SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Sharon C. Schumann and Franklin Lord, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I. Summary Judgment

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, with the view that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough September 23, 2013, order.

II. Motions

Appellants also dispute the district court's denial of their motions for recusal, sanctions against defendants for alleged discovery violations, and reopening of prior proceedings. We review these motions for abuse of discretion and conclude that in none of these instances did the district court abuse its discretion. See ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Fin. AG, 688 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2012) (recusal); Fishoff v. Coty Inc., 634 F.3d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 2011) (sanctions); Molchatsky v. United States, 713 F.3d 159, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2013) (reconsideration).

We have considered all of plaintiffs-appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.