SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Leeland F. Gray, Jr., Kirsten Gray, 145 Eden Hill Road, LLC, Deutsch American Partners, Ltd., and Gray Friesian Farm, LLC (collectively, the "Grays"), appeal from the order and opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.), entered on July 20, 2015, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Robert Maquat, Wallace Williams, Steven Carlson, Paul Dominianni, Darrin Silhavy, Milan Spisek, Robert DeVellis, Phillip Doremus, Town of Easton, Town of Easton Planning & Zoning Commission, and Russell Leggett (the "Defendants"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

"We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment was granted and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor." Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Sec. Plans, Inc. v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 769 F.3d 807, 815 (2d Cir. 2014)). "We will affirm a grant of summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

The Grays' complaint asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their right under the Equal Protection Clause that the government treat all similarly situated people alike. See Gray v. Town of Easton, 115 F.Supp.3d 312, 316 (D. Conn. 2015). The district court determined that "plaintiffs here were not irrationally singled out," id. at 318, and that "[n]o reasonable jury could conclude that . . . any of [their] alleged comparators were contextually similarly situated for purposes of application and enforcement of the law. . . ." Id. at 319. It also found that "no genuine fact issue remains as to their claim that there was any constitutionally improper reason that motivated defendants' conduct," id., and that no "reasonable jury [could] conclude that ill-will or malice motivated defendants to discriminate against [them]." Id. at 320.1 We agree and AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons provided by the district court in its well-reasoned opinion. Because we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the merits, we need not reach its alternative holding concerning qualified immunity.

We have considered all of the Grays' contentions on appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.