3d Dep’t
1994) (same); see also Hassan v. Marriott Corp., 243 A.D.2d 406, 407, 663
N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (1st Dep’t 1997) (“To maintain a cause of action for battery,
plaintiffs must prove bodily contact, with intent that was offensive in nature.”
(citation omitted)). Moreover, even assuming that the battery here was
particularly severe, it was not so far beyond the normal battery as to amount to a
different category of wrong requiring a separate cause of action.
Accordingly, because other tort remedies were available to Salmon, the
district court correctly dismissed his intentional infliction claim.
III. Conclusion
To summarize, we conclude as follows:
1. While the law in this circuit holds that an order to depart a public place
that allows a person to go anywhere else he wishes does not, without more,
effect a Fourth Amendment seizure, see Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d at 153,
where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that the ordering official used physical force
intentionally to restrain plaintiff and control his movements, the officer’s conduct
may or may not be reasonable, but the Fourth Amendment claim cannot be
dismissed for failure plausibly to plead seizure.
18
2. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was correctly dismissed because he
has not alleged either his engagement in expressive conduct or any impairment
of his access to judicial records.
3. Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was correctly
dismissed because defendant Blesser’s alleged conduct falls well within the
ambit of a traditional battery claim.
Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is VACATED as to Salmon’s
Fourth Amendment claim and AFFIRMED in all other respects, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
19
