Filed: Oct. 31, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-3530 Nino v. Doenges, et. al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDE
Summary: 15-3530 Nino v. Doenges, et. al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER..
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15-3530
Nino v. Doenges, et. al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 31st day of October, two thousand sixteen.
5
6 PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 LUDYS NINO,
14 Plaintiff-Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 15-3530
17
18 OLIVER DOENGES AND ANDRES SANCHEZ,
19 Defendants-Appellants.
20
21
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
23
24 FOR APPELLANTS: VALERIE MAZE KEENEY, Town of
25 Greenwich, Greenwich,
26 Connecticut.
27
1
1 FOR APPELLEE: JOHN R. WILLIAMS, New Haven,
2 Connecticut.
3
4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
5 Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, C.J.).
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
7 AND DECREED that the appeal be DISMISSED.
8 Two Greenwich police officers bring an interlocutory
9 appeal from the ruling of the United States District Court
10 for the District of Connecticut (Hall, C.J.) denying their
11 motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’
12 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
13 history, and the issues presented for review. We dismiss
14 the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to decide, on
15 interlocutory appeal, whether a dispute of material fact is
16 genuine.
17 We must consider our appellate jurisdiction sua sponte
18 even when uncontested by the parties. Bolmer v. Oliveira,
19
594 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). Typically, this Court
20 lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for
21 summary judgment because the denial of such a motion is not
22 a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Jones v. Parmley,
23
465 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2006). In qualified immunity
24 cases, however, we may decide interlocutory appeals when
25 defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity either
2
1 on a set of undisputed facts or on plaintiff’s version of
2 the facts. Salim v. Proulx,
93 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).
3 In contrast, we may not decide interlocutory appeals about
4 qualified immunity which turn on whether a dispute of fact
5 is “genuine” enough to preclude summary judgment. Bolmer,
6 594 F.3d at 140-41.
7 The police officers argue that the evidence in their
8 favor was so substantial at summary judgment that there was
9 no genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff consented to
10 a search of her house. But that is precisely the kind of
11 argument we cannot consider until there has been a final
12 judgment, and the police officers’ appeal must therefore be
13 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Salim
93
14 F.3d at 90-91.
15 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the
16 police officers’ other arguments, we hereby DISMISS the
17 appeal.
18
19
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
22
23
24
3