SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Joelle Silver appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Vilardo, J.) dismissing her complaint. We assume the parties' familiarity with the procedural history and facts of this case.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, "accepting as true the factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). First, Silver alleged that the Cheektowaga Central School District had violated her First Amendment right to free speech by imposing the restrictions outlined in the School District's "counseling letter," which included a direction to remove various religiously-themed postings in Silver's classroom. However, this Court has stated that "schools may direct teachers to `refrain from expression of religious viewpoints in the classroom and like settings,'" Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 475 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991)), and that "schools have a constitutional duty to make `certain . . . that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.'" Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (alteration in original)). Further, "when government endeavors to police itself and its employees in an effort to avoid transgressing Establishment Clause limits, it must be accorded some leeway." Id. at 476. Here, the restrictions outlined in the counseling letter fell within the scope of the "leeway" referenced in Marchi. Consequently, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of Silver's free speech claim.

Second, Silver alleged that the School District had violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by restricting her religious expression, thereby "convey[ing] an impermissible, government-sponsored message of disapproval of and hostility toward the Christian religion." J.A. 20. "[F]or challenged government action to satisfy the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause, it must (1) `have a secular . . . purpose,' (2) have a `principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion,' and (3) `not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). Here, the restrictions imposed by the School District had the secular purpose of, and primary effect of, "avoidance of the perception of religious endorsement," Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 634 (2d Cir. 2005), and they did not excessively entangle the School District in religious matters. See id. Therefore, we uphold the District Court's dismissal of Silver's Establishment Clause claim.

Third, Silver alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the basis that she was "prevented . . . from expressing a religious message in a forum in which personal, non-curricula [sic] speech of School District teachers, faculty, and administrators is permitted because Defendants found Plaintiff's religious views and viewpoint unacceptable." J.A. 21. However, in light of our conclusion that Silver's First Amendment claims fail, we conclude that her equal protection claim, grounded in her alleged right to post or otherwise use the materials referenced in the counseling letter, fails as well. See African Trade & Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Abromaitis, 294 F.3d 355, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2002). As a result, we uphold the District Court's dismissal of Silver's equal protection claim.

We have considered all of Silver's remaining arguments and find in them no basis for reversal. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.