Filed: May 10, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-1654 Singh v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 938 728 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
Summary: 16-1654 Singh v. Sessions BIA Christensen, IJ A200 938 728 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH T..
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16-1654
Singh v. Sessions
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 938 728
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 10th day of May, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
REENA RAGGI,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
JASPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 16-1654
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Anas J. Ahmed, Pannun the Firm P.C.,
Jackson Heights, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Jessica A.
Dawgert, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Anthony J. Messuri, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Jaspreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ’s”) denial of Singh’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jaspreet Singh, No. A 200 938
728 (B.I.A. Apr. 28, 2016), aff’g No. A 200 938 728 (Immig.
Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 22, 2014). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain
our decision to deny the petition for review.
We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions,
including portions of the IJ’s decision not explicitly
discussed by the BIA, see Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005), applying well-established standards
of review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, in light
of “the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse
credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor,
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candor, or responsiveness” and on inconsistencies in the
applicant’s statements. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). In
conducting “substantial evidence” review, “[w]e defer . . .
to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 167. A petitioner
challenging an IJ’s credibility determination “must do more
than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
2005) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The adverse credibility determination against
Singh is supported by substantial evidence.
The IJ compared Singh’s testimony to the record of his
credible fear interview and found significant omissions.
Singh does not deny that those omissions exist, but attributes
them to his being nervous and cold at the interview and to
his uncle’s advice that he not mention certain incidents
during his interview. The IJ had the discretion to reject
that explanation. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715,
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725 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We again reject the notion that a
petitioner’s claim that she was nervous and distracted during
the credible fear interview automatically undermines or
negates its reliability as a source of her statements.”).
Moreover, the omissions were substantial. At the
credible fear interview, Singh identified two beatings by
Congress Party members as the basis for his decision to leave
India and stated that he had not been harmed on any other
occasions. He omitted two detentions and beatings asserted
at his hearing. As the IJ reasonably concluded, Singh
appeared to have embellished his asylum claim at the hearing,
making his explanation that his uncle advised him not to
mention the police unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
F.3d at 80–81 (explaining that the agency is not required to
credit an explanation that is merely plausible or possible).
Singh also omitted from his credible fear interview a third
attack by Congress Party members. At his hearing, Singh
explained that he omitted this incident because it was less
severe than the others. The IJ was not compelled to credit
that explanation, particularly given Singh’s specific
response during his credible fear interview that he was beaten
by the Congress Party only on two occasions.
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A single inconsistency or omission that goes to the heart
of a claim, like any of those described above, can alone
provide sufficient support for an adverse credibility
finding. See, e.g., Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
446 F.3d 289, 294-95 (2d Cir. 2006). But in addition, the
IJ reasonably relied on Singh’s confused testimony during the
hearing. For example, Singh initially testified that
Congress Party members beat him in May 2007, but later
testified that it was the police who beat him in May 2007.
He also testified that he joined his political party in
February 2009, but then said he joined in June 2010.
Given these inconsistencies and omissions, substantial
evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Singh’s asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT claims were all based on the same factual predicate, and
so the credibility determination was dispositive as to all
three forms of relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,
156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
5
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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