Filed: Feb. 08, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2492 Nimaga v. Lynch BIA Videla, IJ A099 568 266 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOT
Summary: 14-2492 Nimaga v. Lynch BIA Videla, IJ A099 568 266 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA..
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14‐2492
Nimaga v. Lynch
BIA
Videla, IJ
A099 568 266
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of February, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
MAMADOU NIMAGA,
Petitioner,
v. 14‐2492
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Mamadou Nimaga, pro se, Bronx, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant
Director; Erica B. Miles, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Mamadou Nimaga, who claims to be a native and citizen of the
Ivory Coast, seeks review of a June 10, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming an
April 11, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying his application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). In re Mamadou Nimaga, No. A099 568 266 (B.I.A. June 10, 2014),
aff’g No. A099 568 266 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 11, 2012). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as
modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the basis for denying relief that was not
considered by the BIA (the untimely filing of the asylum application). Xue Hong
Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
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standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165‐66 (2d Cir. 2008).
The agency may base a credibility finding on an applicant’s demeanor, the
plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements and other record
evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). This Court “defer[s] . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
reasonable fact‐finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Here, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence.
The agency relied, in part, on Nimaga’s unresponsive and hesitant
demeanor in finding him not credible, a finding to which we give deference. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400‐01 (2d Cir.
2006). Moreover, the adverse credibility determination is supported by
numerous inconsistencies. See id. at 402. His explanations for those
inconsistencies were not compelling. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80‐81 (2d
Cir. 2005). Having questioned Nimaga’s credibility, the agency reasonably
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relied further on his failure to provide certain corroborating evidence to
rehabilitate his testimony.
Given the demeanor, inconsistency, and lack of corroboration findings,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165‐67. The
adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156‐57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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