Filed: Jan. 23, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2015
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represent
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represente..
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SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Tyron Hammond appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on December 12, 2013 by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, C.J.). Hammond challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from a New Haven, Connecticut residence. We assume the parties' familiarity with the relevant facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review.
On appeal, Hammond contends that the district court erred by admitting the seized evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The record reveals, however, that the district court denied Hammond's motion to suppress for two separate reasons: first, that the evidence had been lawfully seized pursuant to a search warrant executed subsequent to Hammond's arrest, and second, that even assuming the evidence had been seized during the arrest, it would have been inevitably discovered during the subsequent search. See Gov't App'x 117-119, 124.
Hammond confines his appellate brief to the issue of inevitable discovery, and does not argue that the district court erred by finding that the evidence was lawfully seized pursuant to a search warrant. Accordingly, he has abandoned any challenge to that conclusion. See, e.g., LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6)). Because that conclusion supplied an independently sufficient basis for denying Hammond's motion to suppress, we see no error.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
