Filed: Feb. 23, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-2953 Bhangu v. Sessions BIA Wright, IJ A200 896 488 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 15-2953 Bhangu v. Sessions BIA Wright, IJ A200 896 488 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N..
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15-2953
Bhangu v. Sessions
BIA
Wright, IJ
A200 896 488
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 23rd day of February, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 KULDIP SINGH BHANGU,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-2953
17 NAC
18 JEFF SESSIONS, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Hardeep S. Rai, San Francisco, CA.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Keith I.
27 McManus, Assistant Director; Juria
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Jeff Sessions is
automatically substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
1 L. Jones, Trial Attorney, Office of
2 Immigration Litigation, United
3 States Department of Justice,
4 Washington, DC.
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
9 DENIED.
10 Petitioner Kuldip Singh Bhangu, a native and citizen of
11 India, seeks review of a September 1, 2015, decision of the BIA,
12 affirming a January 31, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge
13 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
14 the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Kuldip Singh
15 Bhangu, No. A200 896 488 (B.I.A. Sept. 1, 2015), aff’g No. A200
16 896 488 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 31, 2014). We assume the
17 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
18 history in this case.
19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the
20 decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
21 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
22 standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C.
23 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165-66
24 (2d Cir. 2008); Pierre v. Holder,
588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir.
25 2009).
2
1 Adverse Credibility Determination
2 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
3 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
4 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
5 applicant . . . , the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s
6 . . . account, the consistency between the applicant’s . . .
7 written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency
8 of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements
9 with other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether
10 an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart
11 of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”
12 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
13 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
14 Bhangu was not credible as to his claim that his uncle tried
15 to kill him in India on account of a dispute over his father’s
16 land.
17 The agency reasonably relied on Bhangu’s demeanor, noting
18 that he was evasive and vague when testifying. See 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77,
20 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005); Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 140,
21 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an applicant gives very spare
22 testimony . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the
23 testimony is fabricated . . . [and] may wish to probe for
3
1 incidental details.”), overruled in part on other grounds by
2 Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d
3 Cir. 2007). The agency’s demeanor finding and the overall
4 credibility determination were bolstered by Bhangu’s
5 inconsistent statements regarding whether his father had been
6 arrested once or twice and whether Bhangu had accompanied his
7 father to the police station to report his uncle’s attack. See
8 Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.
9 2006); see also Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67.
10 Furthermore, the agency reasonably relied on Bhangu’s
11 omission of several material facts from his written statement.
12 See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67 & n.3 (“An inconsistency
13 and an omission are . . . functionally equivalent.”). He
14 omitted the following facts: his uncle had the police arrest
15 him in India; his uncle threatened his wife; and his mother died
16 from a heart attack as a result of his family’s land dispute.
17 Bhangu did not compellingly explain any of these omissions from
18 his written statement. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
19 Having questioned Bhangu’s credibility, the IJ reasonably
20 relied further on Bhangu’s failure to rehabilitate his claim
21 with certain corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure
22 to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
23 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
4
1 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
2 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d
3 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). As the agency noted, Bhangu failed
4 to submit the following evidence: objective evidence that his
5 father owns the land at issue; medical records of his
6 hospitalization; a letter from his maternal uncle with whom he
7 purportedly hid; and a letter from his wife. Furthermore, the
8 IJ reasonably concluded that the affidavits from Bhangu’s
9 father and village leader were entitled to little weight because
10 the authors were not available for cross-examination and his
11 father’s affidavit was inconsistent with Bhangu’s testimony
12 (regarding the number of times his father was arrested and
13 whether they went to the police station together). See
14 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741
15 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).
16 Given the demeanor, inconsistencies, and lack of
17 corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination
18 is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination is dispositive of
20 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
21 claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v.
22 Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
23
5
1 Due Process Claim
2 Bhangu argues that his due process rights were violated
3 given problems with the interpreter at his hearing before the
4 IJ. “To establish a violation of due process, an alien must
5 show that []he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present
6 h[is] claims or that [he was] otherwise deprived . . . of
7 fundamental fairness.” Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134
8 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Parties
9 claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in
10 order to prevail, allege some cognizable prejudice fairly
11 attributable to the challenged process.” Garcia-Villeda v.
12 Mukasey,
531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
13 marks omitted).
14 Bhangu was not deprived of a full and fair opportunity to
15 present his claim or prejudiced as a result of interpreter
16 error. The interpreter made three errors at the beginning of
17 Bhangu’s hearing. Each error was immediately identified by the
18 IJ and Bhangu’s attorney. The IJ instructed the interpreter
19 to proceed more cautiously, and the record does not demonstrate
20 any subsequent errors. Furthermore, when Bhangu’s testimony
21 became confused about dates, the IJ provided Bhangu an
22 opportunity to clarify and confirmed that he understood the
6
1 interpreter. On another such occasion, Bhangu admitted that
2 he, and not the interpreter, had provided the wrong date.
3 Accordingly, because the IJ ensured that any errors in
4 interpretation were corrected and did not rely on any
5 incorrectly translated testimony to deny relief, Bhangu was not
6 deprived a fair hearing or prejudiced. See Burger, 498 F.3d
7 at 134; see also
Garcia-Villeda, 531 F.3d at 149.
8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
9 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
10 for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
