Filed: Mar. 19, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2015
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESEN
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENT..
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SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Financial Federal Credit Inc. ("FFCI") appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Ramar Crane Services, LLC, Ramar Steel Sales, Inc., and Ramar Steel Erectors, Inc. (collectively, "Ramar"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all evidence in the manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Janes v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 774 F.3d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir. 2014).
1.
The Liebherr crane: as the district court concluded, Ramar qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course under section 1-201(9) of the New York Uniform Commercial Code.1 Ramar purchased the Liebherr crane, in cash, from a used crane dealer. The conditional "buy back" option (which was never exercised) and the contemplated "trade-in" of another crane (which never happened) are not enough to take this transaction out of the "ordinary course of business" under New York U.C.C. § 1-201(9). The district court correctly concluded that Ramar purchased the Liebherr crane free of any security interest from FFCI. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-320(a).
2.
The Tadano crane: we agree with the district court that FFCI never obtained a perfected security interest in the Tadano, because Ramar neither completed the sale, nor delivered the crane. See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-106(1), 2-401.
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in FFCI's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
