José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judge:
This case presents two questions. The first is whether the framework for evaluating proposed bargaining units set forth in Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934 (2011), is unlawful. Under this framework, the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") uses a two-step analysis to determine whether a union's proposed bargaining unit consists of employees who share a "community of interests" and does not arbitrarily exclude other employees. Several sister circuits recently approved this standard, but we have yet to opine on this question.
We hold the Specialty Healthcare framework to be valid, as our sister circuits have, and to be consistent with this Court's precedent. We conclude, however, that the Board did not properly apply the Specialty Healthcare framework in its decision and order against Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc., d/b/a Woodbridge Winery ("Constellation"). In approving the petitioned-for collective bargaining unit, the Board did not analyze at step one of the Specialty Healthcare framework whether the excluded employees had meaningfully distinct interests from members of the petitioned-for unit in the context of collective bargaining that outweigh similarities with unit members.
Accordingly, we
Constellation owns and operates Woodbridge Winery in California, which employs about 100 managers and 200 production and maintenance employees. Its employees are divided into various departments. This case concerns the cellar operations department, which is organized into two subgroups: "outsider cellar" with 46 employees and "barrel" with 18 employees. The parties dispute whether the "outside cellar" employees form a group that is sufficiently distinct from the "barrel" employees (as well as from Constellation's other employees) that they may be treated separately for collective bargaining purposes under Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").
The certification of a bargaining unit falls largely to the Board's Regional Directors ("RDs"), who are appointed by the General Counsel and approved by the Board, and to hearing officers in the regional offices, who report to the RDs.
On September 2, 2014, the Teamsters Local Union 601 (the "Union") filed a petition seeking to represent Constellation's outside cellar employees as a bargaining unit. Constellation objected, arguing that an appropriate unit should encompass all production and maintenance employees or, at a minimum, all cellar operations employees. Following a hearing, the RD decided in favor of the Union and directed that an election be held. In determining that the Union's proposed bargaining unit of outside cellar employees was appropriate, the RD applied the Specialty Healthcare standard. On February 26, 2015, a three-member panel of the Board (Chairman Pearce, Member Hirozawa, and Member McFerran) denied Constellation's request to review the RD's decision, stating that Constellation had "raise[d] no substantial issues warranting review." Special App. 4.
In the Board-ordered election, the outside cellar employees voted 31-13 to unionize and the RD certified the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. Following the usual procedure for contesting the validity of a union election, Constellation refused to bargain with the Union, which then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge.
While both parties agree that we have jurisdiction, we nonetheless consider the issue independently.
The threshold question presented is whether we, along with six of our sister circuits,
When considering a petition for a proposed bargaining unit, an RD has discretion
While the RD's discretion in determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is broad, it is not unlimited. Section 9(c) of the NLRA explicitly states that "[i]n determining whether a unit is appropriate... the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling."
Certain interested groups argue that the Specialty Healthcare test essentially creates a presumption in favor of "micro" unions, causing the undue proliferation of bargaining units that make it difficult for employers to settle labor disputes and that arbitrarily exclude certain employees.
In the present case, Constellation asserts two objections to the Specialty Healthcare test. First, it argues that this test impermissibly gives controlling weight to the extent to which employees have already been organized, thereby departing from past precedent of the Board and contravening the statutory language of the NLRA. Under the prior framework, Constellation argues, the RD had to determine whether the petitioned-for unit had interests "sufficiently distinct from" those of excluded employees as part of the "community
This concern is misplaced. Step one of Specialty Healthcare expressly requires the RD to evaluate several factors relevant to "whether the interests of the group sought were sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant the establishment of a separate unit."
Constellation's second argument against adoption of the rule of Specialty Healthcare is that the Board failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the new standard.
In sum, Constellation has failed to meet its burden of showing that the Specialty Healthcare framework is inconsistent with
We now turn to the application of the Specialty Healthcare framework in this case. In reviewing the Board's decision of unit appropriateness, we are mindful that our task is not to substitute our judgment for that of the Board.
Constellation argues that the Specialty Healthcare standard improperly rubber stamps a union's organizing efforts by presumptively approving the petitioned-for unit and creating too high a burden for the objecting party.
The RD (whose decision the Board declined to review) did not make the step-one determination required by Specialty Healthcare. Although he appropriately recited the community of interest standard, and declared that "employees in the petitioned-for unit share distinct characteristics," Special App. 34, the RD did not explain why those employees had interests "sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant the establishment of a separate unit."
To be sure, the RD made a number of factual findings that tend to show that outside cellar employees had interests distinct from other employees. But he never explained the weight or relevance of those findings. For instance, the RD did not explain why some factual findings, which seemed to indicate the presence of distinct interests, e.g., "physically separate locations" or "separate front-line [and] immediate supervisors," should have outweighed other findings of similarities, e.g., similar "job functions and duties," evidence of "interchange" and "work[ing] together," and "identical skills and training requirements." Special App. 44 n.20. To the extent that the RD did provide such explanations, it did so only at step two, i.e., only to rebut a heightened showing that the excluded employees share an "overwhelming community of interest" with the presumptively appropriate petitioned-for unit. This misapplication of Specialty Healthcare requires us to deny the Board's petition for enforcement.
Our sister circuits have accepted the Specialty Healthcare framework based on the understanding that it requires the Board to ensure, at step one, that employees are not inappropriately "excluded [from a bargaining unit] on the basis of meager differences."
While the RD has discretion to approve of "an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit,"
Constellation argues that it should also prevail at step two of the Specialty Healthcare framework, known as the "overwhelming community of interests" test, which requires that Constellation show "that there is no legitimate basis upon which to exclude" barrel employees from that unit.
To summarize, we hold as follows:
Accordingly, we
While substantial power has been delegated to the RDs, the Board's General Counsel, a Presidential appointee whose nomination is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, retains the ultimate authority with respect to "the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints" under the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) stipulates that the record and findings made in the underlying representation proceeding is part of the record before this Court. It provides: "Whenever an order of the Board ... is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title, and thereupon the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript."
For many years, the Board presumed store-wide or plant-wide units to be appropriate over multiple representation units within an employer. See, e.g., Laurel Assocs., Inc., d/b/a Jersey Shore Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 325 N.L.R.B. 603 (1998) (service and maintenance unit in nursing home is presumptively appropriate); Gourmet, Inc., d/b/a Jackson's Liquors, 208 N.L.R.B. 807, 808 (1974) ("The employerwide unit ... is presumptively appropriate."); Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 136 (1962) ("A plantwide unit is presumptively appropriate under the Act, and a community of interest inherently exists among such employees."); May Dep't Stores, Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1008 (1952) (declaring a "store-wide unit" to be "the optimum unit for the purpose of collective bargaining" in the retail industry).
This Circuit has long held a preference for consolidating bargaining units. See, e.g., Staten Island Univ. Hosp, 24 F.3d at 456 ("We regard the single-facility presumption as the kind of rebuttable presumption that was beyond dispute in American Hospital."); accord NLRB v. Phoenix Programs of N.Y., Inc., 2 Fed.Appx. 166, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order) (affirming the Board's determination that the employer failed to rebut the "single-facility presumption").
The Board has maintained this governing approach following the Specialty Healthcare decision in 2011. See, e.g., A.S.V., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (2014) (applying Specialty Healthcare and rejecting the proposed unit as "fractured" and thus inappropriate); Odwalla, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 1608, 1612-13 (2011) (applying Specialty Healthcare to find that the recommended unit was an inappropriate "fractured unit" and to further suggest that, even if a smaller constituent part of a proposed unit would constitute an appropriate free-standing unit, the unit may nevertheless become inappropriate if additional employees are proposed for inclusion who have less community of interest with one another than do the excluded employees).