Filed: Jan. 17, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-2625 United States v. Williams UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORD
Summary: 15-2625 United States v. Williams UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDE..
More
15-2625
United States v. Williams
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 17th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 Circuit Judges,
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
13 Appellee,
14
15 -v.- 15-2625
16
17 JASON BRODSKY, BRUCE DAIS, ALANA
18 FIORENTINO,
19 Defendants,
20
21 RALSTON WILLIAMS, AKA Chris,
22 Defendant-Appellant.
23
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
25
26
27 FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL S. NOOTER, Washington,
28 DC.
1
1
2 FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL E. RUNOWICZ, for Deirdre
3 M. Daly, United States Attorney
4 for the District of Connecticut
5 (Marc H. Silverman, on the
6 brief).
7
8 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
9 Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.).
10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
11 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
12 AFFIRMED.
13 Ralston Williams appeals from the judgment of the
14 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
15 (Bryant, J.) reducing his sentence by only 16 months. We
16 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
17 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
18 We affirm because the district court did not procedurally
19 err in reducing Williams’s sentence.
20 A jury convicted Williams of multiple drug offenses in
21 2012, and his resulting Sentencing Guidelines range was 168
22 to 210 months. The district court sentenced Williams at the
23 bottom of the Guidelines range to 168 months imprisonment.
24 In 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated
25 Amendment 782, which reduced the base offense level for
26 various drug offenses. The Sentencing Commission also
27 authorized defendants who had already been sentenced for
2
1 drug offenses to move for retroactive reductions pursuant to
2 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Under the changes in Amendment 782,
3 Williams’s new Guidelines range was 135 to 168 months.
4 Williams’s trial counsel asked to be reappointed to
5 handle the § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, and the district court
6 granted the motion. A Presentence Report Addendum (“PSR
7 Addendum”) stated favorably that during his incarceration to
8 date Williams had received no disciplinary tickets. The
9 government submitted a letter repeating that point and
10 informing the court that it did not oppose a reduced
11 sentence within the new Guidelines range. When Williams’s
12 counsel failed to file a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the district
13 court sua sponte reduced his sentence to 152 months. In
14 doing so, the district court observed that Williams lacked
15 “empathy and appreciation for the significance of his
16 conduct” and was thus “a significant risk of re-offending.”
17 Gov’t Brief at 17.1 Williams then moved pro se seeking an
18 explanation for why the district court did not reduce his
19 sentence to 135 months, the bottom of his new Guidelines
20 range (the court had previously sentenced him at the bottom
21 of his Guidelines range at the initial sentencing). The
1
The district court made this observation in a sealed
document that is not included in the appendix, but is quoted
in the government’s brief. Williams does not dispute the
accuracy of the quoted language.
3
1 district court granted the motion and stated that it had
2 declined to reduce his sentence further due to the gravity
3 of his criminal conduct and his lack of remorse at the
4 initial sentencing.
5 Williams now argues that the district court erred by:
6 1) failing to adequately explain its decision; 2) failing to
7 explicitly consider his conduct in prison; and 3) basing its
8 decision in part on his lack of remorse. We review the
9 district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, and we
10 find none. United States v. Figueroa, 714 F.3d 757, 759 (2d
11 Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
12 On a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the district court must give
13 “at least some minimal statement of reasons” for its
14 decision, but a sentence reduction is “not subject to all of
15 the procedural requirements that apply at sentencing” and
16 the “explanation required need not be lengthy.” United
17 States v. Christie,
736 F.3d 191, 195-97 (2d Cir. 2013).
18 The district court twice explained its sentence, first when
19 imposing the reduced sentence, then in response to the pro
20 se motion. While some of the district court’s explanations
21 may appear to be boilerplate, the court explained that its
22 decision was based on the dangerousness of Williams’s
23 criminal conduct, his lack of remorse at sentencing, and his
24 significant risk of re-offending. That explanation is
4
1 sufficient to allow us to exercise “meaningful appellate
2 review,” and it is therefore adequate. Christie, 736 F.3d
3 at 195.
4 Williams next argues that the district court failed to
5 consider his post-sentencing conduct in its decision. The
6 district court was made aware of that conduct by the
7 government’s briefing and the PSR Addendum, and the sentence
8 was in fact reduced. “[W]e presume, in the absence of
9 record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing
10 judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the
11 statutory factors.” United States v. Fernandez,
443 F.3d
12 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v.
13 United States,
551 U.S. 338 (2007). The district court did
14 not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly consider
15 Williams’s record in prison.
16 Finally, Williams argues that the district court should
17 have given him notice that it would consider his “lack of
18 remorse.” But Williams concedes that Judge Bryant focused
19 extensively on this subject at his original sentencing, and
20 he thus had ample notice that the district court considered
21 it important.2 Lack of remorse is a legitimate factor under
2
Williams correctly notes that some circuits require
district courts to provide a defendant with notice and an
opportunity to respond in a § 3582(c) proceeding. But these
circuits do so only when district courts intend to rely on
5
1 § 3553(a), and the district court did not abuse its
2 discretion by considering it. United States v. Martinucci,
3 561 F.3d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
4 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
5 Williams’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
6 the district court.
7
8
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
11
new information not relied upon at the original sentencing.
See, e.g., United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2010) (“[E]ach party must be given notice of an
opportunity to contest new information relied on by the
district court in a § 3582(c) proceeding.”); United States
v. Foster, 575 F.3d 861, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2009) (same);
United States v. Mueller, 168 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1999)
(same). Where, as here, “[a] court d[id] not . . . rely on
new information,” neither “party [is] entitled to any
response” because “a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a de
novo re-sentencing.” Jules, 595 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis in
original).
6
