Filed: Mar. 22, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 15-2876-cv Varela v. Barnum Fin. Grp. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY
Summary: 15-2876-cv Varela v. Barnum Fin. Grp. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ..
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15-2876-cv
Varela v. Barnum Fin. Grp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 22nd day of March, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 PETER W. HALL,
8 Circuit Judges
9 JANE A. RESTANI,1
10 CIT Judge.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 MARTA BARBEOSCH VARELA, individually
14 and as executor of the Estate of WILLIAM
15 P. BARBEOSCH,
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 15-2876-cv
19
20 BARNUM FINANCIAL GROUP, PETER GRECO,
21 Defendants-Appellees.
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
23
1
Jane A Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT: Thomas More Marrone, Greenblatt,
2 Pierce, Engle, Funt & Flores, LLC,
3 Philadelphia, PA.
4
5 FOR BARNUM APPELLEE: Michael H. Bernstein (Matthew P.
6 Mazzola, on the brief), Sedgwick
7 LLP, New York, NY.
8
9 FOR GRECO APPELLEE: Christopher M. Pisacane,
10 Sichenzia Ross Friedman Ference
11 LLP, New York, NY.
12
13 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
14 for the Southern District of New York (Carter, J.).
15
16 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
17 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
18
19 Marta Barbeosch Varela (“Varela”), in her individual
20 capacity and as executor of the estate of her deceased husband,
21 William Barbeosch (“Barbeosch”), appeals from the judgment of
22 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
23 New York (Carter, J.) dismissing her common law claims for
24 damages against Barnum Financial Group (“Barnum”) and Peter
25 Greco (“Greco”), on the ground of ERISA preemption. We assume
26 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
27 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
28 Until April 1, 2011, Barbeosch was the Chief Fiduciary
29 Officer of a wholly-owned subsidiary of SunTrust Banks, Inc.
30 (“SunTrust”). SunTrust offered an ERISA-governed employee
31 welfare benefit plan (the “Plan”) to its employees. Under the
32 Plan, SunTrust was the Plan Administrator, while Metropolitan
33 Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) underwrote the coverage and
34 was the claims administrator. As a full-time employee at an
35 annual salary of $300,000, Barbeosch was entitled to a group
36 life insurance policy that would pay his beneficiary, Varela,
37 $450,000 upon his death. On April 1, 2011, Barbeosch became
38 a part-time employee and as a result was entitled to no more
39 than a basic life insurance plan that carried $10,000 of
40 coverage. He nevertheless had an option to convert the excess
41 of his $10,000 policy into a private individual policy. He was
2
1 interested in doing so, in part because he had cancer at the
2 time.
3 Varela alleges the following sequence of events. On April
4 8, 2011, Barbeosch received an email from SunTrust human
5 resources stating that he had 31 days to convert his life
6 insurance policy; on April 18, 2011, Barbeosch consulted with
7 Greco, a financial services representative with Barnum, who
8 informed Barbeosch that he had 31 days from April 18 to convert
9 his policy; on April 27, 2011, Barbeosch and Greco further
10 discussed converting Barbeosch’s policy; Barbeosch died on May
11 13, 2011 without having converted his life insurance policy.
12 The Plan undisputedly required Barbeosch to convert his
13 policy within 31 days of his change in employment status, i.e.,
14 by May 2, 2011. Varela brings claims for negligence, negligent
15 misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty against Greco
16 and Barnum.
17 The district court dismissed Varela’s claims as preempted
18 by ERISA. Barnum is not an independent legal entity, but is
19 an office and trade name of MetLife, so in reality Varela brought
20 suit against MetLife d/b/a Barnum. Because Varela sued MetLife
21 d/b/a Barnum and a Barnum employee (Greco) for advice they
22 allegedly gave Barbeosch about the Plan’s conversion
23 requirement, the district court concluded that Varela’s claims
24 arose out of the defendants’ operation and management of a
25 benefit plan covered by ERISA, and were therefore preempted.
26 Varela appeals and argues that her claims are not preempted
27 because they are for damages, under state law, and are lodged
28 against what are effectively strangers to the Plan.
29 1. We review de novo a district court’s decision to
30 dismiss a claim as preempted by ERISA. Arditi v. Lighthouse
31 Int’l,
676 F.3d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 2012).
32 Congress enacted ERISA to establish a “uniform regulatory
33 regime over employee benefit plans” and “to ensure that employee
34 benefit plan regulation is exclusively a federal concern.”
Id.
35 at 299 (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
542 U.S. 200, 208
36 (2004)). To further these ends, ERISA preempts a cause of
37 action where (i) “an individual, at some point in time, could
38 have brought his or her claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)” and
3
1 (ii) “no other independent legal duty . . . is implicated by
2 a defendant’s actions.”
Id. (quoting Davila, 542 U.S. at 210);
3 see also Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272,
642 F.3d
4 321, 328 (2d Cir. 2011).
5 Although such preemption is broad, courts are reluctant to
6 find state laws preempted unless they implicate the
7 relationships among “the core ERISA entities: beneficiaries,
8 participants, administrators, employers, trustees and other
9 fiduciaries.” Gerosa v. Savasta & Co.,
329 F.3d 317, 324 (2d
10 Cir. 2003). For example, “courts routinely find that
11 garden-variety state-law malpractice or negligence claims
12 against non-fiduciary plan advisors, such as accountants,
13 attorneys, and consultants, are not preempted.”
Id. But
14 “state laws that would tend to control or supersede central
15 ERISA functions – such as state laws affecting the determination
16 of eligibility for benefits, amounts of benefits, or means of
17 securing unpaid benefits – have typically been found to be
18 preempted.”
Id.
19 ERISA preempts Varela’s claims. Varela is a beneficiary
20 of the Plan. Her claims arise out of purported oral
21 misrepresentations by MetLife d/b/a Barnum and a Barnum
22 employee about the process for converting a group life insurance
23 policy under the Plan. Greco is an employee of Barnum and
24 Barnum is an office of MetLife. As the insurer and claims
25 administrator of the Plan, MetLife was a fiduciary and a “core
26 ERISA entit[y].” Varela’s claims concern Barbeosch’s right
27 under the Plan to convert his policy and the process for doing
28 so – “central ERISA functions.” Finally, the alleged breach
29 here concerned the Plan itself, not, as in Stevenson v. Bank
30 of New York Co., Inc.,
609 F.3d 56, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2010), an
31 agreement separate and independent from the Plan. See Arditi,
32 676 F.3d at 300.
33 Accordingly, and finding no merit in Varela’s other
34 arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
35 FOR THE COURT:
36 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
37
4