Filed: Mar. 31, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 12-3293 You v. Lynch BIA A077 281 399 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY
Summary: 12-3293 You v. Lynch BIA A077 281 399 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ..
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12-3293
You v. Lynch
BIA
A077 281 399
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 31st day of March, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
LI GHUANG YOU, AKA LI GUANG YOU,
Petitioner,
v. 12-3293
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Fuhao Yang, Law Offices of Fuhao
Yang, PLLC, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Leslie McKay,
Assistant Director, Kristofer R.
McDonald, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Li Ghuang You, a native and citizen of
China, seeks review of a July 26, 2012, decision of the BIA
denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re
Li Ghuang You, No. A077 281 399 (B.I.A. July 26, 2012). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales,
448 F.3d 515, 517
(2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen
proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later
than 90 days after the date on which the final
administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that You’s
motion to reopen, filed in 2011, was untimely because the
BIA issued a final order of removal in 2002.
You contends, however, that his recent membership in
the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) constitutes materially
changed conditions excusing his untimely motion. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). As
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the BIA properly determined, You’s political activities
constituted changed personal circumstances, which are
insufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to
reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d
Cir. 2006) (making clear that the limitations on motions to
reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced
change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the
applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the
United States”); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143,
155 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that the system does not
permit aliens who have been ordered removed “to disregard
[those] orders and remain in the United States long enough
to change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having
children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate
new proceedings via a new asylum application”).
Moreover, You’s evidence does not compel the conclusion
that the treatment of political dissidents in China has
worsened since 2000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (the
BIA’s factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary”); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d
Cir. 2008) (reviewing BIA’s factual findings regarding
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changed country conditions under substantial evidence
standard). Notably, none of You’s evidence related to
individuals, like himself, who joined the CDP in the United
States, or showed that conditions for political dissidents
in China had changed since his merits hearing. See In re
S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In
determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen
demonstrates a material change in country conditions that
would justify reopening, [the BIA] compares the evidence of
country conditions submitted with the motion to those that
existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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