Filed: May 11, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 15-3826 Guan v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 176 203 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH T
Summary: 15-3826 Guan v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 176 203 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH TH..
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15-3826
Guan v. Sessions
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 176 203
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 11th day of May, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HUA GUAN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-3826
17 NAC
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,1
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: David X. Feng, New York, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Nancy E.
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney
General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, is automatically substituted for
former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as the Respondent in this
case.
1 Friedman, Justin R. Markel, Senior
2 Litigation Counsel, Office of
3 Immigration Litigation, United
4 States Department of Justice,
5 Washington, D.C.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
10 DENIED.
11 Petitioner Hua Guan, a native and citizen of the People’s
12 Republic of China, seeks review of a November 3, 2015 decision
13 of the BIA affirming a March 25, 2014 decision of an Immigration
14 Judge (“IJ”) denying Guan’s application for asylum, withholding
15 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
16 (“CAT”). In re Hua Guan, No. A200 176 203 (B.I.A. Nov. 3, 2015),
17 aff’g No. A200 176 203 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 25, 2014).
18 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
19 and procedural history in this case.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the
21 IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
22 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
23 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
24 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
25 Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the
2
1 totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier
2 of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
3 candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the inherent
4 plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consistency
5 between the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . .,
6 the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the
7 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record
8 . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
9 or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
10 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
11 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
12 Guan was not credible as to his claim that Chinese officials
13 detained and beat him during a raid on his unregistered church
14 in China, and that he fears persecution on account of his
15 continued religious practice.
16 The IJ reasonably relied on Guan’s demeanor, finding him
17 unresponsive at times. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
18 That finding is supported by the record.
19 The demeanor finding and the overall credibility
20 determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies
21 regarding whether some of Guan’s fellow church members escaped
22 arrest during the police raid on his church, and where he has
3
1 lived and when he has attended church in the United States. See
2 Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.
3 2006); see also Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67 & n.3. Guan
4 did not provide compelling explanations for these
5 inconsistencies. See Majidi v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d at 80 (2d
6 Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner ‘must do more than offer a plausible
7 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;
8 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be
9 compelled to credit his testimony.’” (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang
10 v. U.S. INS,
386 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2004))).
11 Having questioned Guan’s credibility, the agency
12 reasonably relied further on his failure to corroborate his
13 claim with a statement from his wife. See Biao Yang v.
14 Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Guan explained that
15 his wife did not know that he was Christian, that he attended
16 church weekly, or that he was detained for 15 days. The IJ
17 reasonably found that explanation implausible, particularly
18 given that Guan claimed his wife knew that he had fled China
19 to seek religious freedom. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509
20 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an adverse
21 credibility determination may be based on the inherent
22 implausibility in an applicant’s story when the implausibility
4
1 finding was “tethered to record evidence”). The IJ’s
2 implausibility finding provided further support for the overall
3 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
5 Given the demeanor, inconsistency, lack of corroboration,
6 and implausibility findings, we conclude that the agency’s
7 adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial
8 evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determina-
9 tion is dispositive of Guan’s claims for asylum, withholding
10 of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based
11 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d
12 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
14 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
15 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
16 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
17 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
18 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
19 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
20 34.1(b).
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
