JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge.

This case asks us to resolve a vexed and recurring question: what does it mean to be Hispanic? Specifically, it presents the question of whether "Hispanic" describes a race for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.

Defendants the Village of Freeport, N.Y. ("Freeport" or "the Village") and its former mayor, Andrew Hardwick ("Hardwick"), appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge) following a jury verdict for plaintiff Christopher Barrella ("Barrella"). Barrella had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., alleging that Hardwick had not appointed him chief of police because Barrella was a white Italian-American, and that Hardwick had instead appointed a less-qualified Hispanic.

Based on longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, we reiterate that "race" includes ethnicity for purposes of § 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or lack thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. We also hold that "race" should be defined the same way for purposes of Title VII. Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument that an employer who promotes a white Hispanic candidate over a white non-Hispanic candidate cannot have engaged in racial discrimination, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court insofar as it denied defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

We also hold that the District Court erred in permitting lay opinion testimony that speculated as to Hardwick's reasons for not appointing Barrella, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because this case was factually close, we conclude that the District Court's error was not harmless. We therefore VACATE the judgment of the District Court and REMAND for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND1

In 2009, the Village elected its first black mayor, Andrew Hardwick. Once in office, Hardwick sought to replace the Freeport Police Department's all-white "command staff"—its chief, assistant chief, and deputy chief—with officers who "shared his vision for Freeport"2 and would help him "achieve his vision of community unity."3

Hardwick quickly identified Lieutenant Miguel Bermudez ("Bermudez") as his preferred candidate for the command staff and, ultimately, for chief of police. Bermudez—"who identifies as a member of the White race" and was born in Cuba4—had grown up in Freeport and, after living for some time in nearby Massapequa Park, had moved back to the Village in 2006. Bermudez and Hardwick had known each other for more than 25 years,5 primarily through their shared service in the Freeport Fire Department.

Filling the positions of deputy chief and assistant chief required approval by the Village Board of Trustees, of which the mayor was a member. In April 2010, Hardwick recommended to the Trustees that Bermudez be named deputy chief (the most junior of the three command staff positions), and the Trustees unanimously approved his appointment. Three months later, the mayor recommended, and the Board confirmed, Bermudez's promotion to assistant chief. That promotion made Bermudez the de facto chief of police because the nominal chief, Michael Woodward, was often absent from Freeport, as he used up his accrued leave in preparation for his pending retirement.

Unlike the positions of deputy chief and assistant chief, the Freeport Chief of Police is a civil service position for which candidates must take a promotional examination. The three highest scorers are eligible for selection by the mayor, who exercises sole control over the appointment.

After the Village announced that it would be appointing a new chief, six Freeport police lieutenants sat for a promotional examination, in March 2010. Plaintiff Christopher Barrella, a white Italian-American born in the United States, scored highest. Lieutenant Wayne Giglio, also white, earned the second-highest score. Bermudez came in third.

Barrella testified that he considered himself more qualified than Bermudez to serve as chief. Unlike Bermudez, who had not completed college, Barrella had earned a master's degree in criminal justice and a law degree. Barrella also had more "time in rank" as a lieutenant than Bermudez. And Barrella out-scored Bermudez on the promotional examination. At the same time, Barrella faced three obstacles: he did not know Hardwick; he lacked any influential political allies; and he was not, and never had been, a Freeport resident. The parties dispute the relevance of these considerations.

In November 2010, Hardwick promoted Bermudez to chief without interviewing Barrella or reviewing his resume, personnel file, or other materials related to his candidacy for the position.6

In August 2011, Barrella filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that he had not been promoted because of his race (non-Hispanic white) and national origin (American). After the EEOC sent Barrella a "Notice of Right to Sue," he commenced this action on January 25, 2012, against Hardwick7 and the Village, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,8 Title VII, and NYSHRL.

After extensive discovery, defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On April 26, 2014, the District Court denied the motions except with respect to Barrella's claim of national-origin discrimination. The case then proceeded to trial, during which the jury heard testimony from twelve witnesses over a period of three weeks. At the conclusion of the trial, and after five days of deliberation, the jury rendered a verdict against both defendants on May 28, 2014, finding that Hardwick had intentionally discriminated against Barrella on the basis of race. The jury awarded Barrella $150,000 for lost back pay, $1,000,000 for lost future pay, and (against Hardwick only) $200,000 in punitive damages. The District Court denied defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59. The Court also awarded attorneys' fees and costs to Barrella, but denied his motion to augment his damages to offset the negative tax consequences of receiving his lost income as a lump sum. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Is "Hispanic" a "Race"?

Defendants' principal argument is that "Hispanics" do not constitute a distinct "race" as a matter of law. As a result, defendants argue, Barrella and Bermudez are both white in the estimation of federal antidiscrimination statutes, and Hardwick's decision to promote one white candidate rather than another could not have constituted racial discrimination.9 Defendants raised this argument in their motions for summary judgment, motions in limine, and at trial. They renew the same argument here in challenging the District Court's denial of their Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law.10

In addressing this argument, we need not answer the vexed question posed by the Village's brief: "What is Race?"11 We do, however, need to resolve a narrower issue: whether "Hispanic" is a "race" for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.

1. "Hispanic" in Common Usage

The parties and the District Court experienced some confusion in unraveling the legal definitions of "race" and "Hispanic," thanks partly to the federal government's less-than-straightforward use of those terms.12 The Census Bureau, following standards issued by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), treats "Hispanic or Latino" as an ethnicity, the members of which may belong to any race.13 This bureaucratic definition, however, often fails to resonate with Hispanics themselves, who may hail from societies with quite different notions of racial identity.14 Nor is this definition entirely intuitive to the mainstream media, which sometimes identifies "Latinos" with "blacks,"15 and at other times rounds "Hispanic" to "white."16 In response to this enduring confusion, the Census Bureau is now considering whether to abandon separate taxonomies of "race" and "ethnicity" altogether: the 2020 Census may instead ask respondents to select the "categories" to which they belong.17 Small wonder, then, that the parties in this case have struggled with whether, or in what sense, Bermudez might be both white and Hispanic.

Compounding the confusion, the relevant terminology has changed substantially over time. In 1930, but neither before nor since, the Census counted the "Mexican" race.18 It was not until the 1950s, however, that the federal government consistently started tracking other Spanish-heritage groups, under the denomination of "persons of Spanish surname"19—a term that seems workable only if one ignores the possibility of intermarriage or the prevalence of "non-Spanish" surnames in Spanish-speaking countries.20 As a result, many writers quickly adopted alternative terms that remain current today: "Hispanic" and "Latino."21

2. Section 1981

Despite societal confusion regarding Hispanic identity, the existence of a Hispanic "race" has long been settled with respect to § 1981.22 Although that statute never uses the word "race," the Supreme Court has construed it as forbidding "racial" discrimination in public or private employment.23 The Court has further defined "racial discrimination," for purposes of § 1981, as including discrimination based on "ancestry or ethnic characteristics."24

As a result, two people who both appear to be "white" in the vernacular sense of the term, and who would both identify as "white" on Census forms and the like, may nonetheless belong to different "races" for purposes of § 1981. Similarly, someone may belong to more than one "race" for purposes of that statute.25 For instance, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court found that employment discrimination "based on the fact that [a plaintiff] was born an Arab" constitutes racial discrimination under § 1981, even though "under current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians."26

As defendants themselves insist, Hispanics clearly constitute an ethnic group.27 Defendants should hardly be surprised, then, that shortly after the Supreme Court decided Saint Francis College, our Court drew the obvious inference that discrimination against Hispanics—or "Latins" (sic), as Judge Winter's opinion put it—constitutes "racial discrimination" under § 1981.28 Because § 1981 also forbids so-called "reverse discrimination,"29 our 1988 holding in Albert necessarily implied that § 1981 also protects against discrimination based on lack of Hispanic ethnicity—something we had already assumed several years earlier.30

In short, despite defendants' repeated attempts to confuse an already complicated, vexed issue, it has long been settled in this circuit that Hispanics comprise a distinct race for purposes of § 1981.

3. Title VII

In contrast to our longstanding clarity with respect to § 1981, we have not yet resolved whether Hispanics constitute a race for purposes of Title VII. Title VII obviously affords a cause of action for discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity—but why?

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer" to take adverse action against an employee because of that employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."31 These categories—known as "protected characteristics" or "protected classes"—are not mutually exclusive. In particular, claims based on race and national origin "may substantially overlap or even be indistinguishable depending on the specific facts of a case."32

As a result, courts and litigants alike have struggled with the proper characterization of claims based on Hispanicity. Most courts have assumed that Hispanics constitute a "protected class" but without saying whether that protection derives from race or national origin.33 Others have declared expressly that the underlying rationale is irrelevant.34 We have also recognized claims based on "Hispanic ethnicity," a term not used in Title VII.35

Although we have avoided the question so far, the proper categorization of Hispanicity has important analytical implications. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race but not on the basis of national origin.36 Accordingly, if we were to treat Hispanicity as a national origin, but not as a race, for purposes of Title VII, plaintiffs in cases involving pro-or anti-Hispanic discrimination might in some circumstances need to present two different factual arguments in order to invoke the distinct remedies of that statute along with those of § 1981.37

In the present case, the District Court decided at the summary judgment stage that Hispanic did not constitute a national origin as a matter of law.38 At the same time, the District Court "assumed as a matter of law that Hispanic was a type of race."39 Later, however, the Court reversed course and determined that the existence of a Hispanic "race" was a question of fact to be decided by the jury.40

We disagree with the District Court's ultimate decision to treat the existence vel non of a Hispanic "race" as a question of fact. The meaning of the word "race" in Title VII is, like any other question of statutory interpretation, a question of law for the court.41 Here, however, the District Court's error was harmless, because the jury reached the same conclusion as we do today: that discrimination based on ethnicity, including Hispanicity or lack thereof, constitutes racial discrimination under Title VII.

We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, we analyze claims of racial discrimination identically under Title VII and § 1981 in other respects, and we see no reason why we should not do the same with respect to how we define race with for purposes of those statutes.42 Second, we have repeatedly assumed that claims of ethnicity-based discrimination, including discrimination based on Hispanicity, are cognizable as claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, albeit without holding so explicitly. In Malave v. Potter (2003), for instance, we implicitly acknowledged the viability of a Title VII race-discrimination claim based on Hispanic ethnicity.43 Similarly, in Krulik v. Board of Education (1986), we assumed the viability of a Title VII claim for intentional racial discrimination based on the plaintiff's status as "white, Jewish, and/or not Hispanic."44 The Supreme Court has similarly assumed that Title VII's definition of race encompasses ethnicity.45

To be clear, a claim of discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof may also be cognizable under the rubric of national-origin discrimination, depending on the particular facts of each case.46 We hold only that for purposes of Title VII, "race" encompasses ethnicity, just as it does under § 1981.47

4. Defendants' Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law

We now apply these conclusions to the present case. We review de novo a district court's decision whether to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 Where, as here, a jury has returned a verdict in favor of the non-movant, a district court may grant a Rule 50 motion "only if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, concludes that a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party."49

That is not the case here. Defendants offer three arguments on appeal as to why the District Court erred in denying them judgment as a matter of law: (1) "Hispanic" is not a race as a matter of law; (2) even if "Hispanic" is a race as a theoretical matter, it was not shown at trial that Bermudez and Barrella are members of different races; and (3) Hardwick should in any case be protected by qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established in 2010 that Bermudez and Barrella belonged to different races as a matter of law.

Each argument fails. As we have just established, Hispanics constitute a race as a matter of law, under both § 1981 and Title VII. And the evidence presented at trial unambiguously showed that Hardwick considered Bermudez, but not Barrella, to be Hispanic. Hardwick repeatedly identified Bermudez as Hispanic or Latino, and he frequently referred to him as the Village's "first Hispanic police chief."50 Furthermore, although Bermudez self-identified as "white," he also described himself as "Hispanic."51 Barrella, for his part, described himself as "White of Italian descent," and there is no indication that anyone ever considered him to be Hispanic.52 Accordingly, the jury had ample justification for concluding that Barrella and Bermudez belonged to different "races" for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.53

Finally, we reject Hardwick's qualified-immunity argument, which contends—rather incredibly—that it was "objectively reasonable" for him to believe in 2010 that federal law did not forbid discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity.

As is well known, "[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."54 The determination of qualified immunity depends both on the specific facts of an official's actions—e.g., "what situation confronted [him], what acts he performed, and his motivation in performing those acts"—and on the clarity of the legal rules governing that particular conduct.55

This case presents many knotty legal and factual issues. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, the question is simple. The jury found that Hardwick appointed Bermudez rather than Barrella because the former was "a White person of Hispanic origin" and the latter was "a White person of Italian origin."56 Would a reasonable official in Hardwick's position have known that such intentional discrimination against non-Hispanic whites violated Barrella's rights under federal antidiscrimination law?57

The answer is plainly yes. As Hardwick acknowledges, a right is clearly established if "the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the right."58 Under that standard, it has been clear since the Reagan Administration that § 1981 bars employers from discriminating based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof.59 Indeed, defendants manage to obscure the clarity of established law only by failing to cite Albert v. Carovano in any of the four briefs they collectively submitted, despite the District Court's citation of that case in its opinions below.60

The most charitable reading of Hardwick's assertion of qualified immunity is that the law was unsettled with respect to Title VII. But Title VII is irrelevant to Hardwick's personal liability, which stems solely from § 1981.61 And in any event, it has long been obvious under Title VII that employers may not discriminate based on Hispanic ethnicity, even if it has not hitherto been clearly established that such discrimination would constitute discrimination on the basis of race.62 In short, we conclude that the District Court correctly denied defendants' pre-and post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50.63

B. The District Court's Evidentiary Rulings

We next consider defendants' argument that we should vacate the District Court's judgment and order a new trial because of several erroneous evidentiary rulings permitting the admission of lay opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree with defendants that the District Court erred in allowing several witnesses to speculate about Hardwick's motivation for various employment decisions, and that the errors warrant a new trial.64

A party challenging a district court's evidentiary rulings is generally entitled to a new trial if (1) "the district court committed errors that were a clear abuse of discretion," and (2) those errors "were clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial, where prejudice is measured by assessing the error in light of the record as a whole."65 As we have often explained, "`abuse of discretion' is a distinctive term of art that is not meant as a derogatory statement about the district judge whose decision is found wanting."66 Rather, the term merely signifies that a district court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions."67

1. Did the District Court "Abuse Its Discretion"?

The Village argues that the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to consider unsupported lay opinion testimony regarding Hardwick's reasons for promoting Bermudez. The Village objects principally to testimony by Alfred Gros and Raymond Maguire, as well as by Anthony Miller, Shawn Randall, Debbie Zagaja, and Michael Woodward. The Village contends that these witnesses impermissibly speculated as to Hardwick's motives for various personnel decisions, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Rule 701 permits a lay witness—i.e., one not testifying as an expert—to testify "in the form of an opinion." But as Rule 701(b) provides, such opinion testimony is admissible only if it is "helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue."68 As we explained in Hester v. BIC Corp., Rule 701(b) helps to protect "against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach," rather than providing information that would assist the jury in drawing its own conclusions.69 In employment discrimination actions, "Rule 701(b) bars lay opinion testimony that amounts to a naked speculation concerning the motivation for a defendant's adverse employment decision."70 Although witnesses may testify regarding "their own observations of the defendant's interactions with the plaintiff or with other employees," they may not opine as to the motives, racial or otherwise, underlying those interactions.71

We agree with the Village that the District Court permitted the jury to consider testimony by several witnesses that amounted to the "naked speculation" forbidden by Rule 701(b). We focus here on the testimony of Albert Gros, Freeport's former assistant chief of police, and Raymond Maguire, Hardwick's former chief of staff.72

We begin with Gros, who testified that "there might have been a component of race involved in [Hardwick's] decision" to promote Bermudez.73 Gros repeatedly emphasized that this statement reflected only his "own personal opinion."74 On further probing from Judge Spatt, Gros elaborated that his opinion was based on observing "the actions that [he] saw leading up to" various other promotions that had occurred in the Village at about the same time.75 Specifically, Gros suggested that Hardwick had recommended new heads of the Human Resources, Public Works, and Building departments because of their respective races and despite their lack of qualifications.76 At the same time, Gros testified that he had no personal knowledge of any of those new hires' qualifications or the qualifications of their predecessors. He also testified that he was not familiar with the responsibilities that those positions entailed or the criteria Hardwick used in making his appointments.77

Maguire also testified that race was a motivating factor in Hardwick's personnel decisions.78 Like Gros, Maguire reached this conclusion without any personal knowledge of Hardwick's actual reasons. Indeed, Maguire had "no firsthand knowledge whatsoever with regard to . . . Hardwick's thinking" in appointing Bermudez.79 Instead, Maguire based his conclusion on his "grave concerns" about Hardwick's decision to replace Superintendent of Buildings Joe Madigan, who is white, with Richard Brown, who is black.80 Although Maguire initially suggested that Brown was so unqualified that race must have played a role in his appointment, Maguire later admitted that he was unaware of Brown's qualifications.81

In short, the District Court permitted Gros and Maguire to testify that Hardwick had recommended individuals for promotion based on their race, despite those witnesses' admissions that they had no personal knowledge of Hardwick's selection process and only the vaguest idea of the relevant candidates' qualifications. Such testimony was not helpful to the jury in the sense required by Rule 701(b), and the District Court's decision to allow the jury to consider it was an "abuse of discretion."82

2. Was the District Court's Error Harmless?

This error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. "[W]e are especially loath to regard any error as harmless in a close case," and this case "was factually very close."83

Defendants presented evidence showing that Hardwick had several non-discriminatory reasons to prefer Bermudez over Barrella. Most important, Hardwick and Bermudez were longtime friends and Fire Department colleagues, while Hardwick and Barrella barely knew each other.84 As courts have repeatedly held, federal antidiscrimination law does not forbid an employer from making an employment decision "based on loyalty to a friend or relative," even if that decision "benefit[s] the nonprotected friend or relative at the expense of a more qualified, protected person."85 To put it more bluntly: neither § 1981 nor Title VII forbids favoritism, nepotism, or cronyism, so long as it is not premised on animus against a protected class.86 Furthermore, Hardwick repeatedly testified that it was politically advantageous to appoint Bermudez, a Freeport native, rather than someone who had never lived in the Village and who apparently had no political allies there.87

Barrella, for his part, offered three pieces of evidence (not counting the impermissible lay opinion testimony), each of which suffers from potential defects.

First, Barrella offered evidence that during Hardwick's tenure as mayor, the Village's hiring disproportionately favored non-whites. At the most senior level, however—the hiring with which Hardwick was most closely involved—the appointment of new department heads actually underrepresented Hispanics and overrepresented non-Hispanic whites compared to Freeport's population.88 This hardly constitutes unambiguous evidence of bias in favor of blacks and Hispanics.

Second, Barrella argues that he had "vastly superior qualifications" to Bermudez.89 But that claim is overstated.90 Barrella and Bermudez each offered distinct advantages, and Hardwick was entitled to weigh which he most valued. Moreover, even to the extent that Barrella was more qualified, federal antidiscrimination law "does not require that the candidate whom a court considers most qualified for a particular position be awarded that position; it requires only that the decision among candidates not be discriminatory."91

Finally, Barrella points to Hardwick's repeated references to Bermudez as Freeport's "first Hispanic" or "first Latino" police chief. This last point raises some difficult questions of law, which we urge the parties and the District Court to consider carefully on remand.

We begin with the obvious point that an employer need not feign ignorance of an employee's race to avoid violating federal antidiscrimination law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the lawfulness of affirmative-action initiatives designed to remedy past discrimination, as long as they do not employ tools, "such as quota systems, set-aside programs, and differential scoring cutoffs, which utilize express racial classifications and which prevent non-minorities from competing for specific slots."92 Accordingly, an employer's stated desire for diversity in the workplace does not, without more, establish discriminatory intent with respect to any particular employment decision.93

Moreover, neither § 1981 nor Title VII categorically forbids politicians from considering an appointment's political implications. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, "it is not a violation of Title VII"—or of § 1981—"to take advantage of a situation to gain political favor."94 Indeed, the urge of politicians to take credit for hiring or promoting members of hitherto underrepresented communities has often "been a powerful means of achieving the social and political integration of excluded groups."95

Of course, ethnic politics is not always benign.96 A governmental employer may not excuse otherwise unlawful discrimination by pleading that it was simply responding to voters' preferences.97 Our point is only that an otherwise lawful employment decision—one that was made for race-neutral reasons or as part of a lawful affirmative-action plan—does not become unlawful merely because the decision-maker believed that some voters might evaluate that decision at least partly through the lens of identity politics.

The line between legitimate politics and illegitimate racial discrimination can be difficult to draw in practice98—which reinforces our assessment of this case as factually close. This trial presented inherently thorny questions of motivation, which were further complicated by pervasive uncertainty about the definition of race. In an otherwise confusing trial, the lay opinion testimony at issue here presented some of the clearest claims about Hardwick's motives. Unsurprisingly, Barrella's counsel emphasized that testimony during the summation and rebuttal. The jury's five-day deliberation suggests that it continued to regard this case as difficult until the end. Accordingly, we have little trouble concluding that this case was sufficiently close that "even the smallest error may have been enough to tilt the balance,"99 and that the prejudice caused to defendants by the District Court's Rule 701 rulings warrants a new trial.

C. The Village's Respondeat Superior Liability

Because we conclude that a new trial is required, we need not consider the parties' remaining arguments.100 Nonetheless, we offer some guidance regarding one more issue that is likely to recur at trial: whether the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.

The Village's argument that Judge Spatt erred in this respect is meritless. As the Village rightly points out, a municipality may not be held liable under §§ 1981 or 1983 for an injury inflicted by its agents unless "the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom."101 But for two reasons, that argument carries no weight in the present case.

First, Barrella sued under both § 1981 and Title VII, the latter of which does indeed permit respondeat superior liability.102 Since the same substantive standards govern claims under both statutes,103 a verdict that Hardwick intentionally discriminated against Barrella within the meaning of § 1981 would, absent any other defenses, entail a violation of Title VII—and, thus, respondeat superior liability for the municipality.

Second, even under § 1981, a municipality may be held liable for the actions of high-ranking officials with final policymaking authority.104 In particular, even a single adverse employment action, "if ordered by a person whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, can, by itself, support a claim against a municipality."105 Here, Freeport concedes that Hardwick exercised "the sole authority to appoint a Chief of Police."106 The Village may therefore be held liable in the event that the jury finds that Hardwick intentionally discriminated against Barrella on the basis of race.107

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold as follows:

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court insofar as it denied defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appendix: Census Treatment of "Hispanics"

The following table summarizes the various labels the Census has employed to track the group we now call "Hispanic." Unless otherwise specified, citations are to U.S. Census Bureau, Measuring America: The Decennial Censuses from 1790 to 2000 (2002) ("Measuring America").

Census  Classification/Question      "Hispanic" Responses                 Notes                                Citation
Year

1930    "Color or race"              "Mexican"                             Until 1930, "Mexicans"              Measuring America at
                                                                           had Measuring                       58

1940    "Color or race"              (None)                                "Mexicans" once again               Measuring America at
                                                                           became "white," unless              62, 64
                                                                           were "definitely"
                                                                           some other race.

        "Mother tongue"              Spanish                               First time Census tabulated         Humes & Hogan, ante
                                                                           linguistic date on                  note 13, at 117
                                                                           native-born Americans.

1950    "White population of         Based on a list of 6,000              Compiled only for five              U.S. Census, Special
        Spanish surname"             Spanish surnames compiled             states (AZ, CA, CO,                 Reports: Person of
                                     compiled by the                       NM, TX).                            Spanish Surname 3C-3
                                     Immigration & Naturalization                                              (1953)
                                     Service

1960    Same as 1950 Census                                                Census also counted                 U.S. Census, Special
                                                                           "Puerto Ricans in the               Reports: Person of
                                                                           United States."                     Spanish Surname 3C-3
                                                                                                               (1953)

1970    "Is this person's origin     "Mexican"; "Puerto                                                        Measuring American at
        or descent—"?          Rican"; "Cuban"; "Central                                                 78
                                     or South American";
                                     "Other Spanish"; "No,
                                     none of these"

1980    "Is this person of           "No (not Spanish/                                                         Measuring America at
        Spanish/Hispanic origin or   Hispanic)"; "Yes, Mexican,                                                84
        descent?"                    Mexican-Amer., Chicano";
                                     "Yes, Puerto Rican"; "Yes,
                                     Cuban"; "Yes, other
                                     Spanish/Hispanic"

1990    "Is this person of           Same as 1980, except                                                      Measuring America at
        Spanish/Hispanic origin?"    that "other Spanish/Hispanic"                                             91
                                     now asked to "Print one
                                     group, for example:
                                     Argentinean, Colombian,
                                     Dominican, Nicaraguan,
                                     Salvadoran, Spaniard, and
                                     so on."

2000    "Is this person              "No, not                                                                  Measuring American at
        Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?"    Spanish/Hispanic/Latino";                                                 100
                                     "Yes, Mexican, Mexican
                                     Am., Chicano"; "Yes,
                                     Puerto Rican"; "Yes,
                                     Cuban"; "Yes, other
                                     Spanish/Hispanic/Latino—Print
                                     group"

2010    "Is this person of           "No, not of Hispanic,                     A new instruction was added:    U.S. Census, The
        Hispanic, Latino, or         Latino, or Spanish origin";               "NOTE: Please answer BOTH       Hispanic
        Spanish origin?"             "Yes, Mexican, Mexican                    Question 5 about Hispanic       Population: 2010
                                     Am., Chicano"; "Yes,                      origin and Question 6 about     (2011)
                                     Puerto Rican"; "Yes,                      race. For this census,
                                     Cuban"; "Yes, another                     Hispanic origins are not
                                     Hispanic, Latino, or                      races."
                                     Spanish origin—Print
                                     origin, for example,                                                  Argentinean, Colombian,
                                     Dominican, Nicaraguan,
                                     Salvadoran, Spaniard, and so
                                     on."