Filed: Apr. 03, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 16-2579 Guo v. Sessions BIA Segal, IJ A205 616 677 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 16-2579 Guo v. Sessions BIA Segal, IJ A205 616 677 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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16-2579
Guo v. Sessions
BIA
Segal, IJ
A205 616 677
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3rd day of April, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
YOUQUAN GUO,
Petitioner,
v. No. 16-2579
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Youquan Guo, pro se, Flushing, New
York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Janette L. Allen,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Jessica
D. Strokus, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Youquan Guo, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance
of an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). See In re Youquan Guo, No. A205 616 677 (B.I.A. June
27, 2016), aff’g No. A205 616 677 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 22,
2015). Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s
decision, “we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency
determination,” Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.
2008), applying well-established standards of review, see
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162,
165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). In so doing, we assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain
our decision to deny the petition for review.
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The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances,” base an adverse credibility finding on
inconsistencies and omissions in an asylum applicant’s
testimony, application, and documentary evidence. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d
at 163-64, 166-67. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable
fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 167. Here, substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Guo was not
credible.
The IJ reasonably concluded that Guo’s testimony
materially contradicted his application and his wife’s letter
regarding the injuries he suffered in 1999 and 2010. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Guo’s application alleged
that his arm was dislocated in 1999, when he fought with family
planning officials who came to his apartment. A letter from
Guo’s wife dated February 19, 2014, also stated that Guo’s “arm
was grabbed out of joints” during this 1999 incident. C.A.R.
133. In contrast, at his hearing, Guo testified repeatedly
that hospital guards dislocated his arm in 2010 and then
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testified about medical treatment he received for that injury,
explaining that he did not receive the treatment until after
his release from detention. When confronted with this
inconsistency, Guo confirmed that the injury occurred in 1999
as stated in his application, not in 2010. The IJ reasonably
rejected Guo’s explanation that he had trouble remembering the
dates because of his age and lack of education, noting that Guo
was only 41 years old at the time of his hearing and that a lack
of education did not explain such a memory lapse. See Majidi
v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
testimony.” (emphasis in original)(internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Guo’s current argument that his confusion should be excused
because he lacks medical expertise and, therefore, was “unable
to describe what dislocation was,” Pet. Br. at 10-11, does not
resolve whether his arm was injured or when such injury
occurred. The explanation instead adds further inconsistency,
as it conflicts with his application and testimony, which
4
specifically characterized the injury to his arm as a
dislocation.
The inconsistency regarding whether and when the
dislocation occurred provides substantial evidence for the
adverse credibility ruling. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] material
inconsistency in an aspect of [an applicant’s] story that served
as an example of the very persecution from which he sought
asylum . . . afforded substantial evidence to support the
adverse credibility finding.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)); see also Siewe v. Gonzales,
480 F.3d 160, 170
(2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document or a single instance
of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner)
infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or
unauthenticated evidence.”).
Because Guo’s claims were all based on the same factual
predicate, the adverse credibility determination is
dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
5
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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