SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Darnele Nelson appeals from his sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.) after he pleaded guilty to possession of unauthorized access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Nelson's challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence are without merit. At sentencing, the district court indicated that it "considered the advisory range and points raised by counsel, the defendant[, and] the government." J.A. 154. In addition, the court "carefully considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)" and concluded that a sentence of 36 months' imprisonment was "sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)." Id. The court considered an above-Guidelines sentence, and recognized that it was not bound by the Guidelines, but ultimately imposed a sentence within the Guidelines. Id. at 149, 154.

Although the sentencing court did not explicitly reject counsel's argument that a lower sentence was warranted on the ground that the actual loss suffered by Nelson's victims was less than the loss amount for purposes of sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, n. 3(F)(i), the record reveals that the court properly considered all of counsel's arguments. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e entertain a strong presumption that the sentencing judge has considered all arguments properly presented to her, unless the record clearly suggests otherwise. The presumption is especially forceful when, as was the case here, the sentencing judge makes abundantly clear that she has read the relevant submissions and that she has considered the § 3553(a) factors."), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).

"While we have declined to adopt a per se rule, we recognize that in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances." United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The record reveals no exceptional circumstance that renders the district court's exercise of its discretionary sentencing authority unreasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Nelson's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.