SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on April 23, 2015, is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Ahdy L. Attallah, a former student at defendant New York College of Osteopathic Medicine ("NYCOM"), appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging that NYCOM and others violated his procedural due process rights and New York state law by expelling him. After concluding that Attallah had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Article 78 of the N.Y. C.P.L.R., the district court dismissed Attallah's federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. See Attallah v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 12 Civ. 6132 (JFB) (ARL) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015), ECF No. 127. We review a judgment of dismissal de novo, "accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). In so doing, we assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

1. Party Presentation

Attallah argues that the district court violated the principle of party presentation by dismissing his § 1983 claims against the NYIT defendants1 when only defendants Nassau University Medical Center, Nassau Health Care Corporation, Alan Multz, Martin Diamond, and Prachi Anand explicitly argued an adequate remedy at state law in urging dismissal. The argument is meritless. First, the NYIT defendants advanced an Article 78 argument in the district court both in their memorandum in support of dismissal and at oral argument, albeit with respect to state-law claims. See, e.g., J.A. 215, 217. Second, Attallah was on notice that his § 1983 claims were challenged on the basis of an adequate state law remedy because, as he concedes, other defendants directly raised the issue in their memoranda supporting dismissal. See Wachtler v. Cty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing court's authority to dismiss complaint for failure to state claim, even sua sponte, so long as plaintiff has notice and opportunity to be heard). Attallah had an opportunity to respond to this argument in briefing and at oral argument, and did so in two of his memoranda opposing dismissal. Thus, the district court reasonably considered the alternative remedy point in dismissing Attallah's § 1983 claims against all defendants. See generally Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n.6 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal against all defendants, despite one defendant's failure to appear or to join in motion, because issues concerning non-movant were "substantially the same" as those concerning movants and plaintiff "had notice and a full opportunity to make out his claim"). Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826 (2012), cited by Attallah, warrants no different conclusion. There, the Supreme Court recognized that a district court can consider a forfeited defense if the other party "is accorded a fair opportunity to present his position," as Attallah was here. Id. at 1834. It was because the government had waived the limitations defense that the Supreme Court identified abuse of discretion in dismissal of the habeas corpus petition as untimely. See id. at 1834-35. No such waiver is present in this case. See United States v. Spruill, 808 F.3d 585, 596-97 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing difference between forfeiture and waiver).

2. Adequate Post-Deprivation Remedy

Attallah contends that he was not obligated to pursue his claims in an Article 78 proceeding because his expulsion was not academically based. The argument misapprehends the district court's decision, which did not hold that Attallah was required to challenge his expulsion in an Article 78 proceeding. Rather, the district court concluded that Attallah could not plausibly claim the deprivation of a protected interest without due process of law because an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of an Article 78 proceeding was available under state law. See Attallah v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., slip. op. at 7-10. That ruling comports with controlling precedent. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that alleged state deprivation of property does not violate procedural due process "if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available"). Thus, even if, as Attallah alleges, state employees acted in concert with administrators at Atallah's private medical school to expel him, any ensuing deprivation of property or liberty does not give rise to a procedural due process claim under § 1983. See Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 882 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding "there is no constitutional violation (and no available § 1983 action) when there is an adequate state postdeprivation procedure to remedy a random, arbitrary deprivation of property or liberty" (emphasis in original)); Attallah v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., slip. op. at 9-10 (collecting cases holding that Article 78 proceeding is adequate post-deprivation remedy to challenge expulsion from private school).2

In urging otherwise, Attallah argues that challenges to non-academic expulsions are not limited to Article 78 proceedings and cites cases holding that, under certain circumstances, students can challenge disciplinary actions through breach of contract claims. The argument defeats itself because, assuming arguendo that Attallah's claims are the type suitable for judicial review in a breach of contract action, the availability of that remedy reinforces the conclusion that Attallah was not denied procedural due process. See Campo v. N.Y.C. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 103 n.7 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that procedural due process may be satisfied where plaintiff has available "in addition to Article 78 review, a breach of contract claim").

Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Attallah's § 1983 claims because the availability of an adequate post-deprivation remedy precluded him from stating a plausible procedural due process claim.

3. Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions

Attallah argues that the district court erred in (1) relying on factual misrepresentations by certain defendants granting dismissal and (2) denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 motion for sanctions based on those misrepresentations.

Attallah's first argument fails because the district court did not rely on facts presented by defendants in granting dismissal. Rather, as reflected in its thorough and well reasoned opinion, the district court accepted Attallah's allegations as true and drew all reasonable inference in his favor. Even doing so, however, it concluded that Attallah failed to state a claim as a matter of law. See Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's conclusion that plaintiff's procedural due process claim failed as matter of law when plaintiff "could have sought meaningful review . . . within the state judicial system").

We review the district court's denial of Attallah's Rule 11 motion for abuse of discretion, see Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 698 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2012), and identify none here given the absence of any error of law or fact, see Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that district court does not abuse discretion in deciding sanctions motion unless it based its ruling on erroneous view of law or clearly erroneous assessment of evidence); see generally Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that counsel can violate Rule 11 when "pleading, motion or other paper . . . has been interposed for any improper purpose, or where, after reasonably inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law" (emphasis omitted)).

4. Conclusion

We have considered Attallah's remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.