Filed: Jan. 11, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-1704 Singh v. Lynch BIA Morace, IJ A200 938 552 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 15-1704 Singh v. Lynch BIA Morace, IJ A200 938 552 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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15-1704
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Morace, IJ
A200 938 552
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
11th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
PETER W. HALL,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SANDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 15-1704
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Anthony
P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant
Director; Sheri R. Glaser, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Sandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of an April 27, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming
a March 25, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In
re Sandeep Singh, No. A200 938 552 (B.I.A. Apr. 27, 2015), aff’g
No. A200 938 552 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 25, 2013). We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the
IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin
v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
For asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL
ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” and
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inconsistencies in his or his witness’s statements “without
regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of
the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could
make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d
at 167. As discussed below, substantial evidence supports the
adverse credibility determination.
Singh does not challenge the agency’s reliance on his vague
testimony about his party activities. That finding therefore
stands as a proper basis for the credibility determination.
See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered
waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”); see also
Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Where an applicant gives very spare testimony . . . the
IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the testimony is
fabricated.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang
Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
494 F.3d 296, 305-10 (2d Cir.
2007).
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The agency also reasonably based the credibility
determination on inconsistencies among Singh’s testimony,
border patrol interview, and credible fear interview about
whether he was born Sikh. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
Singh testified that he was born Sikh. At his border patrol
interview, however, he said that he feared persecution because
he was born Hindu and converted to Sikhism. Singh initially
denied making this statement, both during his credible fear
interview and testimony, but later explained that he misspoke
at his border patrol interview because he was hungry and tired.
The agency was not required to credit this explanation; as the
IJ observed, Singh did not have problems answering any other
question asked during his border interview. See Majidi v.
Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
testimony.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis
omitted)).
The agency also reasonably rested its adverse credibility
determination on inconsistencies concerning Singh’s political
party membership. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Singh
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testified (consistent with his application) that he became an
official member, but during his credible fear interview, he
denied being an official member and stated that he only attended
rallies. The agency was not required to credit Singh’s
explanation that he was a junior member and was unsure why his
credible fear interview records indicated he was not an official
member. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
We decline to consider Singh’s unexhausted challenge to the
reliability of his credible fear interview records. Singh did
not challenge the reliability of these records before the BIA,
the BIA did not address the issue, and the Government asserts
Singh’s failure to exhaust. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that
judicially imposed issue exhaustion is mandatory).
Given the foregoing inconsistencies, the totality of the
circumstances supports the credibility ruling. Xiu Xia Lin,
534 F.3d at 167. The inconsistencies related to Singh’s
religion, party membership, and political activities: the sole
basis on which he claims to have suffered past harm. Because
Singh’s claims for relief are all based on the same factual
predicate, the adverse credibility determination is
5
dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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