Filed: Feb. 18, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-4677 Singh v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 894 256 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 14-4677 Singh v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 894 256 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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14-4677
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 894 256
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
18th day of February, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
GURDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-4677
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, New
York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Grace Brier, Law Clerk,
Dawn S. Conrad, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Jennifer L. Lightbody,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Gurdeep Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a November 24, 2014, decision of the BIA
affirming a January 3, 3013, decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Gurdeep Singh, No. A200 894 256 (B.I.A. Nov.
24, 2014), aff’g No. A200 894 256 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan.
3, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The applicable
standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
2
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
For asylum applications, like Singh’s, governed by the REAL
ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies
and omissions in an applicant’s statements and other record
evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of
the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 167. Omissions are “functionally
equivalent” to inconsistencies, and “can serve as a proper basis
for an adverse credibility determination.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534
F.3d at 166, n.3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Singh was not credible.
The agency relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s
border interview and his credible fear interview, asylum
application, and testimony. In assessing whether the record
of a border or credible fear interview is reliable for purposes
of an adverse credibility determination, we look to whether the
interview was “memorialized in a typewritten document setting
forth the questions put to petitioner as well as [his]
responses,” and whether “the interview was conducted with the
3
aid of a[n] . . . interpreter[,] . . . the interviewing officer
explained the purpose of the interview,” and the “petitioner
was asked questions that were clearly designed to elicit a
potential basis for an asylum claim.” Ming Zhang v. Holder,
585 F.3d 715, 723, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft,
357 F.3d
169, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2004). The interview records bear these
“hallmarks of reliability.” Ming
Zhang, 585 F.3d at 725. The
agency properly considered the divergence between Singh’s
border interview, at which he stated he came to the United States
to work and had no fear of persecution in India, and his later
accounts that he had been persecuted based on his membership
in the Shromani Alkali Dal (“SAD”) political party, and feared
he would be harmed or killed if he returned to India. Although
he had an opportunity to explain this inconsistency, Singh
failed to do so. See Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80-81
(2d Cir. 2005).
The agency also considered how an affidavit and medical
certificate from Singh’s doctor omitted that Singh’s leg
injuries were so serious that Singh was unable to walk after
the February 10, 2010 beating. When Singh was confronted with
4
this omission, Singh stated that this doctor lacked x-ray and
other equipment to assess Singh’s condition; however, the
agency was not compelled to credit this explanation since a
doctor could observe a patient’s ability to walk without such
equipment. Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81.
The agency also considered the documents Singh submitted
to corroborate his testimony; however, a letter from Singh’s
temple merely stated that Singh was a member of the SAD Party,
and a letter from the president of the SAD Party did not mention
any of the incidents of persecution. Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Although Singh argues that
the agency should have given “proper consideration” to a letter
from Bhagwan Singh, this letter did not rehabilitate Singh’s
problematic testimony, as the letter stated that Singh suffered
a shoulder injury after the February 2010 beating; this letter
did not corroborate Singh’s claim that his legs were so badly
beaten that he could not walk.
Id.
In light of the inconsistencies, omissions, and lack of
corroboration, the “totality of the circumstances” supports the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d
at 167. This finding was sufficient to deny asylum,
5
withholding of removal, and CAT relief, as all three forms of
relief relied on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
