Filed: May 04, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-3311 Liang v. Sessions BIA Balasquide, IJ A205 232 374 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH T
Summary: 15-3311 Liang v. Sessions BIA Balasquide, IJ A205 232 374 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH TH..
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15-3311
Liang v. Sessions
BIA
Balasquide, IJ
A205 232 374
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 4th day of May, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 GUIHAI LIANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-3311
17 NAC
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Wei Gu, Whitestone, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
26 Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
27 John W. Blakeley, Assistant
28 Director, Patricia E. Bruckner,
29 Trial Attorney, Sarai M. Aldana,
30 Law Clerk, Office of Immigration
31 Litigation, United States
32 Department of Justice, Washington,
33 D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Guihai Liang, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 2,
7 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming a September 4, 2014,
8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liang’s
9 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Guihai
11 Liang, No. A205 232 374 (B.I.A. Oct. 2, 2015), aff’g No.
12 A205 232 374 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 4, 2014). We
13 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
14 and procedural history in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
17 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448
18 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of
19 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
20 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
21 For asylum applications like Liang’s, governed by the
22 REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of
23 the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on
2
1 inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and
2 evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534
3 F.3d at 163-64, 166 n.3. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
4 credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
5 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
6 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
7
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Where the record contains
8 inconsistencies, “[a] petitioner must do more than offer a
9 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
10 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
11 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi
12 v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zhou
13 Yun Zhang v. U.S. INS,
386 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). As
14 discussed below, the adverse credibility determination rests
15 on inconsistencies which called into question the basis of
16 Liang’s claim that he ran a restaurant and lived in a
17 building that the government demolished.
18 The agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency
19 concerning Liang’s place of residence. 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Liang testified that the
21 property he purchased in 2005 (which was allegedly
22 demolished by the Chinese government) served both as his
23 restaurant and residence, but his 2007 Household Register
3
1 listed his father’s address as his residence. The agency
2 was not compelled to credit Liang’s shifting explanations
3 for this inconsistency. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. He
4 proffered both that the Chinese government automatically
5 renews the Household Register without changing information,
6 but when confronted with a different change that had been
7 made, Liang’s explanation was not responsive: he stated that
8 he did not expect his property to be demolished and that his
9 father did not want Liang to leave the father’s house. The
10 agency was not compelled to accept these competing and non-
11 responsive explanations.
Id.
12 Second, Liang’s testimony was also inconsistent with
13 the 2007 Register with respect to his occupation. The
14 Register listed his occupation as grain farmer, not
15 restaurant operator or chef. The agency reasonably declined
16 to credit Liang’s explanation that, to the Chinese
17 government, “once you’re a farmer you’re always a farmer,”
18 because he provided no evidence of that policy.
Id.
19 The agency also reasonably found Liang’s credibility
20 further undermined by his lack of proof of ownership of the
21 demolished property. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate
22 his . . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the
23 absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant
4
1 unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been
2 called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268,
3 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Liang’s explanation that all proof of
4 property ownership was destroyed in the demolition was not
5 compelling because it failed to account for the absence of
6 photographs of the property, bank records, advertisements,
7 or letters from family members or employees; and it was
8 inconsistent with a tax record he produced that was issued
9 prior to the demolition. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80; see
10 also 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a
11 determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the
12 availability of corroborating evidence . . . [unless] a
13 reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such
14 corroborating evidence is unavailable.”); Siewe v. Gonzales,
15
480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document
16 or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable
17 to petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s
18 uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).
19 Given the multiple inconsistencies calling into
20 question whether Liang owned a restaurant and residence that
21 was demolished, as well as Liang’s failure to produce
22 sufficient corroborating evidence, it cannot be said “that
23 no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
5
1 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The
2 adverse credibility ruling is dispositive of asylum,
3 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
4 forms of relief are based on the same factual predicate.
5 Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
10
11
6
