Filed: Feb. 01, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-908 Lin v. Lynch BIA Cheng, IJ A200 748 222 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
Summary: 14-908 Lin v. Lynch BIA Cheng, IJ A200 748 222 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ..
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14-908
Lin v. Lynch
BIA
Cheng, IJ
A200 748 222
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
1st day of February, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
PETER W. HALL,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
FENG LIN,
Petitioner,
v. 14-908
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, New
York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Melissa
Neiman-Kelting, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Anthony J. Messuri, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Feng Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a March 6, 2014, decision
of the BIA affirming a May 24, 2012, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Feng Lin, No. A200 748 222 (B.I.A. Mar. 6, 2014),
aff’g No. A200 748 222 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 24, 2012). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s decision “for the sake of
completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
2008). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin
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Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Lin does not
challenge the finding that his asylum application was untimely
or the agency’s denial of CAT relief; accordingly we review the
agency’s adverse credibility determination only as it relates
to Lin’s application for withholding of removal.
For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, such
as Lin’s, the agency may, considering the totality of the
circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s “demeanor, candor or responsiveness,” the
plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his
statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of
the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). We “defer
to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin,
534 F.3d at 167.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that
Lin’s claim that he was persecuted on account of his Christian
faith was not credible. In so finding the IJ relied on Lin’s
internally inconsistent testimony, inconsistencies between his
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testimony and his documentary evidence, and Lin’s demeanor when
testifying. Lin originally testified that he was baptized
around Easter, in April 2011, but when confronted with his
baptism certificate, he confirmed that he was baptized in
October of that year. Further, his explanation for failing to
remember changed: he first stated that he could not remember
the date because he was experiencing a good deal of stress in
the United States; he later testified that he intentionally did
not remember his baptism date because he felt that baptism was
just a ritual.
Lin’s testimony also conflicted with his evidence. He
testified that he was hospitalized after he was released from
detention in China and that a doctor issued a certificate saying
that he had soft tissue contusions. However, he omitted this
entirely from his asylum application, and his parents did not
mention either his hospitalization or their search for the
hospital certificate in the letter they wrote in support of
Lin’s application. Further, Lin testified that his parents
paid a fine upon his release from detention, but the fine receipt
he submitted lists Lin himself as the payer.
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A finding concerning a party’s demeanor is
“paradigmatically the sort of evidence that a fact-finder is
best positioned to evaluate.” Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129,
140 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we give an IJ’s demeanor
finding “particular deference.” Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice,
426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the record
supports the specific example the IJ cited in making that
finding – Lin’s long pause followed by a failure to answer a
question regarding his baptism.
The totality of the circumstances support the agency’s
adverse credibility determination. Because Lin’s claim for
withholding of removal depends upon his credibility, the
finding that he is not credible is dispositive of his petition.
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2010).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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