Filed: Sep. 08, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-1558 Singh-Kaur v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 812 998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (
Summary: 16-1558 Singh-Kaur v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 812 998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W..
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16-1558
Singh-Kaur v. Sessions
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 812 998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 8th day of September, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RICHARD C.WESLEY,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MANPREET SINGH-KAUR, AKA MANPREET
14 SINGH,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 16-1558
18 NAC
19 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, Gell & Gell, New
25 York, N.Y.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
29 Senior Litigation Counsel; Judith
30 R. O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney,
31 Office of Immigration Litigation,
32 United States Department of
33 Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
2 of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
3 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
4 Petitioner Manpreet Singh-Kaur (“Singh”), a native and
5 citizen of India, seeks review of an April 26, 2016, decision
6 of the BIA affirming an April 22, 2015, decision of an Immigration
7 Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding
8 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
9 (“CAT”). In re Manpreet Singh-Kaur, No. A200 812 998 (B.I.A.
10 Apr. 26, 2016), aff’g No. A200 812 998 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
11 Apr. 22, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
12 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
13 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
14 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
15 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
16 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established.
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d
18 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008)(per curiam).
19 The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides that
20 the agency must “[c]onsider[] the totality of the
21 circumstances,” and may base a credibility finding on an
22 applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
2
1 plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his or his
2 witness’s statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to
3 the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We
5 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . . it
6 is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
7 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
8 Further, “[a] petitioner must do more than offer a plausible
9 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;
10 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be
11 compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
12 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that substantial
14 evidence supports the agency’s finding that Singh was not
15 credible.
16 First, the agency reasonably relied on the inconsistency
17 between Singh’s testimony and his friend’s letter regarding the
18 medical treatment Singh and his father received after the June
19 2010 attack. See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Singh
20 testified that he was treated for five days and his father treated
21 for three days at a private hospital, which was located in a
22 nearby city outside their village. However, Singh’s friend’s
3
1 letter stated: “We took . . . Singh and his father to Village
2 Doctor for treatment. Doctor treated them for 2-3 weeks.”
3 Certified Administrative Record at 283. When Singh was asked
4 about this discrepancy, he contradicted his prior testimony and
5 stated that he and his father were first brought to the village
6 doctor, but the seriousness of their injuries required them to
7 be taken to the hospital. Singh then explained that his friend
8 “must have meant to say that we were taken to the village doctor
9 and later on the treatment continued for two to three weeks.”
10 Id. at 216-17. However, the IJ reasonably rejected this
11 explanation on the ground that the letter is best read to state
12 that Singh and his father were treated by the village doctor
13 for two to three weeks. See
Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. Although
14 Singh challenges the IJ’s interpretation of the letter, “[w]here
15 there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
16 choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Siewe v.
17 Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007).
18 Second, the agency reasonably relied on the omission from
19 Singh’s parents’ affidavit whether Singh and his father received
20 medical treatment after the June 2010 attack. See Xiu Xia Lin,
21 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (“[a]n inconsistency and an omission
22 are . . . functionally equivalent” for credibility purposes).
4
1 The affidavit from Singh’s parents, which otherwise describes
2 the June 2010 attack, omits any mention of the medical treatment
3 that Singh testified he and his father had received. When asked
4 about this omission, Singh responded that his parents must have
5 included it, and then stated that he did not know why a
6 description of the medical treatment had been omitted. The
7 agency reasonably rejected these explanations. See Majidi, 430
8 F.3d at 80.
9 Third, the agency reasonably relied on the omission from
10 Singh’s Shiromani Akali Dal letter whether he was attacked for
11 his involvement with the party. See Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at
12 166-67 & 166 n.3. Although Singh testified that his party was
13 aware of the January and June 2010 attacks that formed the basis
14 of his asylum claim, his party’s letter omits any mention of
15 the attacks. When asked about this omission, Singh responded
16 that he only asked for a “party letter” to confirm his membership
17 in the party. The agency reasonably rejected this explanation
18 because the letter provided specific details about Singh and
19 the type of harm that could befall him in the future, and it
20 was therefore implausible that the author would omit the harm
21 that allegedly befell Singh in the past. See Majidi,
430 F.3d
22 at 80; see also
Siewe, 480 F.3d at 167.
5
1 Lastly, the agency reasonably found Singh’s corroborating
2 evidence insufficient to rehabilitate his credibility. See
3 Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
4 curiam)(“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her
5 testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of
6 corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
7 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
8 question.”). Singh challenges the IJ’s decision to give
9 diminished weight to his corroborating letters and affidavits
10 because they were written for purposes of Singh’s proceedings
11 by interested parties who were not available for cross
12 examination. However, the agency reasonably declined to credit
13 this evidence. See Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir.
14 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to give “letter ‘very
15 little evidentiary weight,’ both because it was unsworn and
16 because it was submitted by an interested witness”); In re H-L-H-
17 & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (giving
18 diminished weight to letters from relatives because “[t]he
19 authors of the letters are interested witnesses who were not
20 subject to cross-examination”), rev’d on other grounds by Hui
21 Lin Huang v. Holder,
677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Xiao
22 Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.
6
1 2006) (holding that the weight accorded to an applicant’s
2 evidence “lie[s] largely within the discretion of the IJ”
3 (alteration in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 Given the agency’s findings, and its reasonable treatment
5 of Singh’s corroborating evidence, the totality of the
6 circumstances supports the adverse credibility determination.
7 See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. A reasonable adjudicator
8 would not be compelled to conclude otherwise.
Id. at 167. The
9 credibility finding is dispositive of Singh’s claims for asylum,
10 withholding of removal, and CAT relief due to his status as a
11 politically active Sikh separatist because those claims are
12 based on the same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v.
13 Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
14 Singh does not meaningfully challenge the agency’s
15 determination that he did not establish his eligibility for
16 asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief solely on the basis
17 of his Sikh religion, and has therefore waived review of that
18 determination in this Court. See Norton v. Sam’s Club,
145 F.3d
19 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the
20 briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed
21 on appeal.”). Although Singh asserts that the IJ ignored
22 evidence that established his fear of future persecution, he
7
1 is incorrect. The IJ considered this evidence and took
2 administrative notice of the most recent State Department
3 International Religious Freedom Report that addressed religious
4 persecution in India, but reasonably found that the evidence
5 did not describe incidents of persecution against Sikhs on
6 account of their religion. And, while the IJ acknowledged that
7 a report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
8 reflects the detention of Sikh separatists suspected of
9 “militancy,” the IJ correctly observed that this evidence was
10 not relevant to Singh because the political dimension of his
11 claim was not credible. Certified Administrative Record at 131.
12 Singh does not address these findings in his brief.
13 Lastly, Singh’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to consider
14 his supplemental country conditions evidence on appeal or to
15 remand to the IJ for consideration of the evidence in the first
16 instance is meritless. “[T]he Board will not engage in
17 factfinding in the course of deciding appeals,” 8 C.F.R.
18 § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), and “[a] motion to remand that relies on
19 newly available evidence is held to the substantive requirements
20 of a motion to reopen,” Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
21 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2005). A movant seeking remand for
22 consideration of new evidence must therefore present “material,
8
1 previously unavailable evidence,” id., and satisfy the “‘heavy
2 burden’ of demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would
3 likely alter the result in [his] case,” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
4
546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008)(quoting Immig. & Naturalization
5 Serv. v. Abudu,
485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). Singh does not challenge
6 the BIA’s finding that his evidence was neither new nor
7 sufficient to alter the outcome of his proceedings and has
8 therefore waived review of that determination in this Court.
9 See
Norton, 145 F.3d at 117.
10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
11 DENIED.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
9
