Filed: Apr. 08, 2016
Latest Update: Apr. 08, 2016
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENT
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTE..
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SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on March 6, 2015, is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Kim J. Stevenson Tota ("Stevenson Tota"), proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Security's 2009 denial of her application for disability benefits. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
In considering whether the Commissioner was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we review the administrative record de novo, mindful that our function is not to determine whether plaintiff is disabled but, rather, to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision and if the correct legal standards were applied. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012). We have recognized "substantial evidence" to be "more than a mere scintilla," and defined it as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Upon this review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge's September 4, 2009 finding that Stevenson Tota is ineligible for disability benefits for the period between November 1, 2001, and December 31, 2007. We also conclude that the administrative law judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards in reaching that decision. Thus, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough and well reasoned opinion. See Mem. & Order, Stevenson Tota v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-cv-3463 (DLI) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015), ECF No. 26.
We have considered all of Stevenson Tota's arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.